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ABSTRACT 
Francis Bacon has long been considered a significant figure in the Scientific 
Revolution, but debate continues regarding the significance and quality of his 
contribution. Although Bacon claimed to be developing a natural philosophical 
movement, he contributed little to methodological or theoretical aspects of the work that 
would eventually become modem science. Bacon's contributions should be evaluated 
within the context of Renaissance humanism rather than modem science, to the extent 
that in arguing for a tum to natural philosophy his aims were more consistent with the 
broad societal goals of his fellow humanists than the more limited ambitions of those 
pursuing natural philosophy. Bacon's methods were those of a skilled apologist, 
thoroughly trained in rhetoric, arguing for the study of nature as the basis for a better 
society. In arguing for the study of natural philosophy as the foundation for his Great 
Instauration, Bacon used concepts and commonplaces culled from a range of ancient 
texts, including schools both earlier and later than Plato and Aristotle. Among the ancient 
philosophies whose influence on Bacon has been insufficiently studied is Stoicism, which 
understood the cosmos as the embodiment and working out of reason, often identified as 
god. Stoicism provided a way for Bacon to rationalize the study of nature as compatible 
with the dominant Christian theology of the day. This dissertation examines the ways in 
which Bacon's philosophical project relied on Stoicism, both as a source of rhetorical 
commonplaces, and as a model for the synthetic and comprehensive philosophical system 
he hoped to institute. Within the context of civic humanism, Bacon blended the Stoic 
concept of nature as normative with the Renaissance commonplace of nature as a second 
divine text to authorize the pursuit of natural philosophy. The wise men of Solomon's 
House in Bacon's New Atlantis co_mbine aspects of the contemplative Stoic sage with the 
humanist concept of the prudentia embodied in the vir bonus. I argue that the Royal 
vu 
Society is evidence of the success of Bacon's Great Instauration and that he helped create 
the space in which such a collegial society committed to the study of nature could 
develop. 
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PREFACE 
The availability of primary texts for this dissertation might be described as either 
feast or famine. In the case of the works of Francis Bacon, there are so many different 
editions that references in the secondary literature are sometimes difficult to locate. For 
convenience, I have relied primarily upon John M. Robertson's anthology, Philosophical 
Works of Francis Bacon, which contains the Advancement of Learning and its Latin 
translation, De augmentis scientiarum, the Novum Organum, the Essays, and a few of 
Bacon's minor natural philosophical texts. References to this work are indicated by the 
abbreviation PW, followed by the page numbers. I have also tried always to indicate 
which of the philosophical texts is being cited. For the letters and other philosophical 
texts that are not included in the Robertson anthology, I have provided a full citation. 
As is noted in the text, many Stoic texts are no longer extant and are known only 
by reference in other ancient texts. These Stoic fragments are available in a number of 
collections, including Doxographi Graeci by Hans Diels and Stoicorum Veterum 
Fragmenta by H. von Arnim. With the exception of extant works such those of Cicero, 
Diogenese Laertius, Plutarch, and Seneca, I have relied on the English translation of 
Greek and Latin fragments in The Hellenistic Philosophers by A. A Long and D. N. 
Sedley. The translations are arranged by topic into chapters and given an alphabetical 
designation. References to the translations of primary sources from this volume are 
designated HP, followed by the chapter number and letter reference (e.g., HP 26A). 
Citations of the annotations and other secondary material in this text follow the standard 
MLA format for parenthetical citations. 
Justus Lipsius's Physiologiae Stoicorum Libri Tres, L. Annaeo Senecae 
is a primary representation of Seneca's Stoic natural philosophy in the Renaissance. This 
text has not been translated into English and the translations here are mine. 
Xl 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Abbreviations for Bacon's texts 
Adv. The Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human 
de Aug 
Inst. Mag. 
NO 
PW 
De dignitate et augmentis scientiarium 
lnstauratio Magno 
Novum Organum 
Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon 
Abbreviations for Stoic texts 
DL 
De fin. 
HP 
Diogenes Laertius 
De finibus bonorum et malorum 
The Hellenistic Philosophers 
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INTRODUCTION 
The period between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries has been seen 
as a critical time in the transformation of the Western mind from a Renaissance humanist 
intellectual tradition, which privileged rhetoric as an epistemological architectonic, to a 
modern, positivist world view, which privileges the scientific method as a way of 
structuring our understanding of the world. Twentieth-century historians attempting to 
write a history of science began to call this transformation the "scientific revolution" 
because they viewed the changes associated with it as both novel and radical. According 
to this history, the scientific revolution does not refer merely to methodological changes, 
but involves profound alterations in the way human beings viewed themselves and their 
place in the world. For example, during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, the accepted 
view of the cosmos placed human beings at the middle of a Great Chain of Being, 
inferior to God and the angels, but superior to animals, plants, and inanimate matter. Just 
as humans imperfectly reflected God's perfect nature, the physical world reflected actions 
in the human realm, so that disturbances in human society were mirrored in the natural 
world. After the scientific revolution, which saw the establishment of a mechanistic 
worldview, human beings have increasingly seen themselves as nature's subjects rather 
than its masters. For example, in the twentieth century and beyond, genetic factors are 
believed not only to determine physical characteristics, but to predispose one to certain 
types of behavior as well. Because science is secured by the regularity of natural law and 
the rigorous application of scientific method it suggests the availability of a kind of 
certainty or "truth" and obviates the need for the arts of contingency that preceded it. It is 
difficult to understate the significance and magnitude of the changes that began in the 
sixteenth century, and in that sense the metaphor of revolution is an appropriate one. 
However, to the extent that "revolution" also represents change that is an abrupt and 
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radical departure from what has gone before, the metaphor leads us to focus on the 
differences between distinct eras rather than on their points of intersection and 
commonality. One particularly significant consequence of using the metaphor of 
revolution is its inadequacy to account for the ways "nonscientific" philosophies, 
practices, or arts of earlier eras have contributed to the formation of what we now call 
science. 
Recently, historians of science have begun to question the accepted tradition that 
the scientific revolution and have focused, instead, on the intersection of science and the 
broader culture. In Leviathan and the Airpump, their exploration of the conflict between 
Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle regarding experimental method, Steven Shapin and 
Simon Shaffer argue that "there is a conditional relationship between the nature of the 
polity occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity" (332). There 
is no question that there is a conditional relationship between and the wider polity and 
any number of institutions, such as religion or education, as well as science. In the case of 
the development of modem science, Renaissance humanism was among the most 
powerful influences on the "wider polity" within which the "polity occupied by scientific 
intellectuals" developed. It is one thing, however, for a new institution to gain authority 
among a group of adherents, but quite another for it to gain authority within the wider 
culture. It is often the case that a significant persuasive effort is required to open a space 
within the larger polity for a new institution to develop. Certainly, humanism, to the 
extent that it recovered ancient texts of all kinds, provided much of the fuel that impelled 
this so-called revolution by inserting many "new" ideas into the culture of the Middle 
Ages. These new ideas included natural philosophy as well as moral and ethical 
philosophies. 1 In this sense, humanism created the conditions in which modem science 
1N.B. It should be noted that humanism is not, itself, a philosophy, nor does the curriculum that is the 
unifying element of humanism include philosophy. See Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its 
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could begin to develop. In the case of the scientific revolution, the humanist project also 
provided the tools, specifically, the art of rhetoric, by which natural philosophers and 
those who were sympathetic to their work began to achieve epistemological legitimacy 
for their ideas. Thus, understanding the epistemological change that has been called the 
scientific revolution requires a fuller picture of the ways that humanists both planted and 
nurtured the seeds for the development of modern science. 
Francis Bacon has long been considered a significant figure in the scientific 
revolution, but there continues to be much debate regarding the significance and quality 
of his contribution. Bacon has been called by some a "father" of science, while others 
have characterized his contributions to modern science as a "joke. "2 I argue that this 
disparity in evaluations of his work arises in part as a result of examining his ideas from 
the perspective of modern science, rather than attempting to understand his work in terms 
of his own era. Bacon, himself, is responsible for much of the difficulty in evaluating his 
contributions. Although he claimed to be developing a natural philosophical movement, 
he contributed very little to the theoretical aspects of the work that would eventually 
become modern science. In addition, his insistence upon the novelty of his ideas belied 
his debts to previous philosophical systems. Bacon's contributions should be evaluated as 
those of a humanist rather than those of a philosopher, to the extent that in arguing for a 
turn to natural philosophy his goals were more consistent with those of his fellow 
humanists than the more limited ambitions of those who were actually involved in the 
investigation of the natural world. While he certainly attempted to influence the "polity 
occupied by scientific intellectuals," to use Shapin and Shaffer's terms, his primary 
achievements were in influencing the "wider polity." His methods were not those of the 
natural philosopher, but those of a skilled apologist, thoroughly trained in rhetoric, 
Sources, for an extended discussion of humanism. This does not, however, negate the fact that many of the 
texts recovered by humanists were philosophical. 
2 Alexandre Koyre is a primary critic of Bacon. See Galileo Studies, 39, n. 6. 
3 
arguing for the study of nature as the basis for a better society. 
In making the case for the study of natural philosophy, Bacon used concepts and 
commonplaces from the whole range of ancient texts, from histories to philosophies. He 
not only culled concepts from the most famous thinkers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and 
Cicero, but deployed ideas from many other ancient Greek and Roman natural 
philosophers, including several atomists from Democritus to the Epicureans. Among the 
ancient philosophies whose influence on Bacon has been insufficiently studied is that of 
the Stoics, particularly the philosophical works of Seneca, the Roman dramatist, moralist, 
and philosopher. Stoicism, which is based on the notion that reason is the immanent and 
guiding force of nature, held many concepts that were amenable for use of early modem 
natural philosophers. Historian William Bouwsma has argued that Renaissance Stoicism 
should be understood to have two strains, Augustinian and Stoic, the latter of which is 
particularly concerned with the perfection of human rationality, while the former is more 
closely allied with Augustine's theological concerns. This dissertation examines the ways 
in which Bacon's philosophical project relied heavily on Stoic humanism, both as a 
source of rhetorical commonplaces, and as a model for the kind of syncretic and 
comprehensive philosophical system he hoped to institute. 
Traditional narratives of the scientific revolution and of humanism have suggested 
that the two are incompatible with one another. Chapter One, "The Humanist Background 
to the Scientific Revolution," reviews the historical literature on the scientific revolution 
and humanism. I argue that the metaphor of "scientific revolution," denoting as it does 
radical and sudden change, obscures the full range of the epistemological complexity that 
characterized the late Renaissance and early modem periods. Most twentieth-century 
narratives of the scientific revolution have focused primarily on the internal history of 
science, ignoring the ways in which humanism helped to make a space within the broader 
culture for natural philosophy to develop. I argue that the philosophical works of Francis 
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Bacon offer an opportunity to study the ways in which humanism served as an incubator 
for the nascent practices that would become modern science. Histories that have 
portrayed Bacon as anti-humanist have not recognized the ways in which the ancient 
philosophy of Stoicism provided a model for Bacon's "active" science and was a source 
of commonplaces that allowed him to reconcile a number of cultural conflicts. Although 
many twentieth-century narratives of the scientific revolution have largely represented it 
as a triumph of Platonism over Aristotelianism, the philosophical background of the 
Renaissance was much more complex than these narratives suggest. I build upon 
William Bouwsma's argument that Renaissance humanism comprised two specific 
strains, one of which was heavily influenced by ancient Stoicism. I summarize the basic 
tenets of Stoicism, which was transmitted directly through ancient texts recovered by the 
humanists and indirectly through Christian theology, and examine the ways in which the 
philosophy influenced the development of Renaissance thought. 
Bacon recognized that education was the primary vector through which humanist 
values and ideas were disseminated throughout the culture. His first philosophical work 
and the one that he says constitutes the first part of his Instauratio Magno was The 
Advancement of Learning in which he describes a complete reformation of learning, 
including institutional and curricular reform. In Chapter Two, "Advancing the New 
Philosophy Through Humanist Institutions: The Influence of Stoic Humanism on Bacon's 
New Philosophy," I argue that the comprehensive and syncretic nature of Stoicism 
provides a model for the comprehensive educational system that Bacon proposed. This 
educational system, which is founded upon natural philosophy and is organized according 
to a model of faculty psychology that emphasizes reason as an organizing principle, 
follows Stoic epistemological principles. I argue that Bacon's rationale for his inductive 
method, which he describes as a "kind of logic," is founded on concepts from Stoic 
epistemology. The method itself is not particularly successful because it relies on the only 
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art with which Bacon himself was actually familiar, the art of rhetoric. While Bacon's 
method per se is not effective, his argument for the study of nature, i.e. "things 
themselves," is ultimately successful. I also argue that the "universality" that Bacon 
claims for his method and that he demonstrates in his Essays is related to the Stoic view 
of an organic, systematic, and comprehensive philosophy. 
Twentieth-century historians have represented Bacon's "plain style" as "anti­
humanist" and "anti-rhetorical." However, when considered within the broad and diverse 
context of Renaissance discourse, Bacon's rhetorical practice was not radically out of 
step with that of his contemporaries, nor is it so modern that later readers find it more 
familiar than that of his contemporaries. What is unique in Bacon's theories of discourse, 
however, is the degree to which he situates rhetoric within his understanding of human 
psychology. In Chapter Three, "Stoic Influence on Bacon's Rhetoric and Discourse," I 
argue that when viewed within its appropriate context of the Stoic strain of Renaissance 
humanism, Bacon's discursive theory is neither anti-humanist nor anti-rhetorical, but is 
consonant with the Stoic linguistic theories and with the values, goals, and practices of 
civic humanism. I analyze Bacon's lnstauratio Magno as a rhetorical "map" of the 
intellectual processes involved in his reform of learning. 
In the fragmentary New Atlantis, Bacon presents a society in which his ideas are 
realized. At the center of this society is a philosophical institution in which educated men 
are engaged in scientific studies that are intended to benefit the society. At the center of 
this institution is a model of a wise natural philosopher. The concept of the wise man or 
sage is one that is shared by Renaissance humanism and Stoic philosophy, although the 
concept of the wise man in humanism differs in significant ways from that described in 
Stoic philosophy. In Chapter Four, "The Stoic Sage in the House of Solomon," I argue 
that the philosophers of the House of Solomon, who are primarily engaged in empirical 
and experimental studies, are examples of the Baconian concept of the sage. The well-
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ordered nature of Bacon's imagined society demonstrates his view that the Stoic ideal of 
behaving appropriately in accordance with nature must be combined with the humanist 
value of utility to society. Further, the sage, as Bacon conceptualizes him, is one who 
fully integrates, or "embodies" all aspects of the arts: practical, theoretical, and 
productive. 
In closing, I examine Bacon's influence, not in the twenty-first century, but in an 
era much closer to his own. I argue that the Royal Society is evidence of the success of 
Bacon's Great Instauration and that he succeeded in creating the space in which such a 
collegial society committed to the study of the natural world could safely exist. What has 
been called the scientific revolution could only happen because a space for it to occur 
was opened by those like Francis Bacon, skilled in the art of rhetoric and operating within 
a humanist matrix. Bacon blended the Stoic attitude of nature as normative with the 
notion that nature was a second divine text and with the values of civic humanism to 
authorize the pursuit of natural philosophy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE HUMANIST BACKGROUND TO THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
"Bacon, the founder of modem science" is a joke and a bad one at that, 
that one can still find in the textbooks. In fact Bacon understood nothing 
about science. He was credulous and completely uncritical. His manner of 
thinking was closer to alchemy and magic (he believed in 'sympathies'), 
in short to that of a primitive or to a thinker of the Renaissance than to that 
of a Galileo or even a scholastic. 
-Alexandre Koyre3 
The new-found land Bacon sighted was not something to be won in a 
generation or by machines alone. It would have to be drawn slowly, by 
infinite and continuing effort, out of minds whose dreams must rise 
superior to the existing world and shape that world by understanding of its 
laws into something more consistent with man's better nature . . . . Bacon's 
science, as he formulated it, was to have taken account of man himself and 
to have studied particularly the ethical heights to which individuals, and 
perhaps after them the mass might attain. His "second world" as his late 
fragment, The New Atlantis, indicates, was to be a world of men 
transformed, not merely as we know them amidst the machines of the 
twentieth century. Thus parts of Bacon's dream lie beyond us still . . . .  It 
was his task to summon the wise men, not for one day's meeting or 
contention, not to build a philosophy of permanence under whose shadow 
3 Galileo Studies, 39, n. 6. 
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small men might sit and argue, but to leave, instead, a philosophy forever 
and deliberately unfinished-not, as he so ably put it, as a belief to be held 
but rather as a work to be done. 
-Loren Eiseley4 
The period between the latter part of the sixteenth century and the end of the 
eighteenth century comprised a critical time in the transformation of the Western 
intellectual tradition from a Renaissance humanist tradition, which privileged rhetoric as 
a means of dealing with cultural issues, to a modem, rational, and positivistic world view 
that privileges "science" as a way of gaining objective information that can be used to 
understand the world. 5 Simply put, during the early modem period, the focus of 
intellectual efforts changed from one that emphasized what "ought" to be done to one 
concerned with what "is. "6 This change was so momentous and so pervasive that it came 
to be known by the middle of the twentieth century as the "scientific revolution," the 
nature and extent of which continues to be debated at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. In a similar fashion, Francis Bacon' s role in the scientific revolution has been the 
subject of continuing debate, as the two passages at the beginning of this chapter suggest. 
4Francis Bacon and the Modern Dilemma 1 4- 1 6. 
5 There is considerable slippage in the names applied to the historical periods under consideration here. 
Most troublesome is the term Renaissance, which is reckoned to have begun quite early in Italy and arrived 
in northern Europe and England, the subject of this dissertation, quite a b it later. Generally, I have used the 
term medieval to refer to the period between the fall of Roman empire and the end of the thirteenth century, 
but I am primarily concerned with Scho lasticism and its emphasis on Aristotelian dialectic as an 
epistemological architectonic; Renaissance refers to the period from 1 300 to the end of the sixteenth 
century, which saw the rise of humanism with its emphasis on rhetoric as the preeminent epistemological 
art; early modern era refers to the period from 1 600 to 1 800 during which the new philosophy was 
established. The life of Francis Bacon ( 1 56 1 - 1 626) began in the late Renaissance and ended in the early 
modern period, and his works in many ways reflect the intellectual ferment of this transitional period. 
6 The notion that the change from humanism to science is a move from concern with "ought'
, 
to "is" is a 
twentieth century commonplace used to describe the move from a teleological to an ontological world 
view. See, for example, Wayne Booth's use of this commonplace in his critique of positivism and 
"irrationalism," Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent. See also Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, 
and Skepticism in the Renaissance. 
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Scientist Loren Eiseley praises Bacon as a great innovator and prophet of science, as "the 
man who saw through time" (28), while historian of science Alexandre Koyre, in more 
generous moments, accepts Bacon's description of himself as a "buccinator,"7 or herald 
of science (Galileo Studies 39), but at other times, insists that labeling him as a scientist 
is a "joke" (39, n6). While Bacon's influence on the development of early modem 
science is certainly open to question, both views of Bacon reflect the perspective of those 
inside an institutionalized science that did not fully emerge until more than one hundred 
years after Bacon's death. Eisley's extravagant praise is justified by a general 
correspondence between the prevailing twentieth-century narrative of the development of 
modem science and Bacon's description of a productive natural philosophy, despite the 
fact that Bacon's own inductive method is not known to have been used to any great 
degree by anyone but Bacon himself. It is true, as Koyre claims, that Bacon was not a 
scientist in any sense that we would recognize today. He may have dabbled at 
experimental science, but he made no significant contributions in any area of scientific 
endeavor. 8 He was not significantly involved in the new experimental natural philosophy, 
nor did he help to develop the mathematical and theoretical aspects of modem science. It 
is also true that Bacon's judgments about the work of other natural philosophers were not 
always accurate.9 
7 The term "buccinator" was Bacon's own (buccinator novi temporis). See Brian Vickers' discussion of the 
metaphors Bacon used to describe the prophetic nature of his enterprise in Francis Bacon and Renaissance 
Prose 3-5 . Koyre' s  understanding of the term "buccinator" would not likely coincide with Bacon's. For 
Koyre, Bacon was merely a buccinator of science; for Bacon, with his Renaissance sensibilities of the 
fower of language, to announce the arrival of a new philosophical age was, in a sense, to make it so. 
Koyre's dismissal of the view that Bacon was a scientist is perhaps buttressed by the standard story of the 
end of Bacon's life that he died of a cold or pneumonia contracted while stuffing dead a chicken with snow 
as part of an impromptu experiment to determine the possibility of using cold as a food preservative. 
Jardine and Stew� in their recent biography. suggest that the story is apocryphal and that the cold was, 
instead, a result of his experimenting with nitre or some other chemical to cure a recurring condition. It 
seems clear, however, that whatever h is experiments were, they were neither executed methodically nor 
documented. 
9 According to Brian Vickers, "Bacon was unaware of many of the new developments of his age and when 
he did hear of them he rejected them out of hand to return to the traditional theories-so he was either 
ignorant of or indifferent to the work of Kepler, Copernicus, Galileo, Napier's logarithms, Harvey's 
1 1  
However, Koyre' s  judgments are based on criteria of modem science that did not exist 
when Bacon was writing in the seventeenth century. Implicit in Koyre' s view of Bacon as 
a buccinator of science who "merely" announced its arrival are certain assumptions about 
the degree to which theories and practices that we now call science had already attained 
epistemological and cultural authority within early modern culture. Also implicit in 
Koyre's  willingness to grant Bacon' s status as a herald of modem science is the 
assumption that the epistemological authority for early modern natural philosophy was 
inherent in its theories and practices, so that the only task for Bacon and others like him 
was to announce its arrival. However, the experience of Koyre ' s own candidate for the 
father of modem science, Galileo Galilei, who suffered excommunication and house 
arrest for advancing his theories regarding the heliocentric universe, demonstrates that the 
knowledge advanced by early modern natural philosophers was not universally regarded 
as self-evident. 
The difficulty Galileo experienced in gaining acceptance for his theories 
regarding celestial mechanics illustrates certain epistemological conflicts of the 
Renaissance and early modern periods, consideration of which is necessary for 
delineating Bacon' s contribution to the development of modem science. Galileo's  model 
of a heliocentric universe was controversial because it fundamentally contradicted a 
cosmological model based upon ancient astronomical observations made without benefit 
of technological aids and buttressed by theology and Aristotelian natural philosophy, 
which conceptualized the cosmos as a teleological creation in the process of actualizing 
its potentiality . 10 However, many Renaissance thinkers privileged biblical authority and 
discovery of the circulation of the blood, and William Gilbert's De Magnete, one of the few pieces of 
empirical research in the Renaissance, which he rejected scornfully. Gilbert, he said, 'hath made 
philosophy out of the observations of a loadstone' ." (Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose 2). It is not 
inconceivable that Bacon's  lack of appreciation for Galileo is in part responsible for Koyre's lack of 
a�preciation of Bacon. 1 Steven Shapin provides a concise description of the Aristotelian background for Ptolemy's cosmology. 
See The Scientific Revolution 17-30 .  
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the ideas of ancient thinkers over the new discoveries of their contemporaries. Thus, 
regardless of the accuracy of Galileo's observations and calculations, or the validity of 
his conclusions, and no matter how many individual adherents his theories gained, larger 
cultural institutions, particularly the Catholic Church, resisted such radical theories. 
Galileo, who was educated in the humanist tradition, attempted to use rhetorical 
strategies 1 1  to make his ideas less threatening to those who were not disposed to accept 
them but was unable to circumvent this institutional resistance. Galileo's experience 
makes it is clear that as important as it is to understand the development of science as an 
institution, it is equally important to understand how the knowledge and practices that we 
now call science gained epistemological authority in a world in which religion and what 
beliefs we would now call superstition were the lenses through which many viewed an 
earth-centered universe. 
The institutional resistance that Galileo attempted to circumvent was the focus of 
Bacon's efforts regarding the advancement of natural philosophy, efforts which, despite 
his claims to the contrary, were primarily rhetorical rather than theoretical. Bacon's 
contribution to modern science ought to be seen, not as the discovery of new natural 
knowledge, the truth of which was incontrovertible, but as the establishment of a 
framework within which natural knowledge could be perceived as authoritative by the 
larger culture. Bacon was eminently suited for such a task. By virtue of his education and 
subsequent public life, Bacon was a quintessential humanist. He was trained in rhetoric 
and committed to the active life of service to king and country, first as a solicitor, later as 
a member of Parliament, and ultimately as Lord Chancellor, the most exalted official in 
1 1  In Novelties in the Heavens, Jean Dietz Moss analyzes Gal ileo's attempts to situate his theories within 
the rhetorical context of the Renaissance. Galileo published his theory of cosmology in the then-common 
form of a dialogue, hoping that the controversial nature of his view might be diluted when presented as one 
of a number of perspectives, including the traditional view. For more on Galileo 's attempts to argue for his 
ideas see also Mario Biagioli, Galileo, Courtier, and Dava Sobell, Galileo 's Daughter. Both examine the 
ways in which Galileo 's work was both made possible and constrained by the wider polity of court and 
church. 
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the land, under King Jaines I. Bacon's early education focused on the classical texts 12 
valued by the humanists . As an adult and a self-proclaimed philosopher, however, he 
rejected both the Aristotelian dialectic of the scholastics and the copious rhetoric of the 
humanists in favor of modes of thought and communication that were more appropriate 
for his interest in natural philosophy. This does not mean that he rejected classical 
philosophy and rhetoric altogether. Classical ideas informed Bacon's system for natural 
philosophy. Rather than being a rejection of classical philosophies, his new philosophy is 
an eclectic blend of ideas and concepts from the most ancient pre-Socratic Greek 
philosophers and more recent Greek and Roman philosophies such as Epicureanism and 
Stoicism. In addition, Bacon's practice of rhetoric is as closely tied to classical models as 
was the copious Ciceronian rhetoric he rejected, and his reform of learning owes as much 
to classical thought as did the traditional humanistic model. Along with many of his 
contemporaries Bacon rejected Cicero's writings as the ideal for eloquent discourse, 
imitating instead the rhetorical models of the Roman writers Tacitus, Marcus Aurelius, 
and Seneca, all of whom were Stoics. Bacon's imitation of these rhetorical models is not 
merely stylistic, however. In the Renaissance, eloquence was not seen as mere style, but 
reflected the character of the speaker. For the Stoics, style was directly related to thought. 
Bacon's adoption of Stoic style brought with it a whole set of beliefs about the 
relationship between language, thought, and nature. 
Koyre is ultimately correct that Bacon's method is of little or no value. While 
Bacon's Novum Organum presents an elaborate justification and explication of his . 
method, it is essentially an empty vessel that is not particularly worthy. However his 
critique of the epistemological status quo and justification of natural philosophy as a 
12 At Oxford, Bacon's education included the works of Livy, Caesar, Sallust, Demosthenes' Orations, 
Homer's Iliad, Cicero' s  Complete Works, and the rhetorical handbook, the Ad Herrenium. He also studied 
Plato, Aristotle, Hermogenes, and Xenophon, Greek grammar and logic (Jardine & Stewart 35). 
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means of discovering truth and improving the human condition were both effective and 
eloquent. In sum, Bacon's contribution to the scientific revolution was primarily 
persuasive, deploying ancient ideas and rhetorical practices of the humanist tradition to 
the end of establishing nature as a source of authoritative and reliable knowledge, which 
could in turn serve as a foundation for making moral, ethical, and political judgments and 
for materially improving the human situation. If Bacon did ·not participate in the 
"scientific revolution," per se, he certainly helped to create a space within which it could 
occur, lending his exceptional rhetorical ability to deploying ancient ideas in the cause of 
reviving natural philosophy. 
Renaissance Humanism 
If we are to understand how the ideas and practices that are the precursors of 
modem science, many of which directly contradicted accepted ways of knowing, came to 
have epistemological authority during the early modem period, it is necessary to examine 
the intellectual context of the time. In particular, it is important to understand the 
influence of Renaissance humanism on the formation of European culture. To a large 
degree, the Renaissance derived its energy from the conflict between medieval attitudes 
and beliefs and the "new'' attitudes and beliefs contained in ancient texts recovered by 
individuals whom we now call humanists. The earliest humanists, beginning with 
Francesco Petrarch, 1 3 contributed to the intellectual ferment of the Renaissance through 
the recovery and dissemination of classical Greek and Roman texts. 14 Petrarch, who 
1 3 Though Petrarch is known today primarily as the author of a sequence of sonnets, he is perhaps the 
prototypical humanist. He sponsored emissaries who went throughout Europe and the Hellenistic world 
looking for manuscripts of ancient texts. 
14 The literature of humanism is vast. A number of anthologies provide an overview of its history, faces, 
and extent. See, for example, Albert Rabil's three-volume work, Renaissance Humanism. See also The 
Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, ed. Jill Kray. 
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welcomed these ancient texts as a breath of fresh air in the stale intellectual atmosphere 
of the late medieval era, wrote : 
I associate greedily with our ancients in the only way I can, and I forget 
most willingly those among whom an evil star decrees that I must live. 
And I strain all the powers of my mind to flee the modems and to seek the 
ancients, because the sight of my contemporaries off ends me deeply while 
the remembrance of the noble deeds and glorious names of the past fills 
me with . . .  incredible delight. 1 5  
While it is perhaps an exaggeration to suggest that the medieval era was a time of 
ignorance and superstition, as the erstwhile term "dark ages" might suggest, it was a time 
that valued stability more than change. 16 Medieval epistemology was secured by 
remnants of ancient learning, by the knowledge revealed in divine texts, and by the 
theological tradition handed down from the early church fathers. The social structure, 
which was grounded in the same traditional epistemology, was stable to the point of 
rigidity. Intellectual activity, which was largely cloistered within the church, the newly­
founded universities, or professions such as law, consisted in large part of applying 
Aristotelian categorical logic to particular cases. 17 The recovery of ancient texts by the 
early humanists, however, challenged the stable attitudes and beliefs of medieval 
Europeans. The term humanism is a neologism coined in 1 808 by German educator F. 
J. Niethammer to distinguish the emphasis in secondary education upon classical 
languages and literatures from new scientific education. 18 However, the term is derived 
15 Four Dialogues/or Scholars. 1 57, n. 24 . 
16 See Johan Huizinga, The. Waning of the Middle Ages, for an extended description of the late Middle 
Ages. Huizinga does not see the era as an intermediate period between the fall of the Roman Empire and 
the European Renaissance, but as a distinct period with its own characteristics. 
17 This is, of course, an oversimp lification. There was, for example, a resurgence of interest in natural 
philosophy, as well as interest in what are now called pseudo-sciences, alchemy and astrology, all of which 
are immediate antecedents of the renaissance ofnatural philosophy. 
18 It is perhaps ironic that the term humanism only came into use as the practices it names were beginning 
to wane. Peter Burke suggests that the term was coined in Germany at a time when the study of the classics 
16 
from a much older word, humanist (Latin humanista), itself coined, apparently as 
university slang, during the Renaissance from the ancient term studia humanitatis, which 
was used by Cicero and others to describe the liberal education of the Hellenistic age. 
During the late quattrocento, studia humanitatis referred specifically to a program of 
study that included grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy. The studia 
humanitatis included the study of Latin, and to a lesser extent, Greek texts. 1 9  This rather 
narrow definition of humanism is the only acceptable one, according to P.O. Kristeller, 
who rejects the tendency to expand the definition to include new attitudes toward 
humankind, or to project it backwards to include those medieval scholastics whose work 
was based on ancient Greek texts. Kristeller argues that since the studia humanitatis 
excludes all philosophy except moral philosophy, as well as other fields such as 
mathematics and law, it is desirable to limit the definition to what can be connected to 
this particular range of studies. Though Kristeller' s limited definition of humanism may 
be technically correct, it does not adequately explain the pervasive influence of 
humanism in the Renaissance. In reacting to those who would describe humanism overly 
broadly, or who would mingle the effects of humanism with other influences such as 
changes in the political environment, Kristeller risks understating the case.20 
was being excised from curricula in the gymnasia in order to make room for the study of the natural 
sciences (The European Renaissance 233-234). See also Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and 
Its Sources for further discussion of the origin of the term. 
19 This list of subjects is P.O. Kristeller's . The standard curriculum for an education in the arts included 
two parts: the trivium included three arts of verbal discourse, grammar, logic, and rhetoric; the quadrivium 
included four mathematical disciplines, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. For a brief but 
thorough discussion of the trivium and quadrivium, see William Bouwsma, The Culture of Renaissance 
Humanism 8. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of education during the late medieval period 
and Renaissance, see James Bowen, A History of Western Education, Vol. II: Civilization of Europe S ixth 
to Sixteenth Century. For the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, see Peter Mack, Renaissance 
Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic. 
2° For further discussion of the limitations of Kristeller's definition of humanism, see Hanna Gray 
"Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence," 499-500; also, Victoria Kahn, 1 98, n. 4. Kristeller' s 
rigorous definition may also reflect the influence of the reductionism of positivistic modern science on 
other, non-scientific disciplines. 
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Nicholas Mann describes the pervasiveness of the influence of humanism's 
scholarly concern with the textual legacy of antiquity, which 
involves above all the rediscovery and study of ancient Greek and Roman 
texts, the restoration and interpretation of them and the assimilation of the 
ideas and values that they contain. It ranges from an archaeological 
interest in the remains of the past to a highly focused philological attention 
to the details of all manner of written records-from inscriptions to epic 
poems-but comes to pervade . . .  almost all areas of post-medieval 
culture, including theology, philosophy, political thought, jurisprudence, 
medicine, mathematics and the creative arts. Grounded in . . .  learned 
research, it rapidly found expression in teaching. And in this way it was to 
become the embodiment of, and vehicle for, that very classical tradition 
that is the most fundamental aspect of the continuity of European cultural 
and intellectual history. (2) 
While it is true that, as Kristeller argues, humanism was primarily an educational 
movement, its influence was much more far-reaching. First, as Mann argues, humanism 
was the vehicle by which large numbers of ancient texts were recovered and the ideas 
they contained were disseminated throughout Western culture from the twelfth century 
onward. Second, those who were educated in the humanist system, which included 
grammar schools as well as universities, went out into the world to become the courtiers, 
parliamentarians, foreign emissaries, local officials, and mercantilists who created the 
culture of the Renaissance. Third, and most importantly to this study, humanism provided 
the rhetorical context and the skills by which early modern thinkers, such as Francis 
Bacon, helped to authorize a variety of cultural changes that were inspired, in part, by 
these "new" ideas. 
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Hans Baron's understanding of humanism, rather than being curricularly defined 
as is K.risteller' s, is related to the activities of those individuals whom he considered to be 
humanists. Baron coined the term "civic humanism" to differentiate it from the literary 
humanism of Petrarch and his contemporaries. This new civic humanism was a response 
to the crisis in Florentine government and instantiated by Salutati's book On the Origin of 
the City of Florence and On Her Renowned Citizens. From the end of the thirteenth 
century, according to Baron, 
the ever-recurring leitmotifs in the humanistic philosophy of life were the 
superiority of the vita activa over the "selfish" withdrawal into scholarship 
and contemplation [ vita contemplativa] ; the praise of the family as the 
foundation of a sound society; and the argument that the perfect life is not 
that of the "sage," but that of the citizen who, in addition to his studies, 
consummates his humanitas by shouldering man's social duties, and by 
serving his fellow-citizens in public office. (7) 
While Baron's concept of civic humanism is more contextualized than Kristeller's, it too 
is limited by its identification with the city of Florence and failure to account for the 
spread of civic humanism to other locales. Nevertheless, his conceptualization of 
humanism helps to explain why it is an engine of social and institutional change. 
Although ancient texts represented for the humanists an escape from the arid intellectual 
tradition of scholasticism, it would be a mistake to suggest that the move from an 
emphasis on the vita contemplativa to the vita activa was complete. Petrarch's desire to 
"associate with the ancients" rather than immersing himself in the civic life of 
contemporary society is representative of the tension between these modes, one which 
might be considered an essential tension of Renaissance humanism. 
Like Kristeller, William Bouwsma has suggested that humanism must be 
considered primarily a phenomenon of educational practice. However, because he 
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recognizes that education more than other social institutions is sensitive to social change 
and that modifications to curricula may be taken as indicators of shifts in human values, 
his view of humanism allows for a broader interpretation than either Kristeller' s or 
Baron's ( Culture of Renaissance Humanism 7). Certainly, the relationship between 
humanist education and culture is an intimate and critical one. Bouwsma contrasts the 
Renaissance humanist emphasis on the studia humanitatis to the medieval emphasis on 
logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. Within the group of subjects designated as 
the trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric), medieval education emphasized logic. 
Renaissance humanists, however, were concerned with rhetoric and grammar, which 
included philology and the study of literature, as well as the study of the structure of the 
language. He characterizes that shift of emphasis as a move from a concern with testing 
knowledge through the methods of logic to a concern with finding or discovering 
knowledge from texts and communicating that knowledge to one's fellow citizens (7-9). 
As Bouwsma suggests, it is important to recognize that Renaissance humanism was not a 
coherent or monolithic institution and that it varied considerably even within Italy during 
the trecento and quattrocento, undergoing even greater change as it made its way 
throughout Europe. 
The Scientific Revolution 
During the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, natural phenomena, particularly 
unnatural or catastrophic ones, were seen as mysteries to be interpreted rather than 
explained because nature was believed to be subject to the actions of supernatural beings 
and the vagaries of human behavior.2 1  While it is an overstatement to suggest that there 
was a single view of nature, it is generally true that Europeans of the Middle Ages and 
21 See Johan Huizinga's The Waning of the Middle Ages for a lengthy discussion of medieval European 
attitudes regarding humans and nature. 
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Renaissance saw nature as part of a hierarchical system, a "great chain of being,"22 that 
extended from the celestial realm to the material world, in which humans enjoyed a 
privileged position between God and angels and the lesser elements of nature such as 
animals, plants, and inanimate matter. Any member of the chain was subject to those 
above it and could be influenced by their actions. Raphael Holinshed's description of the 
unnatural and monstrous consequences of the murder of King Duffe of Scotland (the 
event which served as the source for Shakespeare's Macbeth),23 illustrates perfectly the 
way in which these beliefs permeated the culture. 
For the space of six moneths together, after this heinous murther thu� 
committed, there appeered no sunne by day, nor moone by night in anie 
part of the realme, but still was the skie couered with continuall clouds, 
and sometimes such outragious winds arose, with lightenings and 
tempests, that the people were in great feare of present destruction . . . .  
Monstrous sights also that were seen within the Scotish kingdome 
that yeere were these: horses in Louthian, being of singular beautie and 
swiftnesse, did eate their owne flesh, and would in no wise taste anie other 
meate. In Angus, there was a gentlewoman brought foorth a child without 
eies, nose, hand, or foot. There was a sparhawke also strangled by an 
owle. Neither was it anie less woonder that the sunne, as before is said, 
was continuallie couered with clouds for six moneths space. But all men 
22 The concept of the great chain of being was discussed at length in Arthur 0. Lovejoy's book by that 
name. See also E.M.W. Tilyard, The Elizabethan World Picture, which explores the implications of the 
great chain of being on Elizabethan society. See Michel Foucault's The Order of Things for a less totalizing 
representation of medieval and Renaissance worldviews and the changes that took place between these 
eras. 
23 This description was published in Raphael Holinshed's Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland. 
Cited by Waithe in Introduction to The Tragedy of Macbeth 1 1 2 1 . 
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understood that the abhominable murther of king Duff e was the cause 
heereof. ( qtd. by Waithe in Introduction to The Tragedy of Macbeth 1 12 1) 
The events are medieval, but the description itself was published in 1 577 and again in 
1 5 87 in an edition edited by John Hooker. 
This anthropocentric view of nature was also reflected in the beliefs of natural 
philosophers of the early Renaissance, who continued to hold to a model of the cosmos 
advanced during second century of the Common Era by the Greek astronomer and 
geographer Claudius Ptolemy. Ptolemy situated the earth at the center of a series of 
concentric spheres, which rotated in perfect circles. Each successive sphere exhibited a 
greater degree of perfection in its composition and inhabitants, with the most perfect 
outer sphere being inhabited by God. Ptolemain cosmology was based in part on 
observed experience but was also informed by ancient philosophy and the tenets of the 
Judea-Christian religion. The Ptolemain model depends largely upon the physics of 
Aristotle, who regarded the universe as matter in a state of unrealized potential moving 
toward an unknown telos, or goal (Shapin, The Scientific Revolution 29-30).24 The appeal 
of such a teleological orientation for a society so wholly dominated by Judea-Christian 
theology is obvious. This cosmological model illustrates the ways in which natural 
philosophies and theology were integrated with and mutually constitutive of one another. 
In the early modem era, however, Ptolemain cosmology began to be challenged 
by the results of empirical observation and renewed interest in mathematics. The Polish 
prelate Nicolaus Copernicus was the first to posit a heliocentric universe. Copernicus's 
theory was a result of his inability to reconcile mathematically the Ptolemain model with 
his own observations of planetary orbits. Aware of the implications of his model for 
24 For a comprehensive explanation of Aristotle's teleology and its implications for physics, see Guthrie, 
vol. VI 106-1 29. For a brief explanation of the teleological nature of Aristotle's physics, see Shapin, The 
Scientific Revolution 29-30. 
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contemporary culture and concerned about the possible consequences, Copernicus 
published abstracts of his mathematical work in 1 532, but did not publish the whole of 
his theory until 1 543 , the year of his death. Early in the seventeenth century, Galileo 
Galilei, working from even more accurate observations made possible by his telescope, 
confirmed Copernicus's theories and challenged the Ptolemain model even further when 
he observed sun spots on the supposedly perfect and immutable surface of the sun. 
While he found an audience for his work outside his native Italy, Galileo was eventually 
imprisoned, tried, and excommunicated from the Roman Catholic church for his views 
because in challenging Ptolemain cosmology, he also challenged the theology on which it 
and, indeed, social, political, and religious hierarchies were founded.25 
Similar challenges to the fundamental conceptualization of nature and its 
concomitant hierarc1:tlcal social structure occurred throughout W estem culture during the 
Renaissance, supplying the context in which modem science was formed. The newly 
rediscovered texts of ancient philosophies, advances in technology, and social, political, 
and cultural changes evoked powerful reactions from all classes. These reactions ranged 
from skepticism to fear, from animosity to hatred, from disagreement to censure. In more 
extreme cases, those who were advancing new and apparently heretical ideas faced 
exileand even execution. John Donne's poem, "The First Anniversary" offers a 
description of the intense anxieties at work in the seventeenth century: 
And new philosophy calls all in doubt, 
The element of fire is quite put out, 
The sun is lost, and th'earth, and no man's wit 
Can well direct him where to look for it. 
25 Recent scholars, notably Mario Biagioli, Galileo, Courtier, and Dava Sobel, Galileo 's Daughter, have 
suggested that Galileo's trial had less to do with perceptions of his work as heretical and more to do with 
political expediency for Pope Urban VIII, who had previously been Galileo's patron. 
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And freely men confess that this world's spent, 
When in the planets and the firmament 
They seek so many new; they see that this 
Is crumbled out again to his atomies. 
'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone, 
All just supply, and all relation; 
Prince, subject, father, son, are things forgot. . .  (11. 203-214) 
The "new philosophy" that Donne suggested was responsible for the cultural confusion of 
his era has come, in subsequent ages, to be seen as the foundation of the "scientific 
revolution." 
During the first third of the twentieth century, perhaps as part of constructing a 
modernist narrative in the wake of the trauma of World War I,26 historians and 
philosophers began to examine epistemological shifts between the early seventeenth and 
mid eighteenth centuries, which they called the "scientific revolution." However, the use 
of the term "revolution" to refer to a change in knowledge during this era was not 
completely new to the twentieth century. LB. Cohen27 contends that the concept has a 
long tradition, and traces the use of the term "revolution" in the works of natural 
philosophers, such as Francis Bacon and Joseph Priestley .28 He contends that "from the 
26 Philosopher Stephen Toulmin suggests that the scientific revolution is part of a retroactive narrative of 
modernity that he dates to the first third of the twentieth century. See Cosmopolis, Toulmin's  exploration of 
modernity, 5-44. 
27 Cohen examines applications of the term "revolution" to development of modern science in Revolution 
in Science 75- 1 0 1 ,  473-569. See also H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical 
Inquiry; John R. R. Christie, "The Development of the Historiography of Science" in R, C. Olby, et al., 
Companion to the History of Modern Science 5-22; and David C. Lindberg, "Conceptions of the Scientific 
Revolution from Bacon to Butterfield" in Lindberg & Westman, Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution 
1 -26. 
28 It is unlikely, however, that in the seventeenth century, the term carried quite the same connotations as it 
does today. According to Hanna Arendt, it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that "revolution" 
gained its contemporary meaning of violent upheaval, "the notion that the course of history suddenly 
begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before is about to unfold" (2 1 ). Thus, it 
is unlikely that the term carried quite the same meaning for these early natural philosophers as it does for 
twentieth and twenty-first century historians of science. In fact, during the early modern period, revolution 
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late seventeenth century onward, scientists and historians of science have used the 
language of political revolution ( or political warfare) to describe the progress of science" 
( 4 73). By the late eighteenth century, Cohen argues, the idea of a revolution in science 
was fully established, as demonstrated in the works of historians Jean-Sylvain Bailly and 
Jean Etienne Montucla, both of whom link Copernicus' reconfiguration of the universe to 
the idea of revolution, though neither actually uses the term "Copernican revolution" 
(498-99). 
In the twentieth century, historians began using the term "scientific revolution" to 
describe the epistemological changes that occurred during the early modern era. One of 
the earliest examinations of the scientific revolution, was E. A. Burtt' s The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Physical Science, published in 1 924. Burtt laments the way that 
the scientific revolution resulted in a demotion of humankind's  place in the universe and 
characterizes the world view of the Middle Ages as one in which 
man was in every sense the centre of the universe. The whole world of 
nature was believed to be teleologically subordinate to him and his eternal 
destiny . . . .  The prevailing world-view of this period was marked by a 
deep and persistent assurance that man, with his hopes and ideals, was the 
all-important, even controlling fact in the universe. ( 4) 
This worldview underlay all inquiry and, as in the case of physics, the world was 
interpreted through categories, which "developed in the attempt to throw into scientific 
form the facts and relations observed in man's unaided sense-experience of the world and 
the main uses which he made it serve" (5) . According to Burtt, the scientific revolution 
represents a shift from a teleological world view, in which humankind's journey to reach 
its own potential was reflected in the events of the physical world, to an ontological 
generally referred to cyclical repetition of events, such as the annual progression of the seasons. 
Consequently, Bacon used the term "new instauration" to convey the novelty, magnitude, and 
revolutionary nature of his thought. 
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perspective, in which humankind was one of many equal factors in a mechanistic 
universe: 
[ J]ust as it was thoroughly natural for medieval thinkers to view nature as 
subservient to man 's knowledge, purpose and destiny; so now it has 
become natural to view her as existing and operating in her own self­
contained independence, and so far as man 's ultimate relation to her is 
clear at all, to consider his knowledge and purpose somehow produced by 
her, and his destiny wholly dependent on her. ( 1 0- 1 1 ,  italics in original) 
Burtt views much of the course of modern philosophy as a succession of attempts to 
recover humankind's spiritual sovereignty, the failure of which demonstrates the 
overwhelming dominance of the new ontological world view ( 1 1). Burtt' s  regrets 
regarding the consequences of the scientific revolution were soon replaced by the views 
of other historians with more positive perspectives on these changes. 
Exploring the metaphysical dimensions of the reform of Aristotelian physics, 
Koyre describes the scientific revolution as a struggle so intense that it amounted to a 
veritable "mutation" in human thought (Galileo Studies 1). Koyre suggests that the 
scientific revolution is nothing less than the "destruction of the Cosmos . . .  the most 
profound revolution achieved or suffered by the human mind since the invention of the 
Cosmos by the Greeks. It is a revolution so profound and so far-reaching that mankind 
. . .  for centuries did not grasp its bearing and its meaning" ("Galileo and Plato" 1 9-20). It 
is a revolution that "changed the very framework and patterns of our thinking and of 
which modern science and modem philosophy are, at the same time, the root and the 
fruit" (Closed World v).29 Koyre considers the apex of the scientific revolution to be 
29 Koyre's metaphors reveal a great deal about the way the modem era has come to view the scientific 
revolution. The notion that modern science and phi losophy are both the "root and fruit" of the scientific 
revolution quite perfectly demonstrate the tautological conceptualization of modern scientific evidence as 
"self-evident." 
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Galileo's application of Archimedes' principles of mathematics to the study of 
movement, transforming physics from a purely empirical science to a theoretical one, 
liberating humankind from the "concrete world-space conception of the pre-Galilean 
physics" into the "homogeneous and abstract space of Euclidian geometry" ( 1 9-20). For 
Koyre, the scientific revolution is largely attributable to a triumph of the Platonic 
worldview over the Aristotelian tradition. Ultimately, Koyre views the scientific 
revolution as the result of a change in world view from a hierarchically ordered universe 
whose different levels are subject to the control of those superior to them on the chain of 
existence to an "open and infinitely extended" universe whose laws may be apprehended 
through a "hypothetico-deductive mathematical treatment" ("Galileo and the Scientific 
Revolution" 2). 
Other historians of science have explored the nature of the scientific enterprise. C. 
C. Gillespie sees modern science as contiguous with Greek natural philosophy to the 
extent that it constitutes "conceptual thought mediating between consciousness and 
nature" but claims that modern science is superior to the extent that it is "determinate 
instead of speculative" (9). Where Greek science imposed subjective categories on 
nature, the new science is "impersonal and objective" because, while it is founded upon 
empirical observation, the data are expressed mathematically and tested experimentally 
for their ability to predict outcomes and generate new concepts (9). Rupert Hall defines 
natural science as "the conscious, systematic investigation of the phenomena revealed in 
the human environment and in man himself objectively considered" (xi). Such 
investigation is founded on the assumption that "there is in nature a regular consistency, 
so that events are not merely vagarious, and therefore an order or pattern also, to which 
events conform, capable of being apprehended by the human mind" (xi). 
Perhaps the single most important concept underlying the scientific revolution is 
the notion that there is a "regular consistency" in nature, for it is this concept that gave 
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epistemological authority to natural philosophy. Marie Boas Hall argues that this new 
view, in which nature is characterized as "a vast and intricate piece of machinery," 
provided the "ingredient of rebellion from the past which is so often a necessary stimulus 
to the creative thinker in any field" (3 1 ). She also suggests that the "concept of the world 
as a machine gave a new meaning to the idea of a physical law; for laws of nature could 
now be apprehended as expressions of the way in which God had built the machine and 
the way he intended it to run. Hence physical laws had real meaning and existence, and 
the task of the scientist was to find these laws out" ("The Machinery of Nature" 32). E. J. 
Dijksterhuis, in The Mechanization of the World Picture, argues that this view is the very 
foundation of modernity : 
It was this conception that first led to the methods of research and 
treatment that have caused the great flourishing of physical science . . .  of 
which we are reaping the fruit in our own day: experiment as the source of 
knowledge, mathematical formulation as the descriptive medium, 
mathematical deduction as the guiding principle in the search for new 
phenomena to be verified by experimentation. It was the subsequent 
success of this conception which made the development of technology 
possible, thus leading to the sweeping industrialization without which the 
life of modem society has long since become inconceivable. It was finally 
the modes of thought inherent in this conception which penetrated into 
philosophical thought about man and his place in the universe, and into 
numerous special sciences which at first seemed to lack all contact with 
the study of nature. Owing to all these factors the mechanization of 
physical science has become much more than an internal question of 
method in natural science; · it is a matter that affects the history of culture 
as a whole. (3) 
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These various views of the history of science, regardless of how narrow or broad 
their claims for scientific "revolution," share one thing. They all hold to an "internalist" 
view of science; that is, they are concerned with the internal development of science as an 
autonomous knowledge-producing activity. According to philosopher of science Steve 
Fuller, the "main historiographical assumption [ of the internal history of science] is that 
there is a natural trajectory to the development of science when it is regarded as a 
knowledge producing activity" (Philosophy of Science 7). Koyre puts it more poetically 
when he describes the scientific revolution as a "world-bubble [that] grew and swelled 
before it burst and merged with the space that surrounded it" ( Closed World vi). 
However, although it was never intended to do so, Koyre' s  metaphor also describes the 
way that science is not quite so easily detached from the other cultural institutions that 
surround it. The same is true for Marie Boas Hal 's  contention that physical laws had "real 
meaning and existence" as "expressions of the way God had built the machine and had 
intended it to run" (32). Duijksterhuis, too, when he describes the modernity of sciences 
uses metaphors that are more appropriate to the humanist context than to that of science. 
In order for the new natural philosophy to flourish, diverse reactions of theologians, 
philosophers, and statesmen had to be addressed and overcome. In explaining the 
emergence of science, it is important not merely to explain how science itself advanced, 
but also to show how it came to be seen as an acceptable, authoritative endeavor within a 
cultural context many of whose fundamental beliefs were directly contradicted by its 
findings. In other words, we must account not only for the development of "science," but 
for its epistemological and institutional positioning within the larger culture. 
In contrast to intemalist views of the history of modem science, externalist 
histories of science examine the relationship between science and society. The extemalist 
view is concerned with identifying the cultural phenomena that led to the development of 
modern science. Among the earliest of the histories written from the extemalist 
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perspective are that of Soviet historian Boris Hessen, The Social and Economic Roots of 
Newton 's 'Principia ', published in 1 93 1 , and The Social Function of Science, published 
in 1 939 by English Marxist historian J. D. Bernal. Both works draw correlations between 
elements of the economic and cultural context of the early modern period and the 
progress of science. 30 Sociologist Robert K. Merton in his 1 93 8 Science, Technology, and 
Society in Seventeenth Century England argued that the development of modern science 
in the seventeenth century was linked to the rise of Protestantism, particularly of 
Puritanism. More recently, Frances Yates' studies of the Hermetic Corpus and its 
influence on philosophers of the early modern period such as Copernicus and Newton, 
who are revered for their contributions to the formation of a rational, positivistic science, 
have called into question the integrity of seventeenth century "science." 3 1 
By the turn of the twentieth century, extemalist views of the scientific revolution 
have come to question whether such a phenomenon may legitimately be said to have 
occurred. Steven Shapin begins his sociological examination of these changes, The 
Scientific Revolution, with the oxymoronic assertion, "(t]here was no such thing as the 
Scientific Revolution, and this is a book about it" ( 1 ).32 Shapin's account of the move to 
science in the early modern era recognizes the degree to which what is now called 
"science" - an institution that, since the early twentieth century, has often been 
portrayed as being isolated from the arena of ordinary human activity by its objective 
methodology - remains a socially and historically situated institution. According to 
30 Porter contends that the work of Hessen and Bernal are often dismissed by historians of science as 
"vulgar Marxism" because they lack critical perspective (33-39). 
3 1 In Yates's view, intemalist histories of science have failed to interrogate the influence of disciplines that 
have, in subsequent eras, come to be seen as "pseudo-sciences''. She has investigated the influence of the 
Hermetic corpus in a number of texts, including Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 1 964, The 
Rosacrucian Enlightenment, 1972, and The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age, 1 979. 
32 See also Shapin The Social History a/Truth and Shapin and Shaffer, Leviathan and the A ir Pump. For 
other similar views, see Nature and Society in Historical Context, ed. by Mikulas Teisch, Roy Porter, and 
Bo Gustafsson; see also Scientific Renaissance in National Context, ed. by Roy Porter and Mikulas Teisch. 
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Shapin, the scientific revolution is characterized by four changes in the way early 
moderns viewed knowledge: 1 )  metaphors of mechanization were increasingly used to 
describe natural processes and occurrences; 2) humans increasingly saw themselves as 
separate from their objects of study in the natural world, particularly as related to 
distinctions between human experience of the natural world and explanations of that 
world; 3) epistemological practices were methodized with the end of objectifying 
knowledge, i.e., preventing human subjectivity from tainting scientific knowledge; and 4) 
early moderns began to realize their humanistic impulse to put objective knowledge to 
work for the benefit of human society ( 12- 14  ). 
Because he maps the place of science within the larger culture, Shapin's account 
of the scientific revolution helps to clarify the intellectual terrain of the early modern era. 
He recognizes that the new epistemology arose out of and was enabled by activities 
unrelated to the intellectual practices we now call science, activities related to the 
Renaissance passion for recovering ancient knowledge. He suggests, for example, that the 
humanist recovery of ancient texts spurred the practice of natural philosophy as a way of 
verifying ancient "truth" (75-76). Shapin also recognizes that seventeenth-century 
attempts to change beliefs about nature and the means for securing such beliefs, were not 
incidental but self-conscious and deliberate (75). Finally, he explores ways in which 
"facts" came to be constructed during the seventeenth century, 33 and acknowledges that 
practitioners used "social and linguistic techniques" (84) to achieve adherence to these 
facts. In Leviathan and the Air-Pump, a case study of controversy surrounding Robert 
Boyle's experiments with air pump, Shapin and Simon Shaffer identify three points of 
interaction between the progress of science and politics: 
33 See 84ff. 
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First, scientific practitioners have created, selected, and maintained a 
polity within which they operate; second, the intellectual product made 
within that polity has become an element in political activity of the state; 
third, there is a conditional relationship between the nature of the polity 
occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity. 
(332) 
Because they begin with the scientific polity, however, Shapin and Shaffer do not explore 
the means by which space was made within the wider polity for "scientific" activity to 
take place. Moreover, though Shapin recognizes that it was influential in the development 
of early modem science, he defines humanism merely as a concern with recovering 
ancient knowledge by restoring ancient texts corrupted by medieval copyists to a pristine 
condition (75-76). Shapin, like many others, fails to examine how the culture of 
Renaissance humanism enabled the development and expansion of nascent scientific 
institutions. This failure to examine the role humanism played as a context in which 
modem science could be formed has led historians to conclude that these two systems 
had opposing trajectories, with humanism declining as science arose. In particular, it is 
important to understand the impact of the linguistic and rhetorical practices of 
Renaissance humanists in authorizing early modem science as a legitimate intellectual 
activity.34 
The Decline of Humanism and the Rise of Science 
Many historical accounts of humanism have traced a trajectory that is opposite 
that of the scientific revolution. The history of the scientific revolution suggests that 
34 In Leviathan and the Air-pump, Shapin does examine rhetorical and linguistic implications of debates 
about early modern science; however, he fails to examine the extent to which these are part of, or a legacy 
of, the humanist project. 
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science and humanism are so incompatible with one another that they cannot coexist. 
Perhaps no one has been more influential in advancing this notion than historian Richard 
Foster Jones, who cast the scientific revolution as a "battle" in which the scientific 
modems triumphed against the humanist affection for the ancients. Jones argues that the 
Elizabethans who contributed to the development of modern science were reacting 
against a perception of nature as a creation in the process of decay, a view that they had 
inherited from the classical tradition.35 According to Anthony Grafton, "until the last 
generation or so most historians of civilization, literature and art assumed that 
Renaissance humanism died as the sixteenth century wound to a close" (204). The 
markers of hurpanism's demise were the replacement of Latin with vernacular languages, 
the rise of natural philosophy, and the notion, which he attributes to Montaigne, that 
ancient philosophies had nothing to offer to an age so radically different (204-5) . 
To a large extent, the belief that humanism gave way to science can be accounted 
for by the decline in the fortunes of rhetoric, the art that was central to the humanist 
project. Rhetoric was not merely a communicative art, but was a means of inculcating a 
set of values that were seen as essential to developing the ethos of a Renaissance 
courtier.36 In an age in which social status had become much more fluid and trained 
individuals were needed to administer new governmental entities, rhetorical education 
provided not only the means for ambitious courtiers to adopt the appropriate personae, 
but also to develop skills they needed for their work in the civic arena. The 
epistemological anxiety that characterized the Renaissance not only helped to form a 
context for the growth of science, but also led to a crisis within humanism. Victoria Kahn 
describes the trajectory of Renaissance humanism as one in which the belief in the 
35 Foster's Ancients and Moderns: A Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth Century 
England, was revised and reissued in 1 965. 
36 See Janet Atwill, Rhetoric Reclaimed, for a discussion of humanist education as the inculcation of 
values. 
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possibility that rhetoric can move the individual to prudence, or right action, evolved into 
skepticism about the eff ectuality of texts and even of language itself. Implicit within this 
trajectory is a conflict between values and facts, between "ought" and "is". In Rhetoric, 
Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance, Kahn argues that 
[ w ]ithin the humanist tradition, it is only those texts of the later 
Renaissance, in which the analogy between rhetoric and prudence is 
subject to doubt . . . .  For many of these authors, the rhetorical dimension 
of the text can no longer be contained by practical concerns; rather, it is 
conceived of as threatening, aberrant, resistant to the author's intention to 
persuade to right action. (2 1 -22) 
Eventually, Kahn continues, the rhetorical element of texts gives way to "literariness" as 
epistemological standards change: 
[T]he eighteenth century development of a formalist aesthetics . . .  
coincided with the redefinition of politics in terms of science rather than 
prudence. When mathematical certainty is taken as the standard of reason 
in politics as well as science, then the aesthetic realm of prudential 
deliberation . . .  must be redefined in terms of mere subjective experience. 
(24) 
Early Renaissance rhetorical activity, according to Kahn, grew out of the 
conjunction of the rediscovery of ancient texts and political conditions in the Italian city­
states. New translations of Aristotle's Rhetoric and Nichomachean Ethics, along with 
Ciceronian texts, were readily received by individuals who were open to the argument 
that "the activity of the prudent man is analogous to that of the. orator" (30), i.e. , the 
prudent individual employed the same strategies in making wise judgments that the orator 
used in finding effective arguments. Kahn argues that although classical rhetoric had as 
its provinces the law courts and democratic governments, Renaissance rhetoric was "a 
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truncated version of its classical ancestor, since as the legal and political dimension of 
rhetoric falls away, only epideictic-the rhetoric of praise and blame-remains" (38). 
However, this truncation of rhetoric is not merely "an anticipation of properly aesthetic 
conception of literature" (3 8).37 Rather, she says, "if the conflation of rhetoric and 
poetics diminishes the sphere of rhetoric as it was classically conceived, it enlarges the 
sphere of literature, since the written text now takes on the functions of deliberative and 
judicial rhetoric" (3 8). Whereas classical rhetors invented arguments by arguing on either 
side of a question ( arguing in utramque partem ), they presented only a single side in the 
law courts or forum. However, Renaissance writers, because their arguments were not 
constrained by such specific situations, could always argue both, or many, sides of a 
question. The frequent use of the dialogue as a means of exploring controversial issues 
demonstrates this aspect of Renaissance rhetoric (38). For the early humanists, rhetoric 
was a practical art that was as concerned with process as with product, or perhaps more 
accurately, saw product as equivalent to process. Kahn argues that 
Renaissance humanists . . . go beyond their classical mentors in conceiving 
of literature not only as the cause and effect of prudence and right action 
(i.e., the writer is presumed to be prudent and to inspire prudence in 
others), but as a form of prudence itself. Rhetoric here is not primarily 
conceived of in terms of style or ornaments, but in terms of its capacity to 
exemplify and encourage the activity of practical reasoning. (39). 
According to Kahn, humanist rhetoric was inescapably related to moral philosophy, and 
this relationship was founded on two assumptions: 
37 In fact, the dialogue was the form that Galileo adopted when he published his theories on the structure of 
the solar system, Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems. Galileo hoped to blunt the force of his theory 
by presenting it along with the received model as a conversation among learned men struggling with 
competing worldviews. 
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First, the prudence or practical wisdom that is at work in deliberation 
about action in a social or political context is also at work in the artist's 
production of a work of art. Prudence is, in this sense, the precondition of 
artistic decorum, just as it is of ethical decorum. As a result, the work of 
art is seen less as a product as reflecting a certain process or activity of 
judgment. Second, and consequently, the reader's knowledge of the text 
( or any other work of art) can only be practical, since the act of reading 
requires the same acts of discrimination, the same judgments of decorum 
as does the author's practice of writing. Thus, the practice of 
interpretation, like the practice of writing, exemplifies for the humanist the 
inseparability of rhetoric and moral philosophy. (39) 
This linkage of rhetoric and moral philosophy in the Renaissance is surprising, perhaps, 
given rhetoric's historical reputation for being abused by unethical practitioners, but 
Kahn traces its development from ancient texts. Beginning with Aristotle, Kahn argues, 
rhetoric comprises "a practical standard of judgment reflected in common linguistic 
usage legitimated by the orator's appeal to common sense, his arguments by consensus, 
opinion, and commonplace" (33). Cicero develops this view of rhetoric, arguing in De 
oratore that the "good orator is necessarily a good man" and, in De officiis, that moral 
goodness and decorum, honestas and utilitas, cannot conflict" (34). He further legitimizes 
rhetoric by drawing parallels between the practice of rhetoric and Academic skepticism. 
Kahn shows that "[s]ince man, according to the skeptic, can know nothing absolutely, he 
is always concerned with the realm of the contingent and the probable, that is, the realm 
of rhetoric" (34). Moreover, the skeptic and orator share a rejection of dogmatism and the 
ability to argue in utramque partem, although the skeptic is less concerned with 
persuasion (35). 
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According to Kahn, early humanist rhetoric synthesizes aesthetic, political, and 
religious factors: 
Aesthetic decorum is seen to be inseparable from political effectiveness, 
and in both cases the possibility of such decorum is seen to be not only 
compatible with cognitive skepticism, but contingent upon it. But this 
skepticism about the power of human reason is itself just the opposite side 
of faith in divine will. The view that the impossibility of theoretical 
knowledge leaves room for action and practical certainty explains the 
benign role of both skeptical and hypothetical arguments in early humanist 
texts. (44) 
However, this synthesis did not long survive. As Kahn points out, the very acceptance of 
rhetorical wisdom undermines the standard, i.e., faith in divine will, that legitimizes that 
acceptance: "The legitimacy of the prudential judgment's claim to be something more 
than mere subjective preference depends on an available standard of judgment, but this 
standard is ultimately an article of faith that by definition cannot justify itself before the 
court of skepticism" ( 46). 
By the late sixteenth century, the reemergence of Pyrrhonism, the more radical 
form of ancient skepticism, which challenged rather than supported religion, as well as 
advances in natural philosophy, undermined the humanist project and the status of 
rhetoric. According to Kahn, these changes meant that "skepticism and faith were no 
longer allied [ and] faith itself had become an object of skepticism, and along with faith, 
the possibility of practical wisdom" ( 47). Later humanists, such as Erasmus, questioned 
the existence of a standard for practical wisdom, using the "humanist emphasis on 
discursive activity as constitutive of moral philosophy" (54) . Nevertheless, these later 
humanists, and early modem figures, such as Montaigne, and Hobbes, continued to work 
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within the humanist tradition to the extent that the means by which they questioned that 
tradition was rhetoric itself. 
Stoic Humanism as Context for the Scientific Revolution 
The view that humanism and science are incompatible may be explained, in part, 
by an overly narrow definition of humanism. In "The Two Faces of Humanism," William 
Bouwsma argues that, while Kristeller' s identification of rhetoric as a kind of "lowest 
common denominator for humanism" helps to simplify an enormously complex 
movement, it may underestimate its variety and historical significance ( 1 9). He argues 
that the humanist art of rhetoric "was also the vehicle of a set of intellectual conflicts 
crucial to the development of European culture in the early modern period" ( 1 9-20). Like 
Kristeller, Bouwsma recognizes that humanism, despite a coherent and cohesive 
objection to scholasticism, was hardly a unified movement, and that its conflicts were 
perhaps more characteristic than its agreements. Bouwsma disputes the commonly held 
notion that the Renaissance is a triumph of Platonism over Aristotelianism because the 
philosophy of the Middle Ages was not simply Aristotelian, but was a much more 
eclectic mix, while Renaissance humanism "owed at least as much to Plato as Aristotle" 
(5) . Second, neither the Aristotelian nor the Platonic tradition was primarily interested in 
rhetoric,38 which was the central preoccupation of the humanist program. Finally, 
Bouwsma argues that to the humanists of the Renaissance, Aristotle and Plato were 
systematic philosophers who shared the same cultural moment and seemed to resemble 
3 8 Although neither was "primarily" interested in rhetoric, it was certainly of great concern to both 
Aristotle and Plato. Plato's reaction to rhetoric was primarily negative, and it plays an essential role in at 
least three of his dialogues, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Phaedrus. Only in the Phaedrus does Plato find any 
role for rhetoric at all, and then only when it is subordinated to dialectic. Aristotle's handbook of rhetoric is 
an extensive discussion of the art. In contrast to Plato's discussion of the ethical dimensions of the art, 
Aristotle's  Rhetoric is a techne, a handbook that sets forth strategies for practice of the art. While not 
necessarily more important than his other works during his own era, it was among the most widely studied 
of his works during the Renaissance. 
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each other more than to differ. The debates about Plato and Aristotle in which humanists 
engaged were more likely academic exercises than contests regarding issues of central 
concerns. Thus, he says, the search for the intellectual ·antecedents of the Renaissance 
should focus on Hellenistic derivations rather than the original Hellenic philosophies; 
Stoicism and Augustinianism make much better candidates for explaining the 
contradictions inherent in Renaissance humanism ( 4-6). 
Bouwsma recognizes the difficulties in seeking explanations for humanist 
dichotomies in these two traditions. Neither is particularly easy to define since both are 
large, synthetic, and essentially unsystematic schools of thought. Moreover, 
Augustinianism is, as Marcia Colish demonstrates, 39 considerably influenced by Stoicism. 
Despite significant areas of overlap, Bouwsma suggests that the dichotomy can be 
synthesized fairly easily in general terms. Stoicism, he argues, "for the humanist, was 
sometimes a fairly particular set of beliefs, but it was also the particular form in which 
the pervasive and common assumptions of Hellenistic paganism presented themselves 
most attractively and forcefully to the Renaissance" (7). Augustinianism, on the other 
hand, is "a slow, steady, though incomplete advance from a Hellenistic understanding of 
Christianity, which sought to reconcile the Gospel with the commonplaces of later 
antique culture, toward an increasingly biblical understanding of Christianity" (8). 
Bouwsma describes the conflict in this way: 
The issue between them, in its most direct terms, was the difference 
between the biblical understanding of creation, which makes both man and 
the physical universe separate from and utterly dependent on God, and the 
Hellenistic principle of immanence which makes the universe eternal, by 
one means or another deifies the natural order, and by seeing a spark of 
39 See The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages, volume IL Colish demonstrates at length the 
complex interplay between Christianity and Stoicism in Augustine's philosophy. 
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divinity in man tends to make him something more than a creature of God. 
(9) 
Bouwsma argues that it is this set of contradictions that energizes the humanist project 
and that ultimately, as Stoicism became secularized, the two were seen as complementary 
rather than antagonistic. Nevertheless, "such a reconciliation, which depended on the 
deracination of Stoicism, was obviously a reconciliation on Augustinian terms. Also, 
Stoicism had a peculiar facility for growing new roots" so that a resolution to the 
antagonism could never fully be realized ( 60). 
Although the commonly held view is that "renaissance thinkers only drew 
isolated, practical ethical concepts from Stoic sources," Bouwsma argues that there is a 
good deal more Stoic influence than has previously been recognized. In particular, he 
argues that much Stoic "inspiration" came, in fact, from its doctrines on the "divine, 
harmonious, and intelligible order of nature" ( 17). Bouwsma finds Stoic influences in the 
work of Valla, Vives, and even Calvin.4° Calvin's version of Adam, for example, is 
concordant with that of the Stoic sage, a man in whose mind reigned "perfect intelligence 
. . .  uprightness . . .  [whose] senses were prepared and molded for due obedience to 
reason; and in the body there was a suitable correspondence with this internal order" 
(Commentary on Genesis, qtd. in Bouwsma 19). For the Renaissance mind, reason was 
not a "legitimate source of religious insight" (20), but a resource for practical sense (2 1 ). 
Finally, Stoicism was a source of moral training, and since morality was closely 
associated with intellect, it could be closely connected to the humanist educational 
project (22-23). 
40 In this brief article, Bouwsma does not recognize the fact that Stoic influences in the works of these 
thinkers is more likely the result of their reliance on Pauline doctrine rather than on Augustinianism. Please 
see discussion of the Stoic influence on Pauline doctrine later in this chapter (43-46). 
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Stoicism was prominent among the historical influences that led to the 
Renaissance reconceptualization of what it means to be human. In Renaissance Man, her 
examination of Renaissance philosophy, Agnes Heller argues that any philosophy 
comprises two primary functions: to articulate a vision of objective reality and to develop 
a set of moral and ethical rules that reflect that vision. Stoicism, because it focuses on the 
objective world rather than on a theoretical hereafter, minimizes the dissonance between 
these two aspects of philosophy. This pragmatic nature of Stoicism had three significant 
consequences that made it a particularly attractive philosophy from the Renaissance 
perspective. First, the distinction between the philosopher and the layman was practically 
non-existent. This kind of active philosophy allowed for a synthesis of the humanist 
dichotomy between vita activa and vita contemplativa. Second, the Stoic emphasis on 
human autonomy was compatible with the developing sense of the human as an 
individual rather than a part of a community. Third, the ontological orientation of 
Stoicism helped to authorize the shift from a teleological to an ontological worldview.41 
Certainly, the ontological world view and pragmatic nature of Stoicism, as Heller 
describes them, is consonant with that which historians of science have suggested made 
way for the development of modern science. 
The Legacy and Transmission of Stoic Philosophy 
Stoicism derives its name from an Athenian landmark, the Stoa or Painted 
Colonnade, where Zeno Citium (c. 333-26 1 BCE) regularly conducted public discourse . 
Zeno's philosophical system, which was among the most fully developed and 
comprehensive of any in the ancient world, flourished for more than four centuries, and 
4 1  See Chapter three, "Stoicism and Epicureanism" for Heller ' s  discussion of the role of Stocisim in the 
Renaissance, particularly 1 0 1 -27. 
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spread from Athens to Rome and beyond.42 It found its way to Renaissance Europe 
principally through the writings of Romans of the imperial period, such as Cicero, 
Marcus Aurelius, Tacitus, and Seneca, and through the doxographic texts of the Greek 
historian, Diogenes Laertius and the Roman Plutarch. Though Stoicism was clearly pagan 
in origin, it offered much that would appeal to the Christian philosopher, particularly in 
its descriptions of the wise and virtuous individual. Thus, its influences are seen in the 
work of the early church fathers such as Augustine and Tertulian, who were educated in 
the Roman system. Its later influence can be seen in the deism and naturalism that were 
popular in the eighteenth century, not only in Europe but also among the founders of the 
American republic. 
Stoicism is a synthetic philosophy, which drew from various ancient Greek 
philosophies. According to A. A. Long, Stoicism owes its ethical foundation to Socratic 
influence. For example, Zeno incorporated into his philosophy some basic Socratic 
propositions, among them, that "knowledge and goodness go hand in hand . . .  ; from 
knowledge right action follows necessarily; and the greatest evil is a bad condition of the 
soul" (Hellenistic Philosophy 1 1 1). Zeno likely based his notion of a "creative reason" as 
cosmic principle on Plato's  divine craftsman or world soul, and he and his successors 
also borrowed from Aristotelian (from Aristotle's own works and from his successors in 
the Peripatetic school) and Epicurean philosophies, as well as from other less well-known 
philosophers, such as Heraclitus and Diogenes ( 1 10- 1 13). Despite its debts to its 
contemporaries and predecessors, Stoicism should not be considered a derivative 
philosophy, Long argues, for it altered what it found and pushed well beyond the 
42 For thorough discussions of ancient Stoicism see A. A. Long, Hellenestic Philosophy: Stoics, 
Epicureans, Sceptics, and F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics. See also Marcia L.  Colish's two-volume work, The 
Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. The most comprehensive anthology of Stoic 
textual fragments is H. von Arnim's  Stoicorum veterumfragmenta (SVF). Translations of the principal 
sources, with commentary, are included in A.A. Long and D. N. Sedley's two-volume work, The 
Hellenistic Philosophers. 
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boundaries of what it borrowed from other schools of thought. Most importantly, 
Stoicism, unlike its predecessors, developed its philosophical tenets so fully that it 
became a comprehensive system that included three main branches-physics, ethics, and 
logic-that were almost inextricably intertwined. According to the Greek doxographer 
Aetius, 
The Stoics said that wisdom is scientific knowledge of the divine and the 
human, and that philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility. Virtue 
singly and at its highest is utility, and virtues, at their most generic, are 
triple-the physical one, the ethical one, and the logical one. For this 
reason philosophy also has three parts-physics, ethics and logic. Physics 
is practiced whenever we investigate the world and its contents, ethics is 
our engagement with human life, and logic our engagement with 
discourse, which they also call dialectic. (HP I :26A)43 
Stoicism was an important philosophical movement throughout antiquity, and was 
widely practiced throughout the Roman world from the fourth century BCE until the fall 
of the Roman Empire. It continued to exercise influence even as ancient doctrines began 
to give way to Christianity as the primary philosophical and ethical system in Western 
Europe. Although Stoicism was no longer a recognized doctrine at the beginning of the 
Renaissance, certain concepts and ideas that were part of the philosophy continued to 
hold sway throughout the Middle Ages. As a result, Stoicism's influence in the 
Renaissance came not only through the recovery of ancient texts, but also through the 
received tradition of Christian theology. 
43 Aetius I, Preface 2. Aetius was a Greek doxographer, c. 1 00 CE. His works are not extant, but were 
recomposed from the works of Plutarch, Stobaeus, and others by H. Diels in the late 1 9th century and 
published in Doxographi Graeci. 
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One difficulty in studying Stoicism is that most of the available texts, which come 
from the time when Stoicism was already a fully developed and orthodox doctrine, are 
practical rather than theoretical in nature. There are no extant texts from the earlier Stoic 
philosophers, only fragments and reports in other works. Extensive reports of Stoic 
philosophy can be found in Parallel Lives, biographies of famous Greek and Roman 
philosophers by second century CE Greek historian Plutarch and in Lives of the 
Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius, a Greek doxographer of the third century CE. The 
works of Aetius were preserved in an anthology compiled by fifth century CE Roman 
Joannes Stobaeius for his son Septimus. Thus, Stoic theory, its antecedents, and its 
development are sometimes difficult to ascertain. It is perhaps this lack of theory as much 
as its lack of clear connection to pagan religion that made Stoicism an appealing doctrine 
for Renaissance thinkers. Many of the Stoic texts recovered by the humanists were in the 
form of dialogues on philosophy, letters of advice, and moral essays, which closely 
resembled the "self-fashioning" advice to which the Renaissance mind was accustomed. 
Cicero was not himself a Stoic but found much to admire about the philosophy except for 
their dismissal of rhetoric. He explored Stoic doctrine in several texts, including De 
officiis [On Duty], Definibus bonorum et maloram [On the Limits of Good and Evil], 
and De natura deorum [On the Nature of the Gods}. Seneca's  epistles and moral essays 
were widely read in the Renaissance, as were the works of Diogenes Laertius and 
Plutarch. These discussions of Stoic philosophy focused on moral advice rather than on 
the theory upon which the advice was based, so that the incompatibility between pagan 
and Christian theology and worldviews was not so apparent. 
Stoicism & Christianity 
Christianity originated and began to be disseminated during the last few centuries 
of the Western Roman Empire. The early church fathers were educated in the same 
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Hellenized system that prepared the leaders of the empire. Consequently, the church 
leaders were fully aware of the various philosophical systems that were part of the 
intellectual milieu of the time. Most of these philosophies were too inimical to 
Christianity to be of any value to the Christian cause. Epicureanism, for example, posited 
a rather randomly organized universe in which gods were not qualitatively superior to 
human beings. Skepticism, with its emphasis on suspension of belief, was equally 
antithetical to a religious movement. Stoicism, however, proved to be a valuable ally for 
the Christian fathers for two reasons. First, its strong emphasis on morality and its 
insistence upon acceptance of one's lot were useful adjuncts to the Christian morality and 
acceptance of God's will. More importantly, perhaps, was the Stoic belief in a rational 
force that directed the course of the universe. For most Stoics, even those who called this 
force "god," the deity was not necessarily identified by name so that the "god" of 
Christianity fitted the conceptualization as well as any member of the Roman pantheon. 
The concordance between Stoic philosophy and Christian doctrine is apparent in the 
epistles of St. Paul who was educated in the Roman tradition. Some early Christian 
writers found the connections so persuasive that a legend arose in the fourth century that 
the Stoic Seneca was converted by St. Paul, a belief that was seemingly substantiated by 
a body of correspondence between the two.44 Though this series of letters was 
apocryphal, the fact remains that the tenets of Stoicism and Christianity had sufficient 
common elements that many early Christian writers felt the need to deal with it in one 
way or another. In her exploration of the legacy of Stoicism from classical antiquity to 
the middle ages, Colish argues: 
[W]hether as men trying to make sense out of their own intellectual 
experience or as spokesmen of a beleaguered Christian community in a 
44 This apocryphal correspondence was edited by C. W. Barlow in Epistolae Senecae ad Paulum et Pauli 
ad Senecam 'quae vocantur '. 
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hostile pagan environment, [ early Christian thinkers] frequently felt the 
need to make explicit their attitudes toward the relationship, or lack of 
relationship, that they saw between Stoicism and Christianity. (11 :3) 
According to Colish, this conversation between Stoicism and Christianity continued even 
after the church became institutionalized in the late empire, since theologians could use 
Stoic doctrine in various ways. Where they observed heretical or schismatic threats to 
orthodoxy, theologians could "characterize their opponents as having fallen into error 
because of their attachment to Stoicism," or apply it as a "corrective" to positions they 
wished to refute (11 :3). Tertullian, for example, drew heavily upon Stoic philosophy in his 
writings, where he was equally likely to "criticize them in one context, praise them in 
another, and Christianize them in the third" (11 : 1 4). 
Among the avenues, which Stoicism followed into the Christian Middle Ages, the 
most comprehensive and significant is in the works of St. Augustine. Colish argues that 
Stoic philosophy is ubiquitous throughout the works of Augustine; in some areas he uses 
it inconsistently (II :  1 53-69), and in others Stoicism simply indicates the development of 
his Christian philosophy (11 :2 12-33). In five areas, however, he uses Stoicism with 
relative consistency, including epistemology, rhetoric, language and logic, physics, and 
ethics. Augustine's use of Stoic rhetoric is quite minimal, and his departures from 
Ciceronian style, Colish argues, are attributable both to Stoicism and Christianity (II: 1 79-
8 1). His use of physics is mixed. He, of course, rejects the Stoic cosmic cycle and the 
corporeality of god, although Stoic notions about human nature as a reflection of divine 
rationality are amenable to his doctrines ( 1 98-207). Augustine also accepted Stoic ideas 
regarding the passions and the location of virtue in the soul, though he rejected a good 
deal of the remainder of their ethical doctrines (207-2 12). Perhaps the most influential 
areas of Stoic doctrine in Augustine are in epistemology and language. Augustine made 
good use of the Stoic ideas about sensory perception as an interaction between the 
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individual's pneuma and that of the observed object within a material plenum, though he 
did not specifically recognize the contributions of Stoicism to his thought in this regard 
(Colish 170). Finally, his preservation of the Stoic distinction between word and meaning 
is foundational to his own theories of language and logic ( 190-98). 
Historians have long recognized how influential Stoicism was in England, 
particularly during the Puritan revolution. Reid Barbour, whose English Epicures and 
Stoics examines the influence of Stoicism in Renaissance English culture, argues that 
early Stuart culture is diacritically obsessed with the Stoics and 
Epicureans, apart from and in relation to one another; that the Stoics and 
Epicureans afford early Stuart readers and writers with the most 
impressive yet vexatious answers to many of their most urgent political 
and religious questions; and that given the complexity with which the 
philosophies have been transmitted, the cultural brokers of early Stuart 
England are forced to wrestle with the paradox by which the friendly 
philosophy becomes the enemy, and the enemy the friend. (2-3) 
Barbour argues that Stoic philosophy contributed to English culture in a variety of ways. 
While it has primarily been seen as a source of moral philosophy, it also contributed to 
the formation of early modem natural philosophy (4), and found its expression in 
political and religious treatises, and even in the drama of the times. Audrey Chew 
examines the ubiquity of the Stoic influence on the art literature of Renaissance and early 
modem England. Many "writers were likely to have absorbed Stoic ideas unconsciously 
from a multiplicity of sources, including their favorite Roman popular writers, many of 
whom subscribed to a moderate or diluted Stoic philosophy of life" (79). She argues, 
however, that there were many varieties of Stoicism, some more pure than others, some 
more compatible with Christianity than with paganism. 
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Justus Lipsius and the Recovery of Stoic Philosophy 
The most direct recovery of Stoic philosophy during the Renaissance was in the 
work of Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius, who edited editions of Tacitus and Seneca.45 
Although Lipsius is primarily recognized as a philologist and literary critic,46 his 
translations of Stoic documents constituted the most substantial such effort until Arnim 
complied Stoicorum veterumfragmentum in 1 905 . According to his biographer, Jason 
Saunders, Lipsius' s aim was to trace the history of Stoicism and compare it to Christian 
doctrine, as found in the Bible and in theological works of the Church fathers (xiv). 
Saunders attributes Lipsius' s  interest in Stoicism to his anxieties about the wars that 
ravaged Europe during the late sixteenth century, claiming that he wrote the first of his 
Stoic treaties, De constantia libri duo ( 1 584) "from his real need for support during the 
sufferings of the wars" (22). De constantia was an introduction to Stoic moral philosophy 
that focused on explicating Stoic definitions of concepts such as free will, providence, 
justice, and fate (23). Lipsius relied primarily on the works of Seneca, Epictetus, and, 
occasionally, Cicero. P oliticorum, sive civil is doctrinae libri sex, published in 1 5  89, was 
intended to "illustrat[ e] various theories of government and sound political procedure" 
(27). Sources for Politicorum were Aristotle, Tacitus, and Cicero. The Politicorum was 
an incredibly popular and influential work. Originally published in 1 588-89 in a Latin 
edition, it was translated almost immediately into Dutch, French, English, German, and 
Portuguese, and by 1604, it had also been translated into Italian and Spanish. In addition, 
new editions of about fifteen hundred books were released annually until about 1 6 1 8  
45 For an explication of Lipsius' s  Stoic philosophy, see Jason Saunders, Justus Lipsius: The Philosophy of 
Renaissance Stoicism; see also M. Morford, Stoics and Neostoics: Justus Lipsius and the Circle of 
Reubens. For a brief discussion of Lipsius and his works, see Anthony Grafton, "Portrait of Justus Lipsius." 
46 Lipsius is widely recognized as a leader of the sixteenth-century reaction against Ciceronian sty le. 
According to Morris C_roll, Lipsius was able to build upon the less successful fifteenth-century anti­
Ciceronian movement led by Erasmus. See Croll, "' Attic' Prose in the Seventeenth Century." 
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(Evans 9). In 1 604, Lipsius produced two works of Stoic doctrine, Manductio ad stoicam 
philosophiam and its sequel, Physiologiae stoicorum. According to Saunders, the 
Manductio is an unsystematic and inferior philosophical analysis of the miscellaneous 
aspects of Stoic moral doctrines, a historical treatment of Stoic philosophy and its 
antecedents, and a survey of the Stoic paradoxes. By contrast, the Physiologiae was a 
more carefully argued exposition of Stoic thought, emphasizing Stoic physics (54). 
Lipsius's treatment of Stoic theory revived the Stoic study of physics as the 
fundamental part of philosophy. According to Saunders, Li psi us believed that ethics 
should be the aim of philosophy and logic the method by which knowledge is achieved, 
but physics must be the beginning of philosophy (Saunders 1 1 9) . .  Li psi us argued that 
logic, while "useful [for] sharpening the mind and establishing the separation and choice 
of truth and falsity," loses its meaning when studied "apart from the natural world" ( 1 19). 
Regarding nature as the source of knowledge, Li psi us says, 
Does not the subject of natural philosophy have the power of being more 
sweet [wholesome], honest, useful than other disciplines? Nature opens its 
whole breast - the heavens, earth, and lower regions; the sky, earth, fire, 
water, air; everything contained in them, God, the angels, and 
humankind-and invites one to observe and learn of them. (Phys. 
Stoicorum, 1 .2, IV, 835 [translation mine])47 
Lipsius also equates the study of nature with the study of the divine. 
The mind in the body is oppressed, as if enclosed in a prison. Unless 
contemplation is added, which bids the mind to recover courage from the 
47 Potestne autem suavius, honestius, utilius isto Physicorum? Natura totum sinum suum offert, and 
panduisupera, media, inferna; caelum, terras, ignem, aquas, aera; quidquid iis continetur, Deum, Genios, 
Homines; ad haec spectanda and noscenda invitat. 
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spectacle of the things of nature, and turns the mind from earthly matters 
to those divine. (Phys. Stoicorum, 1 .2 IV, 835 [translation mine])48 
For Li psi us, the eclectic nature of Stoic philosophy was its greatest appeal. He sought in 
philosophy a solution to the dogmatic conflicts that were tearing Europe apart, seeing 
adherence to a single philosophy as dangerous and believing that the study of philosophy 
in general could enhance the "truths" of Christianity (Saunders 2 1 8). 
Li psi us' s version of Stoicism is clearly not faithful to the original, but is a 
compromise with his Renaissance Christian perspective. In his attempt to reconcile 
Stoicism with Christianity Lipsius failed to represent the synthetic and systematic nature 
of the philosophy, instead relying too heavily on the works of Seneca and Epictetus and 
ignoring a variety of other sources, particularly those which described technical aspects 
of Stoic cosmology (Long, "Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition" 379). Lipsius also 
distorted the original philosophy by incorporating secondary material from Platonist and 
Christian writers. Finally, he referred to Christian doctrine as the criterion by which Stoic 
philosophy should be judged. Thus, a number of significant aspects of Stoic philosophy, 
particularly of physics, fell by the wayside (379-80).49 The fact that Lipsius's 
representation of Stoicism was not completely true to the original philosophy does not 
negate its influence, however. It was the compatibility of the received version of Stoicism 
with Christianity that made it attractive as an alternative to the Augustine strain of 
Renaissance humanism. 
48 Ille in hoc corpore, velut in custodia clausus, premitur; nisi Contemplatio accessit; que ilium respirare 
rerum Natura spectacula iubeat; and a terrenis dimittet ad divina. 
49 Long, whose interest is ancient Stoicism, is perhaps too harsh in his criticism of Lipsius' s  representation 
of Stoicism. It is certainly the case that Lipsius was more concerned with moral philosophy than with 
physics and that he deferred to Christian doctrine whenever he found conflicts between it and Stoicism. 
However, there were fewer texts extant that pertained to Stoic physics, and Lipsius did, at least, make 
available a version of Seneca's understanding of Stoic physics to his Renaissance contemporaries. 
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Francis Bacon and Stoic Humanism 
Twentieth century scholars have often described Francis Bacon as an anti­
humanist. Anthony Grafton, for example, says that Bacon treated humanism as "a fatal 
disease of learning" ("New Science" 205).50 Generally, such critique is founded on 
Bacon's criticism of the copious yet empty rhetoric of some of his contemporaries. Brian 
Vickers argues at length that Bacon's 
critique is directed against the excessive imitation of Cicero's Latin style 
and forms part of a well-documented episode within humanism . . .  
culminating in the whole series of literary quarrels sparked off by 
Erasmus' s  Ciceronianus. ("The Myth of Francis Bacon's ' Anti­
Humanism"' 140) 
Vickers concludes that any reading of Bacon's theories regarding rhetoric and language 
that places him outside the humanist tradition does so only by narrowly defining 
Renaissance rhetoric to include only those theories that descended from Quintilian and 
Cicero. 5 1 Certainly, Bacon fits more neatly within the framework of Stoic humanism than 
he does within the Augustinian tradition.52 Bacon's Advancement of Learning, in which 
he argues for a complete reform of education to create a system that is organized 
according to the structure of the human mind and aimed at exploring and explicating the 
natural world, is the clearest example of how he melds elements of Stoic philosophy 
within a Renaissance humanist framework. 
50 See Brian Vickers, "The Myth of Francis Bacon's Anti-Humanism" for a more extensive summary of 
the literature regarding Bacon 's purported antipathy to humanism. 
5 1 Nothing here should be construed to suggest that Vickers places Bacon within the Stoic tradition. In fact, 
places Bacon within the line of Aristotel ian rhetoric and rejects quite strenuously arguments for Bacon' s  
adoption of the Stoic style. See Vickers' Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose. 
52 While Vickers recognizes Bacon' s  plainer style, he rejects the notion that his style is Stoic. 
5 1  
English Humanism and the Education of Francis Bacon 
Nowhere was the civic aspect of humanism more fully developed than in 
England. 53 The early English humanists-including Thomas More, Richard Fox, who 
founded Corpus Christi College at Oxford, John Colet, dean of St. Paul's Cathedral and 
founder of the boys' grammar school there, and Roger Ascham, tutor to Queen Elizabeth 
and author of The Scholemaster - were all committed to promoting a classical 
education, including training in rhetoric, even at the grammar school level,54 and 
competency in both Greek and Latin for more advanced students. For the English 
humanists, however, education was not intended to lead to a cloistered life (the vita 
contemplativa), but to be used in an active life of service to the monarch and 
commonwealth. A number of famous humanist texts, notably Thomas More's Utopia and 
Thomas Elyot's The Boke Named the Governour, were concerned primarily with offering 
advice for the sound government of the commonwealth. Utopia described an idealized 
form of government in which all citizens contributed to the good of the society, while 
Elyot' s text delineated the most desirable education and characteristics of the ideal 
sovereign. English humanism did not limit education to male aristocrats. Ascham 
describes, for example, the excellencies of character of Elizabeth I and Lady Jane Gray, 
both of whom were classically educated in the humanist tradition. Francis Bacon's 
mother also received an extensive humanist education and it was she who chose her sons' 
tutor and oversaw their formal education (Jardine and Stewart 32) .  
Francis Bacon was born in 1 561 ,  younger son of Nicholas Bacon, Lord-Keeper of 
the Great Seal to Queen Elizabeth I, and Ann Cooke, his second wife. Nicholas Bacon, a 
53 This is not to suggest that English civic humanism went further than that described in the Italian city­
state by Baron. My point is that the establishment of educational institutions to prepare individuals for an 
active life of service to the commonwealth was the primary interest of the British humanists. 
54 Laurence Green has argued that the training in the use of tropes and figures in Lily's Latin Grammar, 
widely used in grammar school education from the fifteenth century onward, provided a basic education in 
rhetoric even for students who did not proceed to a university education. See "Grammatica movet". 
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sheep reeve's son, was educated as a scholarship student at Cambridge, became a 
member of the aristocratic literati of the country, and advanced to one of the highest 
positions in the land. That Nicholas recognized the role education played in his 
advancement is demonstrated by a number of generous gifts to educational institutions 
throughout his life (Jardine and Stewart 24-25). Bacon was immersed in Renaissance 
humanist culture throughout his life. 55 As a child, Francis Bacon was introduced at court 
by his father, and is reputed by his biographer Rawley to have demonstrated a rhetorical 
precocity that made him a favorite with the Queen, who called him "the young Lord 
Keeper" (PW 1) .  Bacon's education began at home, where he was first tutored by John 
Walsall, a scholar from Christ Church, Oxford, who was selected by Ann Bacon as much 
for his radical Protestantism as for his humanist erudition (Heltzell; see also Jardine and 
Stewart 35). In 1 573, twelve-year old Francis accompanied his older brother Anthony to 
Trinity College, Cambridge, where they spent most of the next three years. While at 
Oxford, the brothers' education was directly supervised by John Whitgift, master of 
Trinity, who designed for them a typically humanist course of study that included the 
works of Livy, Caesar, Sallust, Demosthenes' Orations, Homer's Iliad, Cicero's 
Complete Works, and the rhetorical handbook then believed to be authored by Cicero, the 
Ad Herrenium. They studied Plato and Aristotle, along with Hermogenes and Xenophon 
in an edition with Greek and Latin on facing pages. They also would have studied Greek 
grammar and logic (35). It was during this time, according to Rawley, that Bacon "first 
fell into the dislike of the philosophy of Aristotle; nor for the worthlessness of the author, 
to whom he would ever ascribe all high attributes, but for the uselessness of the way; 
55 Francis Bacon did not leave an autobiography, though his life is well documented through his letters and 
many other texts . The first of many biographies was published in 1 657 by William Rawley, the first editor 
of Bacon's works. Subsequent biographies include Edwin Abbott' s Bacon and Essex: A Sketch of Bacon 's 
Earlier Life (1 877) and Francis Bacon: An Account of his Life and Work (1 885); Charles Williams's Bacon 
( 1 933); Bryan Bevan's The Real Francis Bacon ( 1960); Catherine Drinker Bowen's  Francis Bacon: The 
Temper of a Man ( 1 963); Anthony Quinton's Francis Bacon ( 1 980); and Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart's  
Hostage to Fortune: The Troubled Life of Francis Bacon ( 1 998). 
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being a philosophy ( as his lordship used to say) only strong for disputations and 
contentions, but barren of the production of works for the benefit of the life of man" (2).56 
According to Rawley, during his tenure at Cambridge, Bacon "was observed to be more 
than an ordinary proficient in the several arts and sciences" (2); it is clear from the 
eloquence that characterized his discourse throughout his life that he learned much from 
his early training in the liberal arts. It should not be assumed, however, that Francis 
Bacon was devoted solely to the academic life. Jardine and Stewart paint a portrait of 
Bacon and his brother Anthony at Cambridge as young men who saw this time as an 
opportunity for "gentlemanly grooming," during which they gathered the learning and 
accouterments that allowed them to fashion themselves as the future courtiers that their 
heritage entitled them to be (36). 
In 1576, shortly after Francis was admitted to Gray's Inn for the study of law, his 
father arranged for him to become a member of the household of Sir Amyas Paulet, 
ambassador to France. Nicholas Bacon's plan was for Francis to augment his legal 
studies by studying Roman law as it was practiced in France (Jardine and Stewart 39). 
Francis Bacon was to look back on this period as one of the most important in his life. In 
addition to learning Roman law, he met new people and learned the manners and habits 
required of an ambassador to the more sophisticated courts of Europe (39-40). He was 
also exposed to new ideas and new ways of thinking. 57 During his stay in France, in order 
to supplement the money supplied by his father, Francis undertook some spy missions on 
behalf of the crown. He also became acquainted with Thomas Phillips, Sir Francis 
Walsingham's master cryptographer, from whom he first learned codes and cyphers, an 
56 Jardine and Stewart suggest that, brill iant as the young Bacon was, such "philosophical precocity" may 
be some of Bacon' s  own revis ionism (35). 57 Paolo Rossi suggests that Francis Bacon's philosophy regarding technology was formed in part by his 
exposure to the ideas of Bernard Palissy, a French potter known for his experiments in ceramics (From 
Magic to Science 8-9). Markku Peltonen indicates that Bacon may have attended Palissy's public lectures 
during his time in Paris (3). 
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interest that Bacon continued throughout his life and that informed his representation of 
nature as a perplexing but ultimately decipherable mystery (Jardine and Stewart 49-57). 
In February, 1 579, Nicholas Bacon died unexpectedly, before he was able to provide an 
estate for Francis. Within a month, Francis returned home to begin a much different kind 
of life. 
On his return home from Europe, Bacon began his study of the law at Gray' s Inn 
and the long struggle to carve out a place for himself in the British court. Two years later, 
Bacon got his first taste of political office when he was returned to Parliament for 
Bossiny, Cornwall, and he continued to be active in the House of Commons for many 
years. In 1 5 82, he was admitted to the bar as an utter barrister and progressed through the 
ranks for the next decade. Throughout this time, as Bacon became more involved in the 
political and legal life of England, he continued to seek the preferment that he finally 
found from Elizabeth' s successor, James I .  In 1 603, he was knighted, in 1 604 appointed 
Learned Council to the king, and in 1 607, having taken a key role in the negotiations 
between Parliament and the King for unification of the two kingdoms, he was rewarded 
with the post of Solicitor-General which he had sought for many years. As he continued 
to curry favor with James and his intimates, Bacon' s fortunes rose accordingly. Between 
1 6 12  and 1 6 1 8, he was appointed to the posts of Attorney General, Privy Councilor, Lord 
Keeper, and Lord Chancellor. In 1 6 1 8, Baco_n was created Baron Verulam and, in 
January 1 62 1 ,  he was created Viscount St. Albans. This exalted status did not last long, 
however; by March of the same year, Francis Bacon was charged with and convicted of 
accepting bribes. 
Although Bacon never again participated to any significant degree in the public 
life of England, he made perhaps his most lasting contribution during the last five years 
of his life. As was the case with many humanists, Bacon longed for the contemplative life 
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even as he lived the active life at court and in Parliament.58 During the relative seclusion 
that resulted from his disgrace, he produced many of the philosophical texts for which he 
is remembered today. His biographer, Rawley, gives the following account of the works 
Bacon produced during this period:59 
The last five years of his life, being withdrawn from civil affairs and from 
active life, he employed wholly in contemplation and studies-a thing 
whereof his lordship would often speak during his active life, as if he 
affected to die in the shadow and not in the light; which also may be found 
in several passages of his works. In which time he composed the greatest 
part of his books and writings, both in English and Latin. (PW 4) 
Jardine and Stewart suggest that Rawley's account of Bacon's final years and his gift to 
posterity is a continuation of Bacon's own campaign to rehabilitate his image (473-476). 
Whatever his or his close associates' intentions, there is no doubt that these texts, along 
with the Novum Organum and The Great Instauration, are the foundation for the image 
of Francis Bacon that has persisted into the twenty-first century. 
As in his lifetime, Bacon remains a difficult figure to evaluate. His life, however, 
exemplifies the tension between the vita activa and vita contemplativa that is 
characteristic of the humanist project. Whether or not his motivations were selfish, there 
is no question that he dedicated all his energies to the life of public service that was 
central to the humanist tradition. This impulse toward service carried over into both his 
political and philosophical writings. Although Francis Bacon's  political writings were, 
58 William Bouwsma in The Culture of Renaissance Humanism, examines the contradictory impulses 
toward the vita activa and vita contemplativa that characterize the humanist experience. 
59 Rawley goes on to enumerate the list of works Bacon completed, many of which were published 
posthumously. See Graham Rees' Introduction to Vol. 6 of The Oxford Francis Bacon for a discussion of 
when the works Rawley enumerates were actually written. Rees suggests that most of these works were, in 
actuality, already in progress as many as ten years before Bacon's trial and subsequent "withdrawal" from 
civic life. 
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perhaps, the most influential of his writings during his lifetime, they have proved less 
durable over time than his Essays and his philosophical works on education and natural 
philosophy. As a humanist, Bacon was concerned with reforming the educational system 
of his times, and he sought to resolve some of the inherent conflicts he recognized within 
the humanist project . He describes his project William Burghley thus: 
I have taken all knowledge as my province; and if I could purge it of two 
sorts of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous disputations, confutations, 
and verbosities, the other with blind experiments and auricular traditions 
and impostures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in 
industrious observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions 
and discoveries; the best state of that province. (qtd. in Jardine and Stuart 
133-34) 
Such confidence in his ability is, perhaps, no great boast for one who, according to his 
biographer Rawley, had decided at an early age to reform educational practices that had 
been in place since the time of Aristotle. 
Bacon 's Active Science 
Twentieth-century opinions of Francis Bacon's status as a progenitor of modem 
science are mixed. Whether he is seen as a buffoon or as a visionary, however, such 
retrospective views are based on criteria of modem science . One might argue, following 
Thomas Kuhn's model, that Bacon's views are no longer scientific because subsequent 
paradigm shifts have made his understanding of science incommensurable with our 
contemporary understanding of science. 6° Conversely, however, contemporary views of 
6° Kuhn, a historian of science, introduced the concept of the "paradigm shift," a model that describes the 
process through which changes in scientific thought and practice occur. Paradigm shifts begin in the course 
of "normal science," i.e. the routine testing of the limits of currently accepted theory, with the observations 
of anomalous events that contradict a prevailing scientific theory. As these anomalous observations 
accumulate, scientists begin to advance new theories to explain them. Generally, however, it is not until the 
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science are incommensurable with sixteenth-century epistemology, so one cannot so 
easily dismiss the appropriateness of Bacon' s limited practice of natural philosophy in 
his own age. 
There is also considerable disagreement over the relationship between Bacon's 
new philosophy to humanism. Grafton, for example, cites a commonly held view that at a 
time when humanism was already being "questioned and subverted," Bacon "inserted 
dynamite and lit the fuse" ("The New Science and the Traditions of Humanism" 205). 
Assertions that Bacon intended either to destroy humanism or to establish science are 
both problematic since humanism was hardly a coherent institution and "science" as an 
identifiable cultural construct had yet to come into being. Bacon recognized a number of 
"deficiencies" in the educational and intellectual practices of his day, deficiencies that he 
detailed for the first time in his 1605 publication of The Advancement of Learning. Not 
all these deficiencies were part of the humanist tradition; some of them were associated 
with scholasticism and with the Protestant reformation. Among the problems he 
identified were the conflict between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa and a 
concern with words at the expense of matter. The way to remedy these problems, 
according to Bacon, was "to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all 
human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations" (Proem to the Great Instauration, 
PW 24 1). He argues for nature as the foundation for the edifice of learning he proposes. 
The belief that Bacon's program is anti-humanistic is a result of a failure to 
consider the totality of his debt to ancient philosophies, as well as his commitment to 
humanist values. Graham Rees argues that Bacon drew on a variety of ancient doctrines 
in formulating his view of nature and natural philosophy, including "atomist and 
accretion of anomalies is so great that they can no longer be ignored that a paradigm shift occurs, and a new 
theory becomes generally accepted. In Kuhn's view, then, the process of scientific revolutions is much 
more evolutionary than catastrophic. They are, however, revolutionary to the extent that they are inevitable 
and irrevocable; after the paradigm shift occurs, the old paradigm is incommensurable with what it 
replaced. 
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Aristotelian natural philosophies, Copemicanism, Galileian observational astronomy, the 
work of Paracelsus, of William Gilbert, Telesio, Patrizi, and others besides" ("Bacon' s 
Speculative Philosophy" xxxvii). According to Rees, Bacon' s  natural philosophy had a 
doubleness that has not been sufficiently explored. He argues that it appears "[ o ]n the one 
hand . . . .  as a programme for constructing a body of scientific knowledge that would 
yield practical benefits to release the human race from material privation. On the other 
hand it appears as a strange corpus of theory, a speculative recreation, an attempt to 
picture the knowledge that might be produced once the programme was implemented" 
(xxxvi) . This is reflected in the Plan of the Great Instauration, for example, in which 
Bacon's descriptions of the first three parts of the work clearly indicate his intent to 
establish such a program while the latter parts suggest a more speculative activity . If 
Rees' s description of the doubleness of Bacon's project is taken at face value, there 
seems to be little space for Stoic influence, since the programmatic aspects are too 
materialistic for Stoic sensibilities, and the speculative sections are informed by the mish­
mash of theories that Rees has identified. However, Rees' description of Bacon's 
program, i .e . , "constructing a body of scientific knowledge that would yield practical 
benefits to release the human race from material privation," does not reflect fully the 
degree to which Bacon saw his Instauration as transformative of the intellect and spirit of 
humankind, as well as improving its material situation. For the humanist, intellectual arts 
were not mere sets of strategies, but were intended to be internalized and practiced. In the 
same way that eloquence was not merely the product of art, but reflected the character of 
the speaker as well, Bacon would have expected his method to have a transformational 
effect on its practitioner and for that to be reflected in behavior and demeanor. Thus, the 
benefits achieved through the methodical study of nature would not have been merely 
intellectual, but material and spiritual as well. The philosophy of Stoicism served as a 
model for this sort of transformational and normative practice. Bacon's understanding of 
59 
nature as a rational and discernible creation owes much to the ideas of the later Stoics, 
especially those of Seneca. In particular, Bacon relied on Stoicism to bolster his 
assertions that nature was divinely created and yet an orderly system whose mysteries 
could be penetrated by rational humans. Bacon's understanding of nature as a source of a 
normative standard may also be traced to the Stoics. 
Bacon recognized that many of the fundamental conflicts of the Renaissance were 
epistemological. Humanism, operating in the realm of the contingent, relied upon a 
standard of practical wisdom; religion was legitimated by divine revelation; and the new 
philosophy yielded theoretical knowledge that was legitimated observationally or 
methodologically. Bacon argued for nature as a legitimate source for theoretical 
knowledge, and in doing so, he proposed a new ethical standard for the practical wisdom 
which humanists valued so highly. He also articulated a justification for technology as 
productive knowledge and broadened the range of methodologies by which human 
beings interrogated their world. Whereas the humanists had depended almost exclusively 
upon rhetoric as an architectonic art, Bacon developed a "new kind of logic" for the new 
kind of intellectual activity he proposed. However, despite his claims regarding the 
novelty of his new philosophy, Bacon's reformation is clearly in the humanist mold, 
given its emphasis on education, civic activism, and the rhetorical nature of his efforts. 
His earliest attempts in this regard were aimed at reforming the educational system, 
replacing both the stultified Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages and the copious rhetoric 
of the Renaissance with a "new" philosophy inspired, . in part, by ideas from ancient texts 
recovered by his humanist predecessors. Moreover, it seems clear that this reconstruction 
was founded upon the humanistic desire to improve the human condition. Despite his 
concern regarding the inherent inability for words adequately to represent things, his 
program was greatly influenced by humanist rhetoric, and his Great Instauration was 
really little more than an extended argument, which begins from the premise that nature 
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is the appropriate foundation for knowledge. Unlike his contemporary Peter Ramus, who 
showed great contempt for rhetoric, Bacon recognized the importance of eloquence in the 
public arena. The centrality of language to his project is perhaps best demonstrated in his 
emphasis on the development of new discursive forms that he claimed were better suited 
to philosophical endeavors. 
While Bacon's new philosophy in some respects seems to reject humanist 
practices and to propose a new, methodical intellectual enterprise that somewhat 
resembles modem science, it is grounded in humanist values and practices. Bacon 
sought, through his Great Instauration, to unite the active and contemplative ways of life 
and to produce a certain kind of individual who could carry out this program of 
improvement. Thus, he united practical wisdom with theoretical knowledge and, rather 
than replacing Aristotelian teleology with ontology, conflated "ought" with "is". This 
collapsing of "ought" with "is" is compatible with the Stoic view of nature as rational 
and normative. Bacon did not stop, however, with uniting these two epistemological 
practices, but returned to the Aristotelian typology, which posits a third branch of 
wisdom, productive knowledge. Unlike Aristotle, however, Bacon had to deal with a 
theological tradition that was suspect of notions that humans could command nature. The 
philosophy of the ancient Stoics provided him with a set of concepts and commonplaces 
that he deployed in an extended argument for a new epistemological system. Stoicism 
provided a model for a synthetic philosophy that integrated all these aspects of 
knowledge in a way that could accommodate theological objections and advance the 
humanistic desire for improving the lot of humankind. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FINDING NATURE'S ORDER: 
STOIC INFLUENCES IN BACON'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 
Nature is an artistic fire going on its way to create. 
-Diogenes Laertius61  
Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones 
and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile 
they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, 
and the yolk in the center is Physics. Or again, they liken Philosophy to a 
fertile field. Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the 
soul or the trees. Or, again, a city strongly walled and governed by reason. 
-Diogenes Laertius62 
Now what the sciences stand in need of is a form of induction which shall 
analyse experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion 
and rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion. And if that ordinary mode 
of judgment practiced by the logicians was so laborious, and found 
exercise for such great wits, how much more labour must we be prepared 
to bestow upon this other, which is extracted not merely out of the depths 
of the mind, but out of the very bowels of nature. 
-Francis Bacon63 
6 1  Diogenes' description of the Stoic concept of nature appears in Lives of the Philosophers, vii 1 56. 
62 Diogenes' description of the relationship between the elements of Stoic philosophy appears in Lives of 
the Philosophers vii 39. 
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It may also be asked . . .  whether I speak of natural philosophy only, or 
whether I mean that the other sciences, logic, ethics, and politics, should 
be carried on by this method. Now I certainly mean that what I have said 
to be understood of them all; and as the common logic, which governs by 
the syllogism, extends not only to natural but to all sciences; so does mine 
also, which proceeds by induction, embrace everything. For I form a 
history and tables of discovery for anger, fear, shame, and the like; for 
matters political; and again for the mental operations of memory, 
composition and division, judgment and the rest; not less than for heat and 
cold, or light or vegetation, or the like. But nevertheless since my method 
of interpretation, after the history has been prepared and duly arranged, 
regards not the working and discourse of the mind only ( as the common 
logic does) but the nature of things also, I supply the mind with such rules 
and guidance that it may in every case apply itself aptly to the nature of 
things. 
-Francis Bacon64 
The key to the development of modem science is a mechanistic view of nature as 
a regular system the rules of which may be perceived and exploited by human beings. 
Francis Bacon's natural philosophy, while not completely consistent with modern 
science, also presents nature as orderly and comprehensible to human beings. This view 
is very different from that which preceded it, i.e. , nature as a mysterious system 
responsive to the commands of God and the actions of human beings. Any history of 
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"The Plan of the Work," PW 25 1 .  
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science ought to take into account the means by which this transformation occurred. The 
standard narrative of the scientific revolution suggests that a revitalizing Platonism, with 
its emphasis on abstract mathematical concepts, triumphed over a stultified Aristotelian 
teleological philosophy.65 However, modern science is not merely abstract; rather it is 
also empirical and experimental, to the extent that it derives abstract principles from the 
experimental testing of hypotheses based upon empirical observations. Platonism 
certainly provided no examples for this kind of thinking or practice. Despite the 
usefulness of Platonist mathematics for disciplines such as theoretical physics, it is 
unlikely that Platonism alone could have sparked changes as far-reaching as those that 
constitute the scientific revolution. First, the Platonists viewed the physical world as an 
inferior reflection of the world of Ideas, so that, while it may ultimately be useful for 
scientists attempting to describe how Nature works in the abstract, Platonism is not likely 
to have led Renaissance thinkers to engage in empirical investigations of nature, the 
corrupt physical manifestation of the Ideal. Thus, while this Platonizing narrative may 
partially satisfy an intemalist history of science, it does not fully explain even the internal 
changes in natural philosophy, much less how the larger culture came to accept such a 
radical change in world view. To uncover the roots of the scientific revolution, it is 
worthwhile examining the activities and ideas of Renaissance humanists, who recovered 
a wide variety of ancient philosophical texts and are responsible for inserting new ideas 
into the culture of the late Renaissance. A number of these other philosophical systems 
encompassed views of nature that were more compatible with both the then-current 
natural philosophy and Christian theology. 
The intellectual life of the ancient world was much more diverse than the 
modernist Platonism-Aristotelianism dichotomy would suggest. As a result of their 
65 Alexandre Koyre' s "hypothetico-deductive" model of Galilean science is an example of this kind of 
narrative. 
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efforts to recover ancient texts, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European humanists 
were fully aware of philosophies both more ancient and more recent than those of Plato 
and Aristotle. Available to them through the works of ancient biographers and 
doxographers were fragments from the most ancient Greek philosophers, such as Thales 
and Anaxagoras, the Pythagoreans, and the early Greek atomists such as Democritus. It 
was a rich heritage, only part of which included a mathematical view of the universe. In 
addition to these more ancient texts, humanists also recovered the works of philosophers 
who were contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, as well as those of their successors in 
their respective schools. Texts that were not extant were often recounted in the other 
texts. Also available to Renaissance thinkers were texts from philosophical schools that 
evolved from these classical philosophies, such as the various schools of skepticism­
the Academics and the more radical Pyrrhonists - as well as the materialist philosophies 
of the Epicureans and Stoics. In addition to these ancient texts, records of more recent 
attempts to understand and manipulate nature contributed to the intellectual background 
of the scientific revolution. These include a brief interest in natural philosophy during the 
late Middle Ages66 and the more durable interest in alchemy and astrology. 67 Finally, 
technological innovations in a number of fields, from medicine to optics to ceramics, 
contributed to this eclectic intellectual mix. 
Francis Bacon's philosophy, which he constructed from both ancient 
philosophies and more recent practices, demonstrates the eclecticism that characterized 
the Renaissance philosophical landscape. In his study of Bacon's  philosophy, Stephen 
Gaukroger examines the degree to which Bacon's eclecticism was characteristic of the 
philosophical landscape of seventeenth-century England. According to Gaukroger, this 
66 See Butterfield, The Origins of Science 13 00-1800. 
67 See Frances Yates' s work on the Hermetic corpus in Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, The 
Rosicrucian Enlightenment, and Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age. Paolo Rossi examines Francis 
Bacon's interest in alchemical tradition in From Magic to Science. 
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eclecticism was not merely a result of the variety of sources recovered by the humanists, 
but reflected the character of the recovered philosophies themselves: 
Eclecticism was a feature of philosophy in the late Hellenistic, Roman, 
and early medieval periods. Cicero, one of the principal sources of the 
moral philosophy of antiquity, presented this moral philosophy in a 
completely eclectic way, and Renaissance humanists from Petrarch 
onwards took over this eclecticism as part [ of] their approach to moral 
philosophy. More generally, Roman thought, in which Stoicism was 
particularly important, was saturated with various forms of eclecticism and 
syncretism, and Stoic, Aristotelian, and Platonist doctrines were readily 
assimilated. (28-9) 
As far as the practice of experimental natural philosophy in the Renaissance is concerned, 
Epicureanism,68 which adopted a material view of the universe and attempted to explain 
events in the physical world without reference to any divine intervention, may have had 
more to contribute to the Renaissance resurrection of natural philosophy as the immediate 
epistemological antecedent of modern science. But Epicureanism, to the degree that it 
was seen to promote hedonism and reject the divine, was certainly anathema to Christian 
Europe. However, Stoic philosophy, which had a much greater influence on Renaissance 
and early modern society as a whole, is more likely to have helped prepare the late 
Renaissance or early modem mind for the epistemological shift that has been called the 
68 Epicureanism, which drew upon ancient Greek atomistic philosophy, is perhaps a more likely antecedent 
for the practice of early modern science and for some of Bacon's ideas. For a concise discussion of this 
school, see the chapter, "Epicureanism," in E. E. Long's Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, 
Sceptics. See Reid Barbour's "Remarkable Ingratitude: Bacon, Prometheus, Democritus" for a discussion 
of Bacon's borrowings from atomistic philosophies. See also Fulton Anderson, The Philosophy of Francis 
Bacon, for a discussion of Bacon's appreciation for the Greek atomists. For a discussion of Gassendi's 
struggles to "Christianize" Epicurean atomism, see Margaret J. Osler, "Renaissance Humanism, Lingering 
Aristotelianism, and the New Natural Philosophy: Gassendi on Final Causes." Osler argues that 
Epicureanism's conceptualization of the atom, though incompatible with Renaissance religion, was more 
compatible with the new natural philosophy than Aristotelian teleology ( 193-1 95). 
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"scientific revolution." This is not to say that Bacon himself, who often protested quite 
vigorously against various Stoic doctrines and against those of his contemporaries who 
had more openly adopted Stoic moral philosophy, was a Stoic. Nor is it to suggest that 
Bacon's natural philosophy replicates Stoic physics, of which little is actually known. 
Rather, I argue that Bacon incorporates certain aspects of Stoic philosophy, particularly 
that he uses Stoic ideas as commonplaces in his argument in favor of natural philosophy 
and that Stoic epistemology informs his own new philosophical method. Stoicism also 
provided a model for integrating natural philosophy with other moral and ethical 
philosphy and provided a model for the sort of synthetic intellectual system Bacon 
wanted to build. Finally, because for the Stoics �ature fulfilled a normative function, i.e., 
to behave in accordance with nature was the highest good, . it served as a model for the 
study of nature as equivalent to the study of divine relevation. 
The Stoic View of Nature 
Stoic philosophy is built upon the central principal that the whole of the universe 
is the embodiment of reason, which they call logos, and that human beings are governed 
by and share in the immanent logos of the universe. It is this intersection between the 
natural world and reason that accounts for the extraordinary coherence of Stoic 
.. philosophy. Physics, the study of nature or physis, is the study of the natural (rational) 
order of the universe; logic trains human beings to interpret immanent logos; ethics is the 
practical application of natural reason, or, to be precise, the attempt to conform to natural 
order. Central to the Stoic enterprise are two key concepts: reason (logos) and nature 
(physis). 
Logos 
The term logos is a contested term that carried different meanings within the 
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various schools of Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. Generally it is denotes a variety of 
linguistic concepts, including the structure of argumentation, discourse, and logic or 
reason. 69 Throughout antiquity, because the Greeks recognized language as the source of 
humans' superiority over other creatures, logos always evoked the notion of power or 
force: the power to persuade, or even, in the rhetoric of the early Sophists, to remake our 
concept of the world. 70 The Stoic philosophers, however, endowed the term with 
extraordinary generative power because they believed that logos was not merely a way 
for human beings to conceptualize the world, but the force that was responsible for the 
creation of the world. The Stoics believed that the universe (kosmos) was made up of two 
elements, "that which acts and that which is acted upon. That which is acted upon is 
unqualified substance, i .e. matter; that which acts is the reason [logos] in it, i.e . god. For 
this, since it is everlasting, constructs every single thing throughout all matter" (Diogenes 
Laertius 7. 134). For the Stoics, logos is "intelligent, a designing fire [pur technikon] 
which methodically proceeds towards creation of the world, and encompasses all the 
seminal principles according to which everything comes about'' (Aetius 1 .7.33 [HP 
46A ]). Logos is the seminal force in the cosmos. In the Stoic cosmology narrative, logos, 
which is synonymous with "god," in the form of a creative fire, initiates a cycle of 
generation which lasts several thousand years before being consumed in a conflagration 
initiated by the sun: 
God, intelligence, fate, and Zeus are all one, and many other names are 
applied to him. In the beginning all by himself he turned the entire 
substance through air into water. Just as the sperm is enveloped .in the 
69 See Susan Wells's discussion of the term in the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric. 
7° For the Sophists, the art of rhetoric was the most important art. In The Sophists, W.K.C. Guthrie 
describes Sophistic perceptions of reality: "For Gorgias persuasion was sovereign because there was no 
truth over and above what man could be persuaded to believe and Protagoras was already teaching his 
pupils that on every subject opposed positions could be argued with equal validity, that what a man 
believed was true for him, and no man could contradict another in opposing a true view to a false" (2 1 1 -
12). 
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seminal fluid, so god, who is the seminal principle of the world, stays 
behind as such in the moisture, making matter serviceable to himself for 
the successive stages of creation. (Diogenes Laertius 7. 1 3 5-67 ) 
The two primary principles, i.e., logos and matter, are indestructible and infinite, whereas 
elements, i.e. earth, air, fire, and water, which combine to create everything in the world, 
are finite and "pass away at the conflagration" (Diogenes Laertius 7 . 1 34 ). Following the 
conflagration, "nature comes to stop for a while" and the god "reposes in himself given 
over to his thoughts" (Seneca, Letters 9. 1 6), after which the cycle repeats itself. In 
representing logos as a "designing fire," [ emphasis added] the Stoics emphasized the 
intelligence and craftsmanship of the seminal principle in the cosmos. 
Another term for the immanent, activating force in the cosmos is pneuma, 71 or 
breath, a term which the Stoics preferred to use in discussions of material aspects of 
nature. They use pneuma, for example, to explain the diversity of life in the cosmos. 
Diogenes Laertius says that, according to the Stoics, "[t] he world is directed by 
intelligence and providence, . . .  since intelligence pervades every part of it, just like the 
soul in us. But it pervades some parts to a greater extent and others to a lesser degree" 
(Diogenes Laertius 7 . 1 3 8-9). The Stoics make distinctions between different levels, or 
concentrations, of pneuma as it inhabits animals, plants, and inanimate objects : 
Intelligence . . .  has many powers, the tenor kind, the physical, the psychic, 
the rational, the calculative . . .  Tenor is also shared by lifeless things, 
stones and logs, and in our bones, which resemble stones, also participate 
in it. Physique also extends to plants, and in us there are things like 
plants-nails and hair. Physique is tenor in actual motion. Soul is Physique 
71 The Stoics used a number of terms to designate the same thing, i.e., the seminal, rational, motivating 
force of the cosmos. Logos, pneuma, pur technikonc all refer to the same force. 
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which has also acquired impression and impulse. This is also shared by 
irrational animals. (Philo, Allegories of the laws 2.22-3 ) 
The Stoics make a distinction between inanimate objects that have only the tenor of the 
creative force and cannot act but must be acted upon and things that "have the cause of 
movement in themselves, that are ' ensouled' and able to receive impressions which lead 
to impulses" (Origen, On principles 3. 1 .2-3). The soul of animals had seven parts, 
including the five senses, the ability to reproduce, and utterance. Rational animals had, in 
addition, a commanding faculty (hegemon) that was called reason (Aetius 4.2 1 . 1 -4). For 
the Stoics, the cosmos, itself ensouled by reason/god/pneuma was in effect a living 
being- "[The Stoics] say that god is an animal which is immortal and rational or 
intelligent" (Diogenes Laertius 7. 14  7)-and the human being was seen as a microcosm 
(Long & Sedley 319). 
Stoicism, unlike its philosophical antecedents, did not posit the existence of 
absolutes or the Platonic concept of the Ideal: 
[C]oncepts are neither somethings nor qualified, but figments of the soul 
which are quasi-somethings and quasi-qualified. These, they say, are what 
the old philosophers called Ideas. For the Ideas are of the things which are 
classified under the concepts, such as men, horses, and in general all the 
animals and other things of which they say that there are Ideas. The Stoic 
philosophers say that there are no Ideas, and what we 'participate in' is the 
concepts, while what we 'bear' is those cases which they call 
'appellatives' . (Stobaeus 1 . 136, 21- 137, 6) 
Nor did the Stoics believe in an afterlife. At the end of the regenerative part of the cosmic 
cycle, when the world was consumed in fire, god, or logos, withdraws into itself: 
It will be like the life of Zeus, at the time when the world is dissolved �d 
the gods have been blended together into one, when nature comes to stop 
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for a while; he reposes in himself given over to his thoughts. The wise 
man's behaviour is just like this: he retires into himself, and he is with 
himself. (Seneca, Letters 9 . 1 6) 
Stoicism, then, is not a teleological system, such as those posited by Plato and Aristotle. 
The end of human existence, indeed of the cosmos itself, is not some future existence, but 
existence itself. 
Nature and Natural Order 
The second critical term in Stoic philosophy is "nature" (physis), which they use 
to refer to a cluster of related concepts: 
By 'nature' they sometimes mean what sustains the world, and so�etimes 
what makes things on earth grow: nature is a self-moving tenor, which 
completes and sustains its products in accordance with seminal principles 
at determinate times, and continues to perform the actions from which 
they came to light. (Diogenes Laertius 7. 148.9) 
These two functions do not fully capture the many ways in which the Stoics 
conceptualized nature. The Stoics commonly used this term in five ways, including "( l )  
the power or  principle which shapes and creates all things; (2) the power or principle 
which unifies and gives coherence to the world; fiery breath; (3) artistic fire, self-moving 
and generative; ( 4) necessity and destiny; ( 5) God, providence, craftsman, right reason" 
(Long Hellenistic Philosophy 148). While the term 'nature' is often synonymous with 
logos, it has additional meanings since the term refers not only to the entire cosmos, but 
also to each part of the cosmos, i.e., the nature of plants is physic, the nature of animals is 
soul, and the nature of rational animals, or human beings, is logos.72 Because it is 
identified with logos, the creative and intelligent force of the universe, the Stoics saw 
72 See Long' s  discussion of these natures in Hellenistic Philosophy 148 .  
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nature as deterministic and normative and identified this deterministic aspect as fate, "a 
sequence of causes, that is, an inescapable ordering and interconnection" (HP 551). 
Chrysippus, one of the leaders of the Stoa, called fate 
a power of breath, carrying out the orderly government of all . . . . [A]nd 
here and there. in other works he expresses a variety of views: 'Fate is the 
rationale of the world', or ' the rationale of providence' s  acts of 
government in the world' ,  or ' the rationale in accordance with which past 
events have happened, present evets are happening, and future events will 
happen'. (Stobaeus 1 .79, 1 - 1 2) 
Alexander of Aphrodisias describes the Stoics' view of fate in this way: 
[S]ince the world is a unity which includes all existing things in itself and 
is governed by a living, rational, intelligent nature, the government of 
existing things which it possesses is an everlasting one proceeding in a 
sequence and ordering . . . .  For nothing in the world exists or happens 
causelessly, because none of the things in it is independent of, and 
insulated from, everything that has happened before . . . . They say that the 
very fate, nature and rationale in accordance with which the all is governed 
is god. It is present in all things which exist and happen, and in this way 
uses the proper nature of all existing things for the government of all. ( On 
fate 1 9 1 ,  30- 1 92, 28) 
Because of the rational nature of the cosmos, the Stoics believed that the universe is 
ultimately knowable : "[I]f there were some human being who could see with his mind 
the connection of all causes, he would certainly never be deceived. For whoever grasps 
the causes of future things must necessarily grasp all that will be" (Cicero, On divination 
1 . 1 27). 
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The rational principle, according to the Stoics, is similar to a sperm that 
inseminates inanimate matter, resulting inevitably in a perfectly ordered nature : 
At certain fated times the entire world is subject to conflagration, and then 
is reconstituted afresh. But the primary fire is as it were a sperm which 
possesses the principles [logoi] of all things and the causes of past, 
present, and future events. The nexus and succession of these is fate, 
knowledge, truth, and an inevitable and inescapable law of what exists. In 
this way everything in the world is excellently organized as in a perfectly 
ordered society. (Eusebius, Evangelical preparation 15 . 14.2 [ HP 46G]) 
This order includes both animate and inanimate things. Diogenes Laertius describes the 
natural order of the cosmos: "Uppermost is the fire called ' aether' in which the sphere of 
the fixed stars is first created, and next the sphere of the planets. After this the air, and 
then the water, and as foundation of everything the earth, which is at the center of all 
things" (Lives of the Philosophers 7.137).73 Animate objects "must be sharper and 
greater" than inanimate objects because they "have some part of the world's  commanding 
faculty. "For every nature which is not isolated and simple but conjoined and composite 
must have within itself some commanding faculty, such as intelligence in man, and 
something resembling intelligence in beasts . . .  [ and] trees too and plants are thought to 
have a commanding faculty in their roots" (Cicero, De nature deorum 2.23-5, 28-30). 
Finally, human beings occupy the second highest spot in the natural order on account of 
having reason as their commanding faculty : "What is best in man? Reason: with this he 
precedes the animals and follows the gods" (Seneca, Letters 76.9-10). The Stoic concept 
of Nature plays a dual role in causal explanations. According to Long, "To say of 
something that it is natural in Stoicism is to combine description with evaluation. Nature 
73 This physical description of the universe is not radically different from Ptolemy's model of concentric 
spheres, though it is not informed by Christian theology. 
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embraces both the way things are and they way they should be (Hellenistic Philosophy 
169). For the Stoics then, Nature is both factual and normative, what is and what should 
be; it is at once ontological and teleological. 
The Instauratio Magno 
Though in his lifetime Bacon was best known for his activities in Parliament and 
in the cowts of Elizabeth and James, his lasting reputation is related to his book of Essays 
and the philosophical texts he produced after his disgrace. While these works, especially 
the philosophical texts, are now seen by some as contributing to the scientific revolution, 
there is no question that they are also part and parcel of the humanist context of the 
Renaissance. In particular, they are consistent with the branch of Renaissance humanism 
that Bouwsma associates with Stoicism and has identified as being concerned with the 
exercise of human rationality. While Bacon called his works philosophical they are, to an 
even greater degree, rhetorical, using language that is carefully crafted to persuade those 
who read the texts to accept a version of the natural world that is radically different from 
the prevailing model. 
Renaissance cosmology depicted nature as a "great chain of being" in which each 
element of the chain exercised some degree of command over all other inferior elements. 
Because theological and political institutions relied upon such a model to justify their 
own hierarchical structures, a mechanistic world view that posited regular and discernible 
natural laws might well threaten such institutions. Thus, it is not likely that widespread 
trust in the findings of the natural philosophers, which was prerequisite to the acceptance 
of the the mechanistic world view and the development of scientific institutions, would 
have come about simply because those findings were "self-evident." Rather, the new 
philosophy had t� be fitted to the contemporary worldview. The lnstauratio Magno and 
Book I of Novum Organum constitute just such an argument. Stoic philosophy, i.e. , the 
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received Stoicism of the Renaissance, provided a set of concepts that could be used to 
forge a middle way between the theological/political tradition and the new natural 
philosophy. Bacon's use of Stoic principles was subtle. Unlike Lipsius, who sought to 
reintroduce Stoic philosophy but truncated and altered it to fit within the framework of 
Renaissance theology, Bacon culled concepts that were useful to his project, without 
necessarily attributing them to the Stoics. 
The Goal and P Ian of the Work 
In 1620 Bacon published the lnstauratio Magno, which consisted of the Novum 
Organum along with a number of prefatory texts. In this work, he proposed a new 
"instauration," an intellectual edifice that he believed should take the place of the then­
current, and in his eyes, impotent status of human knowledge. In the Proemium, Bacon 
argued that "the entire fabric of human reason which we employ in the inquisition of 
nature is badly put together and built up, and like some magnificent structure without any 
foundation," and he proposed to begin "a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all 
human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations" (PW 24 1 ). He found that the state 
of knowledge as it then existed was "not prosperous nor greatly advancing" and believed 
that an entirely new way should be opened so that "the mind may exercise over the nature 
of things the authority which properly belongs to it" ("Author's Preface," PW 243). The 
new edifice that Bacon imagined was founded upon the empirical observation of ''things 
of nature." This interrogation of nature was to be guided by a method that was itself 
based upon human nature, i.e., a method that was designed according to Bacon's 
understanding of the human perceptual and intellectual faculties. This method 
accommodated the flaws in human nature that stood in the way of achieving more 
accurate and productive knowledge. Bacon articulated two goals for the new instauration: 
initially, he hoped to improve the human condition through technological innovation, 
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which was to be achieved through experimentation; and, ultimately, he anticipated the 
discovery of a philosophia primum, a set of general principles drawn from the careful and 
methodical examination of particular instances. These goals encompass both the 
pragmatic values of humanism and the desire for theoretical knowledge of the new 
natural philosophy that was the basis for the scientific revolution. 
The tasks that Bacon set for himself in the Jnstauratio Magno demonstrate the 
degree to which his work was at once rhetorical and philosophical. The first task, which 
was clearly rhetorical, was to make a case for the study of nature as appropriate work for 
humanity. The second task, which he called a purging of the intellect, combined 
rhetorical and philosophical elements. The third, the explication of his new method, 
which included a gathering and winnowing of particulars, was clearly philosophical in 
nature and intent. Further, to the degree that Bacon's great instauration was not merely a 
method, but included recommendations for institutional change as a way of realizing the 
method and gaining benefits from it, it is both humanistic and "scientific." Stoicism, with 
its beliefs that nature was normative and that physics was the foundation upon which 
other forms of philosophy were predicated, and humanism, which provided the rhetorical 
strategies upon which Bacon draws, form the context for his efforts. 
Making the Case for Natural Philosophy 
Bacon's argument in favor of the study of nature as the basis for a new 
epistemology was certainly not unique during the Renaissance, but it was among the 
more sophisticated and successful of such efforts. Unlike Galileo who, for example, used 
the rhetorical form of the dialogue to mitigate the impact of his "heretical" conclusions,74 
74 Galileo's theories were accepted as valid by many practitioners of the new philosophy across Europe, 
though not ironically by Bacon himself. It was only inside Italy, where the Catholic Church controlled the 
publication of his work, that he had to resort to such strategies. 
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Bacon's intention was not merely to justify his own experimental and theoretical work. 
Rather, he hoped to influence culture more broadly, arguing for the establishment of 
institutions in which theoretical and productive endeavors would yield knowledge and 
inventions that would improve the situation of humankind. In a cultural milieu in which 
the foundations of knowledge and authority were under assault from all sides, Bacon's 
"new philosophy" offered the promise of a degree of epistemological certainty to anyone 
willing to engage in the careful and methodical study of nature. Nevertheless, he 
recognized the need to accommodate the concerns of a number of different groups, 
including natural philosophers and humanists. Bacon argued that the study of nature was 
not the kind of mere solipsism of which the humanists accused their scholastic 
predecessors, but a productive art that could yield tangible benefits for humankind. At the 
same time, he countered the objections of theologians by arguing that nature was God's 
creation. While he never directly presented a view of nature that refers directly to 
Stoicism, he certainly drew on Stoic imagery and concepts to make his case. 
Bacon did not contest the commonly accepted view of nature as a divine creation 
that was corrupted as a result of the fall from grace of Adam and Eve. Rather, he 
exploited the creation story effectively to his own ends. Prior to the fall, Bacon argued, 
Adam had enjoyed a "pure and uncorrupted natural knowledge" ("Preface," PW 246). As 
a consequence of the fall, Bacon suggests, such knowledge was no longer readily 
available, but was hidden: "But the universe to the eye of the human understanding is 
framed like a labyrinth; presenting as it does on every side so many ambiguities of way, 
such deceitful representations of objects and signs; natures so irregular in their lines, so 
knotted and entangled" ("Preface," PW 245) . Though it is difficult for the human 
understanding to penetrate the mysteries of nature, however, Bacon did not believe that 
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those ways were chaotic or capricious. In his Confession of Faith,15 Bacon describes how 
the creation is governed by laws ordained by God: 
He created heaven and earth, and all their armies and generations, and 
gave unto them constant and everlasting laws, which we call Nature, 
which is nothing but the laws of creation; which laws nevertheless have 
had three changes or times, and are to have a fourth and last. The first, 
when the matter of heaven and earth was created without forms: the 
second, the interim of every day's work: the third, by the curse, which 
notwithstanding was no new creation, but a privation on part of the virtue 
of the first creation: and the last, at the end of the world, the manner 
whereof is not yet revealed. So as the laws of Nature, which now remain 
and govern inviolably till the end of the world, began to be in force when 
God first rested from his works and ceased to create; but received a 
revocation in part by the curse, since which time they change not. ( Works 
vii.220- 1 )  
In representing nature as a regular system governed by laws established by God, Bacon 
was able to argue for a reform of education based on natural philosophy. 
Bacon recognized the need to deal with religious beliefs and the objections of the 
church before advancing learning along the paths that he mapped out in the Instauratio 
Magno. When he addressed his culture's "disgraces and discredits" of learning (Adv. 
Learning, PW 43), he first addressed those of the divines. As Galileo's experience 
illustrates, religious doctrine and institutions were, perhaps, the greatest impediment to 
the pursuit of natural philosophy. In large part, the objections of the divines were related 
to concerns that too much learning leads to the kind of arrogance and overreaching that 
75 Though perhaps written earlier, the Confession was published in 1 603. 
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lead to the fall, or to atheism, or that "contemplation of second causes doth derogate the 
mind from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause" (44) . Bacon also recognized 
that it was not sufficient merely to critique the church's  objections to learning; he needed 
also to present an alternative model of natural knowledge that did not conflict with 
religious doctrine. First, he makes a distinction between divine revelation and natural 
philosophy and the means by which we are to understand them. In De augmentis, Bacon 
distinguishes between the two types of knowledge: 
For knowledge of man is as the waters. Some waters descend from above, 
and some spring from beneath; and in like manner the primary division of 
sciences is to be drawn from their sources; of which some are above in the 
heavens, and some here below. For all knowledge admits of two kinds of 
information; the one inspired by divine revelation, the other arising from 
the senses . . . . I will therefore divide knowledge into Divinity and 
Philosophy; meaning by Divinity Sacred or Inspired, not Natural Divinity. 
(PW 453) 
While divine knowledge must be accepted unquestionably, Bacon believes that natural 
philosophy is subject to human reason. In dividing natural philosophy and divine 
revelation in this way, Bacon avoided criticism that he was making the study of nature 
superior to received Biblical knowledge. At the same time, however, he manages to 
legitimate knowledge gleaned from nature so that it could be seen as roughly equivalent 
to truths received from divine inspiration. In one of his fragmentary texts, Fil um 
Labyrinthi, 76 Bacon makes the case that knowledge gained from natural philosophy is not 
16 Fi/um /abyrinthi (Thread of the Labyrinth) is a fragment that, according to Spedding, appears to 
correspond to Bacon's Latin text, Cogitate et visa. It was not published until 1 794. Spedding speculates that 
it was intended as part of the lnstauratio Magno and was not a further explanation of Bacon's method. At 
any rate its late publication suggests it would not have been an influential text during the early modern 
period. It does, however, help to clarify some of Bacon's thinking regarding the justification for making 
natural philosophy the foundation for studies. 
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the same as the knowledge of good and evil, the "temptation which caused the original 
fall" (PW 209). First, he argues, knowledge of nature was already inherent in human 
beings as "the light whereof man discerned of every living creature, and imposed names 
according to their propriety" (209). Rather, it is moral philosophy that is harmful to the 
extent that it seeks "moral knowledge of good and evil, affected to the end to depend no 
more upon God's commandments, but for man to direct himself' (209) . Bacon further 
argues that, apart from this unquestionable acceptance of divine revelation, human beings 
are not only allowed, but commanded to seek further knowledge. 
[N]either could he find in any Scripture, that the inquiry and science of 
man in any thing, under the mysteries of the Deity, is determined and 
restrained, but contrariwise allowed and provoked; for concerning all other 
knowledge the Scripture pronounceth, That it is the glory of God to 
conceal, but it is the glory of man . . .  to invent; and again, The spirit of 
man is as the lamp of God, wherewith he searcheth every secret,· and again 
most effectually, That God hath made all things beautiful and decent, 
according to the return of their seasons; also that he hath set the world in 
man 's heart, and yet man cannot find out the work which God worketh 
from the beginning to the end; shewing that the heart of man is a continent 
of that concave or capacity, wherein the content of the world (that is, all 
forms of the creatures and whatsoever is not God) may be placed or 
received. (PW 209; emphasis in original) 
Bacon expands further the notion that humans have an obligation to study nature 
by arguing that such study "tendeth highly to the magnifying of the glory of God in his 
power, providence, and benefits; appearing and engraven in his works which without this 
knowledge are beheld but as through a veil; for if the heavens in the body of them do 
declare the glory of God to the eye, much more do they in the rule and decrees of them 
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declare it to the understanding" (Fi/um Labyrinthi, PW 2 10). Such understanding of the 
limitless possibilities of the power of God is, according to Bacon's reading of Scripture, 
an imperative: 
for to that purpose speaketh our Saviour in that first canon against heresies 
delivered upon the case of the resurrection, You err, not knowing the 
Scriptures, nor the power of God; teaching that there are but two fountains 
of heresy, not knowing the will of God revealed in the Scriptures, and not 
knowing the power of God revealed or at least made most sensible in his 
creatures. (PW 21  O; emphasis in original) 
The sense that the study of natural philosophy is a sacred activity is reflected in the 
Preface and Plan of the /nstauratio Magno. In the Author's Preface, he prays 
to God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, that 
remembering the sorrows of mankind and the pilgrimage of this our life 
wherein we wear out days few and evil, they will vouchsafe through my 
hands to endow the human family with new mercies. This likewise I 
humbly pray, that things human may not interfere with things divine, and 
that from the opening of the ways of sense and the increase of natural light 
there may arise in our minds no incredulity or darkness with regard to the 
divine mysteries; but rather that the understanding being thereby purified 
and purged of fancies and vanity, and yet not the less subject and entirely 
submissive to the divine oracles, may give to faith that which is faith's. 
Lastly that knowledge now being discharged of that venom which the 
serpent infused into it, and which makes the mind of man to swell, we may 
not be wise above measure and sobriety, but cultivate truth in charity. (PW 
246-47) 
82 
This prayer, which reiterates his intention not to question divine revelation, echoes a 
similar prayer at the end of t,he Plan of the Work: 
And all depends on keeping the eye steadily fixed upon the facts of nature 
and so receiving their images simply as they are. For God forbid that we 
should give out a dream of our own imagination for a pattern of the world; 
rather may he graciously grant to us to write an apocalypse or true vision 
of the footsteps of the Creator imprinted on his creatures. 
Therefore do thou, 0 Father, who gavest the visible light as the 
first fruits of creation, and didst breathe into the face of man the 
intellectual light as the crown and consummation thereof, guard and 
protect this work, which coming from thy goodness returneth to thy glory . 
Thou when thou tumedst to look upon the works which thy hands had 
made, sawest that all was very good, and didst rest from thy labours. But 
man, when he turned to look upon the work which his hands had made, 
saw that all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and could find no rest 
therein. Wherefore if we labour in thy works with the sweat of our brows 
thou wilt make us partakers of thy vision and thy sabbath. Humbly we 
pray that this mind may be steadfast in us, and that through these our 
hands, and the hands of others to whom we shall give the same spirit, thou 
wilt vouchsafe to endow the human family with new mercies. (PW 253-
54) 
While these prayers place the pursuit of natural philosophy clearly within a religious 
context, their language also reflects the commitment to an active life that is characteristic 
of Renaissance civic humanism. Bacon foresaw that the results of the study of nature 
would be, not merely knowledge, but tangible benefits. 
Bacon's view of nature provided a means by which to reconcile, not only some of 
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the theological and epistemological conflicts of his time, but also the humanistic conflict 
between the vita contempliva and the vita activa. He uses the metaphors of "mines" and 
"caves" as a way of emphasizing the benefits to be gained from experimental and 
technological work. In his view, by immersing oneself within these deep mines and 
caves, it was possible both to divine nature's secrets and reproduce the results of her 
actions for the benefit of one's fellow humans. Bacon's view of nature both synthesized a 
variety of ideas contained within the many philosophical texts recovered by the 
humanists and also provided a foundation which could be used to reconcile conflicts 
inherent within the humanist project. 
A common metaphor for portraying nature during the Renaissance was as a 
secondary divine text, a book of nature equivalent to biblical texts. As Bouwsma 
describes it, there emerged from the new research in natural philosophy "an insistence 
that truth was of several kinds, among which the least certain was that composed by men. 
But God . . .  had revealed not only the way of salvation in Scripture, but also another set 
of truths in the 'book of nature'" (The Waning of the Renaissance 1 85). Galileo used this 
conceit in attempting to justify his research as reading the book of nature, as did Bacon 
himself. 77 There is no doubt that the metaphor was a powerful one in a culture so deeply 
embedded within a textual matrix as the Renaissance. In the Advancement of Learning, 
Bacon explains the ways in which philosopher's reading of the book of nature works to 
support faith and religion: 
There be two principal duties and services, besides ornament and 
illustration, which philosophy and human learning do perform to faith and 
religion. The one, because they are an effectual inducement to the 
exaltation of the glory of God: For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do 
77 See Charles Whitney, Francis Bacon and Modernity, 60-62, for a discussion of how Bacon developed 
this metaphor to conceptualize his new philosophy. 
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often invite us to consider and magnify the great and wonderful works of 
God, so if we should rest only in the contemplation of the exterior of them 
as they first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like injury to 
the majesty of God . . . .  The other, because they minister a singular help 
and preservative against unbelief and error: For our Saviour saith, You err, 
not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God ; laying before us two 
books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error; first the 
Scriptures, revealing the will of God, and then the creatures expressing his 
power; whereof the later is a key unto the former; not only opening our 
understanding to conceive the true sense of the Scriptures, by the general 
notions of reason and rules of speech; but chiefly opening our belief, in 
drawing us into a due meditation of the omni potency of God, which is 
chiefly signed and engraven upon his works. (PW 63-4) 
In the Proemium to the Instauratio Magno, Bacon equates the study of nature with the act 
of interpreting, i .e., reading, in order to make the somewhat paradoxical point that 
humans, who are subservient to nature rather than its masters, may nevertheless gain 
some degree of mastery over nature only by observing it: 
For man is but the servant and interpreter of nature: what he does and what 
he knows is only what he has observed of nature's order in fact or in 
thought; beyond this he knows nothing and can do nothing. For the chain 
of causes cannot by any force be loosed or broken, nor can nature be 
commanded except by being obeyed. And so these twin objects, human 
Knowledge and human Power, do really meet in one. (PW 253) 
In this brief summary, Bacon represents the study of natural philosophy as a middle path 
between many of the conflicts that characterized the early modem era. While he does not 
refer specifically to religion, he presents the human pursuit of natural knowledge as a 
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necessary and obedient act rather than as an attempt to rise above the power of the 
Creator. In choosing to use the phrase "chain of causes," Bacon evokes the familiar 
concepts of the great chain of being and the Aristotelian theory of causes, both of which 
he will later challenge.78 He also manages, by asserting that human knowledge arid power 
"meet in one," to resolve the humanist conflict between the vita contempliva and the vita 
activa. In making his case for the study of natural philosophy, Bacon deploys a variety of 
theological, literary, and philosophical arguments. Ultimately, it was Bacon's expertise in 
the humanist art of rhetoric that allowed him to write and speak so eloquently on behalf 
of natural philosophy. 
In making the case for Stoicism as one of two faces of Renaissance humanism, 
Bouwsma argues that the notion that nature is the expression of god is a primary 
attraction: "[T]he hellenistic principle of immanence . . .  makes the universe eternal, by 
one means or another deifies the natural order, and by seeing a spark of divinity in man 
tends to make him something more than a creature of God ("Two Faces of Humanism" 
9). Bacon's view of nature as an orderly system that may ultimately be perceived and 
even manipulated by human beings seems clearly to reflect this view. In the beginning of 
the Book II of Novum Organum, Bacon uses the phrase natura naturans to describe the 
specific or individual natures of the various elements of nature. The phrase, which 
Spedding translates as "nature-engendering nature" is equivalent to "form," or "true 
specific difference," or "source of emanation" (NO Il. i). According to Spedding, the 
phrase is unique in Bacon's works, and suggests that "[w]ith the later Schoolmen, as with 
Spinoza God was considered as the cause immanens of the universe, and therefore, 
78 These concepts were familiar to his audience, but it is unlikely that Bacon was referring to Aristotle's 
theory of the four causes, which he ultimately rejects in the Novum Organum. It is likely that h is 
understanding of causes is much closer to that of the Stoics. 
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according to the latter at least, not hypostatically different from it" (PW 302, n. 1) .79 The 
Stoic view of god as logos, of course, was incompatible with Renaissance Christian 
theology. However, Bacon's separation of divine knowledge from natural knowledge 
allows him to follow the Stoic model without contradicting Christian beliefs. 
The contradictions between Stoicism and Christianity are sufficiently great that 
Bacon does not make obvious connections between the ancient philosophy and his own 
new philosophy. It is also the case that the status of the Stoic textual legacy would have 
made it difficult to formulate an authentic neo-Stoic physics. Additionally, the Stoic 
concept of god was certainly at odds with that of Renaissance Christian theology. 
However, the Stoics seem to be less concerned with the pantheon than with god as 
reason. Diogenes Laertius says, for example, "God, intelligence, fate, and Zeus are all 
one, and many other names are applied to him. In the beginning all by himself he turned 
the entire substance through air into water" (7. 135). Aetius, too, said, "The Stoics made 
god out to be intelligent, a designing fire which methodically proceeds toward the 
creation of the world" ( 1 .7.33, HP 46A). 
While Bacon does not directly attribute elements of his thought to Stoic 
philosophy, the general assumption that nature is a source of normative knowledge is 
very strong. In addition, there are intimations of the connection, many of which are found 
in the images Bacon uses to describe human faculties and God as a maker or craftsman. 80 
The Stoics used two primary images, fire and breath, or pneuma, in referring to reason, 
the logos of the universe. Bacon does not often use the image of fire, but blends the Stoic 
79 Spinoza's use of the term is significant since he is perhaps the most faithful interpreter of Stoicism in the 
early modern age. See A. A. Long's discussion of Spinoza's Neosto icism in "Stoicism in the Philosophical 
Tradition : Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler." 
80 See Antonio Perez-Ramos' s  discussion of Bacon's new philosophy as part of the "maker's knowledge 
tradition in Francis Bacon 's Idea of Science and the Maker 's Knowledge Tradition. 
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image of breath with the Christian image of light. 8 1  In his essay, "Of Truth," Bacon 
explores this image at length. 
The first creature of God, in the works of days, was the light of the sense; 
the last was the light of reason; and his sabbath work ever since, is the 
illumination of his Spirit. First he breathed light upon the face of the 
matter or chaos; then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he 
breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his chosen. (PW 750) 
Bacon uses both images, light and breath, in describing creation in a way that is 
remarkably similar to the Stoic version of creation. The image of light, particularly in 
referring to reason and intellect, is common throughout Bacon' s  work. Davis also 
demonstrates how Bacon uses the image of God as maker, craftsman, or architect in 
describing God ( 1 67-68) . 
Bacon' s attempts at natural history are loosely patterned on those of the Roman 
philosopher and playwright Seneca, who was also known for his moral essays and 
epistles. Entitled Natura/es Quaestiones, these essays gather what is known about various 
natural phenomena, such as "Lights in the Sky," "Terrestrial Waters," and "Lightnings 
and Thunderings". Bacon' s own attempts at natural histories, which include De fluxu et 
refluxu maris, Historia venturum, Historia vitae et mortis, and Historia densi et rari, 
follow Seneca's  in that they gather and compare various observations and theories on 
their different topics. However, Bacon owes an even greater debt to Seneca, to the extent 
that Seneca' s understanding of nature as a trove of nomative knowledge is a forerunner of 
Bacon's own. In the first of Seneca' s examinations of natural questions, he says: 
I, for one, am very grateful to nature, not just when I view it in that aspect 
which is obvious to everybody, but when I have penetrated its mysteries; 
8 1  See Walter B. Davis's exploration of Bacon' s  use of this image in "The Imagery of Bacon's Late Work." 
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when I learn what the stuff of the universe is, who its author or custodian 
is, what god is; whether he keeps entirely to himself or whether he 
sometimes considers us; whether he creates something each day or has 
created it only once; whether he is a part of the universe or is the universe; 
whether it is possible for him to make decisions today and to repeal in part 
any sort of universal law of fate; whether it is a diminution of his majesty 
and an admission of his error that he had done things which had to be 
changed. If I had not been admitted to these studies it would not have been 
worthwhile to have been born. ( 1.3-4) 
Seneca also finds utility in the study of nature : "[T]he subtlety of thought exercised on 
the mysteries of nature will be no less successful in dealing with plain problems" (111 . 1 8) . 
Seneca also implies an equivalence between divine knowledge and natural knowledge 
that is a pattern for Bacon's: 
Aristotle has said excellently that we should never be more reverent than 
when a subject deals with the gods. If we enter temples with composure, 
if, when we are about to approach a sacrifice, we lower our eyes, draw in 
our toga, if we assume every sign of modesty, how much more ought we 
to do so when we discuss the planets, the stars, the nature of the gods, lest 
in our ignorance we assert something rashly, impudently, or even lie 
knowingly. (Natural Quaestiones VII 30. 1 )  
Finally, Seneca provides a foundation for Bacon's understanding of the great work that 
needs to be founded upon the study of nature: 
Nature does not reveal her mysteries once and for all. We believe that we 
are initiates but we are only hanging around the forecourt. These secrets 
are not open to all indiscriminately. They are withdrawn and closed up in 
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the inner sanctum. This age will glimpse one of the secrets; the age which 
comes after us will glimpse another. (VII.30.6) 
Bacon, too, insists that his work is merely a step onto the path, not a completed journey. 
In the Plan of the Jnstauratio Magno, he describes the fifth part as an "Anticipation" of a 
natural philosophy, "for temporary use only, pending the completion of the rest, like 
interest payable from time to time until the principal be forthcoming" (PW 253). The 
sixth and final part "which discloses and sets forth that philosophy by which the 
legitimate, chaste, and severe course of inquiry which I have explained and provided is at 
length developed and established," will be a long time in the making. He calls it a 
beginning and "the fortune of the human race will give the issue" (253). Like Seneca, he 
recognizes that the discovery of God through the study of nature is a long and arduous 
task. For Bacon, that task must be predicated upon purging the intellect of mistaken 
notions and old philosophies. 
The Reform of Learning 
In The Advancement of Learning, 82 Bacon speaks to the importance of education 
in human society: 
[L ]et us conclude with the dignity and excellence of knowledge and 
learning in that whereunto man's nature doth most aspire; which is 
immortality or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and raising of 
houses and families; to this buildings, foundations, and monuments; to this 
tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration; and in effect, the 
82 Bacon published The Advancement of Learning in 1 605 . The text was expanded and translated into Latin 
as part of the lnstauratio Magno, De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, and publ ished in 1 623 .  
Chronologically, De augmentis was the second part of the lnstauratio Magno as i t  was published 
subsequent to the Novum Organum, although it precedes it in the organizational scheme. Spedding suggests 
that the text may actually have been completed earlier and delayed by the translator ("Editor's  Preface" to 
De augmentis, PW 4 1 3). 
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strength of all other human desires. We see then how far the monuments of 
wit and learning are more durable than the monuments of power or of the 
hands. [ . . . ] But the images of men's wits and knowledges remain in books 
exempted from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual renovation. 
Neither are they fitly to be called images, because they generate still and 
cast their seed into the minds of others, provoking and causing infinite 
actions and opinions in succeeding ages. (PW 73-4) 
Education was the vehicle by which the values of humanism made their way through 
Renaissance culture. According to Bouwsma, 
Viewed simply as a shift in emphasis within latter medieval education, 
Renaissance humanism may seem at first sight, a development of only 
mild and specialized interest; it hardly appears a likely vehicle for the 
cultural revolution widely associated with the renaissance. But, as recent 
experience has compelled us to realize, education is peculiarly sensitive to 
the world that surrounds it. For this reason pressures for the modification 
of educational programs are likely to express - and so, perhaps, to reveal 
- significant social change and even profound shifts in human values. 
(Bouwsma, The Culture of Renaissance Humanism 1) 
There can be little doubt that Bacon was aware of the importance of education to cultural 
change. In the Instauratio Magno, Bacon suggests that learning is the fundamental task of 
human beings, one that is necessary for both spiritual and material improvement of the 
human condition. This emphasis on learning as a means of bettering the human condition 
is consonant with the values of Renaissance civic humanism, but Bacon's insistence upon 
nature as the foundation for learning does not conform with the humanist educational 
emphasis on the art of rhetoric and the study of ancient texts. The fact that Bacon's 
proposal for the reform of education does not adhere strictly to the standard humanist 
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curriculum should not be interpreted to mean, however, that he was anti-humanistic. He 
did not, for example, remove rhetoric from the curriculum, but situated it within an 
expanded curriculum for the study of language. His educational reforms should be 
understood as an attempt to create a framework that would accommodate changes that 
had come about as the result of the activities of humanists, as well as those of explorers, 
artisans, and natural philosophers. 
Bacon's goal was to develop an intellectual edifice that could accommodate all 
the conflicting facets of contemporary culture. He saw the wisdom in recovered 
philosophies, but he also recognized the degree to which the veneration of ancient 
wisdom was stifling innovation. He adhered to the tenets of Protestantism, but recognized 
the ways in which religious institutions impeded the practice of natural philosophy. He 
was fascinated by the technological developments of his day and hoped, not only to 
encourage them, but to coordinate such practical wisdom with natural philosophy. 
Stoicism represented a synthetic and comprehensive philosophy and served as a model 
for the kind of edifice for learning Bacon hoped to construct. In Of the Proficience and 
Advancement of Learning, Bacon set out his plan for a division of learning that would 
lead to the kind of philosophically-based society that he hoped to create. 
The Advancement of Learning, which comprises an extensive proposal for the 
reform of learning, is not merely a renunciation of humanist learning but a description of 
a comprehensive system founded upon the study of nature. Moreover, Bacon's 
educational reform is not merely curricular reform. Rather, it comprises a critique of the 
epistemological milieu of the late Renaissance and makes recommendations for both 
curricular and institutional reform. Furthermore, his curricular reform is not just a 
reorientation of emphasis from rhetoric to another part of the traditional liberal arts 
curriculum but describes a wholly new curricular organization based not upon the 
traditional model but on human nature. The Advancement advocates replacing the 
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traditional trivium and quadrivium with a division of the diciplines founded on natural 
philosophy. Bacon claimed that his reforms were original, and to the extent that what he 
described was unlike previous educational models, those claims are accurate. This is not 
to say, however, that his ideas are completely new. In fact, the ideas that inform his 
curricular reform demonstrate a significant debt to ancient philosophies, and most 
especially to Stoicism. 
In the Plan of the Instauratio Magno, Bacon describes the De augmentis as a 
"summary or general description of the knowledge which the human race at present 
possesses," including "not only things already invented and known, but likewise things 
omitted which ought to be there" (PW 248). Bacon dedicated the Advancement of 
Learning to King James as a tribute to the king's great intellect and erudition, a "fixed 
memorial, and immortal monument bearing a character of signature both of the power of 
a king and the difference and perfection of such a king" (PW 43). Bacon says that the 
work will 
consist of these two parts: the former concerning the excellency of learning 
and knowledge, and the excellency of the merit and true glory in the 
augmentation and propagation thereof; the latter, what the particular acts 
and works are which have been embraced and undertaken for the 
advancement of learning, and again what defects and undervalues I find in 
such particular acts; to the end that though I cannot positively or 
affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound unto you framed 
particulars, yet I may excite your princely cogitation to visit the excellent 
treasures of your own mind, and thence to extract particulars for this 
purpose agreeable to your magnanimity and wisdom. (PW 43) 
Bacon follows in a tradition of giving advice to rulers that had been established by his 
humanist predecessors, most famously, Machiavelli. The most notable precedent in the 
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English tradition was Thomas Elyot's The Booke Called the Gouvernor, which dealt in 
part with the proper character and training of a king. 83 Bacon's project differs, however, 
in significant respects: first, his emphasis is not on virtue itself, but on philosophy - the 
pursuit of knowledge, particularly knowledge of nature - as the proper path to attaining 
virtue; second, his advice is not directed toward changing character per se, but on 
changing the institutions and methods that, as far as the humanists were concerned, were 
charged with shaping character. Nevertheless, Bacon's purpose is to argue for the 
establishment of an educational system which would allow those who participate in it to 
attain skills that will allow them to live a virtuous life. 
Mapping the Epistemological Landscape 
Just as Bacon required a thorough natural history as foundational for improving 
natural philosophy, Bacon's plan for learning begins with a thorough survey of the 
history and status of learning. In the first book of the Advancement of Learning, Bacon 
begins by addressing what he calls the "discredits and disgraces of learning," and he 
provides what is essentially a map of the epistemological uncertainty of the late 
Renaissance. Bacon delineates arguments against learning perpetuated by the "zeal and 
jealousy of divines, . . .  the severity and arrogancy of politiques, . . .  and the errors and 
imperfections of learned men themselves" ( 43) and then systematically responds to those 
critiques. Divines, for example, object to learning on the grounds that the desire for 
knowledge was the cause of original sin, that "knowledge puff eth up," that concern with 
worldly knowledge distracts the attention from God, and that sometimes learned 
83 Elyot' s text was published in 1 53 1  and dedicated to Henry VIII in a letter that, similarly, praises the 
king's wisdom and learning. Elyot, however, was more concerned with expl icating the qualities of a good 
commonwealth. Bacon' s  sycophancy, perhaps, led him to limit his discussion of the King's character to 
praise rather than advice. Also, by l imiting his d iscussion to institutional and curricular reform of 
education, he dealt with a subject in which he knew James was interested, but in which he had little direct 
involvement. Also, James I was himself the author of a treatise on government, the Basilikon Doron, a 
treatise written to his eldest son Henry to advise him how to rule when he became king. 
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individuals have become atheists ( 43-4). "Politiques" object to learning on the grounds 
that it makes men soft and unfit for war or civic life and that learning leads to indecision 
or too much love for the contemplative life (46). In general, Bacon's  response to these 
"discredits and disgraces" are that they result from weakness of character rather than 
being the fault of learning and that selfless devotion to learning is not the cause but the 
cure for these problems ( 44-49). While Bacon considered these attitudes among "divines" 
and "politiques" regarding the advancement of knowledge to have serious consequences, 
he was more concerned about the attitudes of the learned themselves. 
Bacon finds many problems with the contemporary state of learning, but he 
focuses on the rhetorical practices of the humanists and the stultified logic of the 
Scholastics as the most serious deficiencies of learning. He identifies three "distempers" 
of learning which he considers to be the most serious obstacles standing in the way of the 
advancement of learning: "the first, fantastical learning; the second, contentious learning; 
and the last, delicate learning: vain imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations" 
(PW 53). The last of these, which he treats first, is excessive concern with style, the most 
extreme example of which was the euphuistic style of John Lyly. Bacon argues that the 
humanists' preoccupation with the search for ancient texts and their admiration for the 
style of those classical texts, which was precipitated both by their objection to the sterile 
wranglings of scholastic philosophers and by the need to persuade a variety of audiences, 
led84 to the 
study of eloquence and copie of speech, which then began to flourish. This 
grew speedily to an excess; for men began to hunt more after words than 
matter; and more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the round and 
clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, and 
84 Bacon erroneously traces the humanist preoccupation wit rhetoric to Martin Luther' s  rebellion against 
Catholicism. 
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the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures, than 
after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of 
invention, or depth of judgment. . . .  Here therefore [is] the first distemper 
of learning, when men study words and not matter. (54) 
Bacon does not wholly prohibit the use of eloquence, for he recognizes its usefulness in 
"civic occasions, of conference, counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like" (55). Rather, 
he objects to the tendency of eloquent discourse to curtail inquiry: "for surely to the 
severe inquisition of truth, and the deep progress into philosophy, it is some hindrance; 
because it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire of further 
search, before we come to a just period" (55). 
Bacon is even more dismissive of scholastic logic, which he calls the second 
distemper of learning. According to Bacon, scholastic logic demonstrated two indicators 
of what he called "suspected and falsified sciences ; the one, the novelty of and 
strangeness of terms; the other, the strictness of positions, which of necessity doth induce 
oppositions, and so questions and altercations" (55). In addition, he is critical of the 
tendency for scholastic logic to become focused on its own processes rather than on the 
subject under examination: 
For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the 
contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff, and 
is limited thereby: but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, 
then it is endless, and brings forth cobwebs of learning, admirable for the 
fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit. (55) 85 
85The comparison of dialectic to spiders' webs, which Bacon uses throughout his works, is almost certainly 
a borrowing from the Stoic philosopher Ariston, a member of the early Stoa, who wished to discard both 
logic and physics. According to D iogenes Laertius, Ariston said, "Dialectical reasonings . . .  are like 
spiders' webs, which, though they seem to display some artistic workmanship, are yet ofno use" (DL 
II. vii . 16 1  ). 
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Bacon's primary objection both to rhetoric and logic was that they were more concerned 
with language, i.e., with words and form of arguments, than with matter; they focused on 
verba, rather than res. He does not, however, advocate doing away with logic and 
rhetoric. Rather, he proposes a reform of education founded on nature, focusing on things 
rather than words, but that nevertheless recognizes the importance of words when they 
were kept in their place. 
Curricular and Institutional Reform 
In Book II of The Advancement of Learning Bacon describes a comprehensive 
reform of learning at both the institutional and disciplinary levels. At the institutional 
level, he is concerned with resources, such as libraries, with support for scholars, and 
with cooperation between and among educational institutions. This concern with 
institutional aspects of education as a way to secure the blessing of learning for the good 
of the citizenry is certainly consonant with the humanist tradition, and it demonstrates 
Bacon's attempt to unite the vita activa and vita contempliva. Bacon hoped that James 
would support in substantial material ways the educational reforms that he recommends 
in the Instauratio Magno. In the Epistle Dedicatory, Bacon asks that James follow 
Solomon's  example in 
talcing order for the collecting and perfecting of a Natural and 
Experimental History true and severe (unencumbered with literature and 
book-learning), such as philosophy may be built upon - such, in fact, as I 
shall in its proper place describe; that so at length, after the lapse of so 
many ages, philosophy and the sciences may no longer float in air, but rest 
on the solid foundation of experience of every kind, and the same well 
. examined and weighed. I have provided the machine, but the rest must be 
gathered from nature. (PW 242) 
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Bacon was not asking merely for James's encouragement; in fact, he hoped that James 
would provide resources to endow institutions in which the research for this natural and 
experimental history would occur. In the Advancement of Learning, Bacon identifies 
three "objects" involved in learning: places, books, and persons (PW 75). Regarding 
books, he was concerned with the institution of libraries for assembling the works of 
ancient authors and with commissioning the production of new and more accurate 
translations of these authors (75). 
There are four items to be considered regarding the places of learning: 
"foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with franchises and 
privileges, institutions and ordinances for government; all tending to quietness and 
privateness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles" (PW 76). Bacon was concerned 
that the colleges and universities of Europe were primarily places for professional 
education and argued that institutions dedicated to the arts and sciences were needed. He 
argued for institutions that were devoted to the pursuit of theoretical knowledge in order 
to form a better foundation for philosophical education. He also sought to reform faculty 
compensation, arguing that the most competent teachers must be adequately 
compensated. Education ought not, however, be focused solely on what is found in 
books. Bacon also sought to encourage "men to sell their books and build furnaces" (PW 
77). He wanted to build on the growing trend of experimental philosophy and sought 
means of providing the instruments for that work. Finally, he was concerned with the 
governance of educational institutions, particularly regarding curriculum and 
communication between and among institutions (PW 77-79). 
Having touched on the outlines of institutional reform, Bacon spends most of his 
time in Book II on his recommendations for disciplinary and curricular reform, and it is 
here that the complicated relationship between Bacon's thought and that of ancient 
philosophies is most apparent. As his title Novum Organum indicates, Bacon saw his 
98 
Great Instauration as a replacement for Aristotle's Organon, the set of philosophical texts 
that formed the foundation for the received tradition of the Renaissance. As his 
biographer Rawley indicates, Bacon very early developed a "dislike" of Aristotelian 
philosophy for the "unfruitfulness" of his method, although he "ascribe[ d] all high 
tributes" to the author (PW 2). His comprehensive scheme for learning is imitative not 
only of the wide-ranging approach of Aristotle's own school, but also of the broadly­
based paideia tradition from the ancient world.86 Rather, he proposed to classify the 
disciplines according to human nature rather than tradition, but his organization was 
nevertheless compatible with the humanist impulse to rely on ancient knowledge. 
Bacon devised a disciplinary classification that was based on faculty 
psychology, 87 the model of human psychology that was then current, and on distinctions 
between the sacred and the mundane, consistent with distinctions he made between 
natural and divine knowledge. Generally speaking, faculty psychology divided the human 
psyche into a number of divisions, some appetitive, which applied to physical aspects of 
behavior, and some intellective, which applied to mental activity. Bacon's classification 
of the faculties was a relatively simple one, which made a primary distinction between 
understanding and the will, which translated understanding into action. There was a 
further division of the understanding into three parts: memory, imagination, and reason: 
The parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of Man's 
Understanding, which is the seat of learning: History to his Memory, 
Poesy to his Imagination, and Philosophy to his Reason. Divine learning 
receiveth the same distribution; for the spirit is the same, though the 
revelation of oracle and sense be diverse[.] (Adv., PW, 79) 
86 Bacon, of course, rejects the traditional organization into the trivium and quadrivium. 
87 See Park and Kessler's discussion of faculty psychology in the Cambridge Companion to Renaissance 
Philosophy, 455-63. For the influence of Stoicism on Renaissance views of faculty psychology, see A.H.T. 
Levy 93ff. 
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Bacon expands on his theories regarding the faculties and the division of the arts in 
Descriptio Globi Intellectualis (A Description of the Intellectual Globe): 
And hence it is evident that from these three fountains [memory, 
imagination, and reason] flow these three emanations, History, Poesy, and 
Philosophy; and that there cannot be other or more than these. For under 
philosophy I include all the arts and sciences, and in a word whatever has 
been from the occurrence of individual objects collected and digested by 
the mind into general notions. Nor do I think that there is need of any other 
division than this for Theology. For the information of revelation and of 
sense differ no doubt both in matter and in the manner of entrance and 
conveyance; but yet the human spirit is one and the same; and it is but as if 
different liquors were poured by different funnels into one and the same 
vessel. (Descriptio, PW 677) 
Bacon's ideas regarding these faculties are based on his notions regarding impressions, 
which are sensory images received by the mind. Impressions, which are the province of 
history, are the "most ancient guests of the human mind, and are as the primary material 
of knowledge" (PW 677). The mind "perpetually exercises itself, and sometimes sports" 
with these impressions. He describes the process of human learning as follows: 
For the images of individuals are received by the senses themselves and 
fixed in the memory. They pass into the memory whole, just as they 
present themselves. Then the mind recalls and reviews them, and ( which is 
its proper office) compounds and divides the parts of which they consist. 
For the several individuals have something in common one with another, 
and again something different and manifold. Now this composition and 
division is either according to the pleasure of the mind, or according to the 
nature of  things as it exists in fact. (PW 677) 
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When the mind's activity is "according to the pleasure of the mind" and involves the 
transposition of "parts" of sensory impressions into "the likeness of some individual," 
Bacon places it within the province of poesy (PW 677). Imagination is the faculty related 
to poesy and it is not "bound by any law and necessity of nature or matter," so that it may 
"join things which are never found together in nature and separate things which are 
primary parts of individuals" (PW 677). Nevertheless, imagination is constrained by the 
primacy of impressions, for "of things that have been in no part objects of the sense, there 
can be no imagination, not even a dream" (PW 677). While poesy is related to the 
imagination, philosophy is the work of the faculty of reason and its material is the 
"evidence of things, and as they really show themselves in nature, or at least appear to 
each man's comprehension to show themselves" (PW 677) . 
Bacon's reorganization of learning, as it is represented in The Advancement of 
Learning and its later Latin translation, De augmentis, is intended to be the means to 
achieve a comprehensive and synthetic philosophy. In the ancient world, only the 
Aristotelian and Stoic schools provide models for such a system, and there are clearly 
problems with asserting that either is foundational for Bacon. Bacon himself declared his 
general antipathy for Aristotle's method, and he was frequently critical of aspects of Stoic 
philosophy. However, while it does not incorporate all aspects of Stoic philosophy, 
Bacon's system is founded upon similar assumptions about the primacy of nature and 
about its regularity and comprehensibility. 
One remarkable aspect of Stoicism is the degree to which all parts of the 
philosophy, i. e., physics or natural philosophy, logic, and ethics or moral philosophy, 
were fully integrated with one another. The Stoics used a number of metaphors to 
describe this interrelationship. According to Diogenes Laertius, 
Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones 
and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile 
10 1  
they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, 
and the yolk in the center is Physics. Or again, they liken Philosophy to a 
fertile field. Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the 
soul or the trees. Or, again, a city strongly walled and governed by reason. 
(vii,39) 
In his description of his philosophical system Bacon invokes an organic metaphor that 
echoes those used by the Stoics: 
In philosophy, the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, or 
are circumferred to Nature, or are reflected or reverted upon Himself. Out 
of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, Divine 
philosophy, Natural philosophy, and Human philosophy or Humanity. For 
all things are marked and stamped with this triple character, of the power 
of God, the difference of nature, and the use of man. But because the 
distinctions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet 
in one angle, and so touch but in a point; but are like branches of a tree 
that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and 
conti uance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and 
boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribution, 
to erect and constitute one universal science, by the name of Philosophia 
Prima, Primitive or Summary Philosophy, as the main and common way, 
before we come where the ways part and divide themselves. (PW, Adv. of 
Learning 89-90) 
The educational system that Bacon proposed was predicated on the notion that nature, 
which was the expression of the power and will of God, could be perceived, understood, 
and, to a degree manipulated by human beings. It was, however, only by submitting 
oneself to nature that it could be controlled. This submission to nature, which reflects 
1 02 
both Stoic philosophy and Christian theology, is evident in Bacon's use of human nature, 
or faculty psychology, as a means of organizing learning. Bacon's new philosophical 
method also reflects his attempt to accommodate human nature's weaknesses as well as 
its strengths. 
Purging the Intellect 
While there is no question that Bacon saw the goal of his project as an 
improvement of the human situation, it clearly involves a transformation of more than 
just the arts: 
This doctrine, then, of the expurgation of the intellect to qualify it for 
dealing with truth is comprised in three refutations: the refutation of the 
philosophies; the refutation of the demonstrations; and the refutation of the 
natural human reason. The explanation of which things, and of the true 
relation between the nature of things and the nature of the mind, is as the 
strewing and decoration of the bridal chamber of the mind and the 
universe, the divine goodness assisting, out of which marriage let us hope 
( and be this the prayer of the bridal song) there may spring helps to man, 
and a line and race of inventions that may in some degree subdue and 
overcome the necessities and miseries of humanity. ("Plan of the Work," 
P W 25 1) 
Bacon recognizes the difficulty inherent in studying nature. Nevertheless, he believes that 
penetration into nature's mysteries is possible, but only if first "a more perfect use and 
application of the human mind and intellect be introduced" (246). The difficulty of the 
task Bacon set for himself and his fellow human beings was worth it. The reward for 
following the inductive method to observe nature was to "see things exactly as they are," 
and to gain the benefits which come from God's power. 
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Although Bacon saw his project as the foundation of a new epistemological 
system to replace the Aristotelian system that had so long held sway, it is not fully 
system. This was the case, in part, because Bacon did not begin producing the bulk of his 
philosophical works until late in his life, after his disgrace at court. More importantly, 
however, Bacon saw his Great Instauration as a beginning of knowledge rather than the 
end. The Plan of the lnstauratio Magno identifies six parts. The first part, the Division of 
the Sciences, was published in 1 604 as The Advancement of Learning. The second part 
was the Novum Organum, or New Organon, an inductive method for making 
observations of nature. The word "organon," which means instrument, referred at that 
time to Aristotelian logical texts, in general, and more specifically to syllogistic 
reasoning which was commonly used during the Renaissance. Bacon objected to 
deductive reasoning because it was based on words, using propositions to derive other 
propositions, rather than beginning with nature. Bacon considered that the state of 
learning, as it then existed, was deficient because abstract principles had been hastily 
derived from insufficient observation. Thus, he considered it necessary to purge the 
intellect of this deficient learning before commencing the new instauration. The most 
comprehensive discussion of these obstacles occurs in Novum Organum in the discussion 
of the Idols of the Mind. Bacon identifies four idols that "so beset men's minds that the 
truth can hardly find entrance, but even after entrance obtained, they will again in the 
very instauration of the sciences meet and trouble us, unless men being forewarned of the 
danger fortify themselves as far as may be against their assaults" (NO l .xxxviii) . These 
are the Idols of the Tribe, of the Cave, of the Marketplace, and of the Theatre. 
The Idols of the Tribe are those that are inherent in human nature. Bacon says that 
"perceptions as well of the senses as of the mind are according to the measure of the 
individual and not according to the measure of the universe." The human understanding, 
Bacon argues, is "like a false mirror, which receiving rays irregularly, distorts and 
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discolours the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it" (I.xli). Bacon 
summarizes the Idols of the Tribe as those which rise from "the homogeneity of the 
substance of the human spirit, or from its preoccupation, or from its narrowness, or from 
its restless motion, or from an infusion or the affections, or from the incompetency of the 
senses, or from the mode of impression" (l.lii). In general, Bacon's idols of the tribe refer 
to tendencies related to inferring general principles from particular instances (1.xlv-li). 
The Idols of the Cave are those which are related to the "peculiar constitution, 
mental or bodily, of each individual" and of the education and experiences which each 
individual experiences (I.liii). The idols of the cave include an individual's preference for 
a particular discipline, for antiquity or for novelty, for analysis or synthesizing (I.liii­
lviii). These idols arise from "the predominance of a favourite subject, or out of an 
excessive tendency to compare or distinguish, or out of partiality for particular ages, or 
out of the largeness or minuteness of the objects contemplated" (l.lviii). Bacon suggests 
that any student should be wary that "whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon" is 
potentially an idol and that care should be exercised to "keep the understanding even and 
clear" (l.lviii). 
The Idols of the Marketplace are those related to discourse by which humans 
interact with one another: 
For it is by discourse that men associate; and words are imposed according 
to the apprehension of the vulgar. And therefore the ill and unfit choice of 
words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. Nor do definitions or 
explanations wherewith in some things learned men are wont to guard and 
defend themselves, by any means set the matter right. But words plainly 
force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and 
lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies. 
(1.xliii) 
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Bacon believes that words are particularly problematic because, while "men believe that 
their reason governs words . . .  it is also true that words react on the understanding" 
rendering intellectual enterprises "sophistical and inactive" (I.lix). Bacon identified two 
specific types of linguistic idols: words that name things that do not exist and 
propositions that result from faulty abstraction (I.lx). 
The last of the four idols, the Idols of the Theatre, are neither innate, as are the 
idols of the Tribe and the Cave, nor do they influence us without our being aware of it as 
do the Idols of the Marketplace. Rather, Bacon says, the Idols of the Theatre "are plainly 
impressed and received into the mind from the play-books of philosophical systems and 
perceived rules of demonstrations" (I.lxi). He identifies three classes of philosophical 
idols-sophistical or rational, empirical, and superstitious-all of which are "based on 
too narrow a foundation of experiment and natural history, and decided on the authority 
of too few cases" (I.lxii). The Sophistical schools, among which he includes the 
philosophies of Aristotle, Anaxagorous, Leucipus, Democritus, Parmenides, Empedocles, 
and Heraclitus, "snatch from experience a variety of common instances, neither duly 
ascertained nor diligently examined and weighed, and leave all the rest to meditation and 
agitation of wit" (I.lxii, lxiii). The empirical schools, which include the alchemists and, 
perhaps, the philosophy of Gilbert, "having bestowed much diligent and careful labour on 
a few experiments, have then made bold to educe and construct systems; wrestling all 
other facts in a strange fashion to conform therewith" (I.lxii, lxiv). The superstitious 
schools of philosophy, which include Plato and the Pythagoreans, "out of faith and 
veneration, mix their philosophy with theology and tradition" (I.lxii, lxv). All of these 
schools, argues Bacon, are concerned with what he calls the "quiescent" rather than the 
"moving" or active princples of things (I.lxvi). While Bacon does not include Stoic 
natural philosophy in his classification of the Idols of the Theatre, neither does he hold it 
up as an example of an ideal philosophy and in fact suggests that Zeno and later heads of 
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the school were among founders of "suspect schools."88 However, there are unmistakable 
similarities between the Bacon's new philosophy and Stoic epistemology, which is 
primarily concerned with understanding how human beings come to know the world and 
to make sense of it. Given that the perfecting of an individual' s  rationality was the human 
essential task, epistemological concerns were paramount for the Stoics. Critical to 
perfecting rationality and achieving virtue was understanding how the individual gains 
and evaluates knowledge. As Bacon's discussion of the Idols of the mind suggests, he 
was also concerned with how knowledge is gained and secured. 
The Stoics believed that the individual was born as a blank slate, a tabula rasa, or 
a blank sheet on which experience is written: "When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has 
the commanding-part of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon" (Aetius 
4. 1 1 . 1 -4 [HP 39E]). Knowledge is gained in a number of ways. The initial apparatus by 
which knowledge begins is the "impression." Stoics divided impressions into two main 
categories, sensory and non-sensory. A great deal of knowledge, especially knowledge of 
the material world, is gained primarily through se.nsory experience. The Stoics believed 
that the individual' s pneuma interacts with the pneuma of an external object, making an 
"impression" on the mind.89 Non-sensory impressions "are ones obtained through thought 
such as those of the incorporeals and of the other things acquired by reason" (Diogenes 
Laertius 7 .49-5 1 [HP 39A]) .  The mind is not merely a paper upon which multiple 
impressions are written. It also has associated with it and related to its rational nature, 
what the Stoics called "incorporeals", which are concepts and functions the mind uses in 
the process of gaining understanding. Sextus Empiricus listed four "species" of 
88 Bacon suggests that subsequent Roman and Arabic philosophies are tainted because they are based upon 
the original Greek philosophies, and he includes Zeno, Chrysipus, and Carneades among the founders of 
the suspect schools. (I.lxxi). 
89 The Stoics describe sensory experience as an interaction between the immanentpneuma of the universe 
and the pneuma within every human being. See Long, Hellenistic Philosophies, 1 55-58 .  
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incorporeals: sayables (lekta), void, time, and place (Against the Professors 10.218 [HP 
27D]). The mind combines material impressions and incorporeals in the process of 
gaining and evaluating information. According to Aetius, once something is perceived, a 
memory remains, and a "plurality of impressions" leads to experience. He calls the 
results of experience "conceptions," some of which occur through this process of 
perception, while others come through "our own instruction and attention." These latter 
are only called conceptions, while the original impressions are also called 
"preconceptions." He says that reason develops from these preconceptions by the time an 
individual is seven years old ([Aetius 4.11.1-4 [HP 39E]). Diogenes Laertius lists a 
number of ways individuals come to think about sense-objects in order to create 
conceptions from preconceptions, including similarity, analogy, transposition, 
combination, opposition, transition and privation (Diogenese Laertius 7 .53). The Stoics 
also recognized several different species of impressions, including those which are 
convincing, unconvincing, true, and false. 90 Thus, the result of a single sensory 
experience could rarely be considered as genuine knowledge. The Stoics saw the process 
of gaining authoritative knowledge as a three-stage process: the individual first sees a 
thing in the world, after which an impression of the thing is made on the mind, and, 
finally, the mind understands or grasps the thing. These phases of the process of gaining 
knowledge were called "impression," "assent," and "cognition." Human beings, as 
rational creatures, are able to differentiate between true and false impressions and only 
those impressions that are true may be fully grasped, or known. An impression is not 
sufficient, however, to count for knowledge. Once the impression is made, the individual 
may begin to believe it is true, but until it is grasped and understood, that knowledge is 
incomplete. 
90 The Stoics recognized a number of combinations of categories of impressions. For a more complete 
discussion, see Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 7.242-6 . 
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Knowledge is always subject to some criterion of truth. The Stoics made a 
distinction between belief or opinion, which they called assent, and knowledge of 
understanding. According to Sextus Empiricus, there are three states of knowledge which 
are linked together: 
scientific knowledge [ episteme ], opinion [ doxa ], and cognition [ katalepsis] 
stationed between them. Scientific knowledge is cognition which is secure 
and firm and unchangeable by reason. Opinion is weak and false assent. 
Cognition in between these is assent belonging to a cognitive impression; 
and a cognitive impression, so they claim, is one which is true and of such 
a kind that it could not turn out false. Of these they say that scientific 
knowledge is found only in the wise, and opinion only in the inferior, but 
cognition is common to them both, and it is the criterion of truth. (Against 
the Professors 7. 1 5 1 -7 [HP 4 1C]) 
In some instances, true impressions come from experiencing "what is" exactly as it is. 
However, other impressions were shown to be true in other ways such as through logical 
demonstration. 9 1  
The Stoics used a variety of metaphors to describe the process by which the 
rational human gains knowledge and understanding. They compare impressions to the 
impression made in wax, with true impressions being made in a "craftsmanlike" way 
(Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 7.247-52 [HP 40E]) ;  they also compare the 
process to a hand that curls its fingers to hold the impression and then grasps knowledge 
firmly in its fist : 
Zeno used to clinch the wise man's sole possession of scientific 
knowledge with a gesture. He would spread out the fingers of one handand 
91 See Long and Selby's discussion of criteria of truth in Hellenistic Philosophers 249-53 . 
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display its open palm, saying, "an impression is like this." next he 
clenched his fingers a little and said, "Assent is like this. ' Then, pressing 
his fingers quite together, he made a fist, and said that this was cognition 
(and from this illustration he gave that mental state the name of katalepsis, 
which it had not had before.) Then he brought his left hand against his 
right fist and gripped it tightly and forcefully, and said that scientific 
knowledge was like this, and was possessed by none except the wise man. 
(Cicero, Academia 2. 145 ) 
Cicero neatly summarizes Stoic epistemology in this way: 
The mind itself, which is the source of the senses and is even identical 
with the senses, has a natural force which it applies to the things by which 
it is activated. So it seizes some impressions in order to make immediate 
use of them, others, which are the source of memory, it stores away so to 
speak, while all the rest it arranges by their likenesses, and thereby 
conceptions of things are produced, which the Greeks call sometimes 
ennoiai and at other times prolepsis. With the addition of reason, logical 
proof and a multitude of innumerable facts, cognition of all those things 
manifests itself and reason, having been perfected by these stages, arrives 
at wisdom. (Cicero, Academica 2.30- 1 )  
While Bacon does not fully delineate the process by which cognition occurs, it is 
clear from his description of the various Idols of the Mind that cognition is a process 
which requires significant attention. And while Bacon does not refer to Stoic cognitive 
theory in Novum Organum, he does use Stoic terminology. For example, he calls inferior 
forms of knowledge, such as that gained from the deficient philosophical schools, or that 
which is imagined, or that which comes from the weakness of human understanding, 
impressions. He also uses the term "assent" to describe a firm understanding, and the 
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ultimate term for "understanding truly" is eucatalepsia (I.cxxv). Bacon believed that it 
was possible to obtain a true and faithful knowledge of the world, and that such 
knowledge could lead to the betterment of the human condition: 
Again, it will be thought, no doubt, that the goal and mark of knowledge 
which I myself set up . . .  is not the true or best; for that the contemplation 
of truth is a thing worthier and loftier than all utility and magnitude of 
works; and that this long and anxious dwelling with experience and matter 
and the fluctuations of individual things drags down the mind to earth or 
rather sinks it to a very Tartarus of turmoil and confusion; removing and 
withdrawing it from the serene tranquility of abstract wisdom a condition 
far more heavenly. Now to this I readily assent; . . . For I am building in 
the human understanding a true model of the world, such as it is in fact, 
not such as man's own reason would have it to be; a thing which cannot be 
done without a very diligent dissection of the world. But I say that those 
foolish and apish images of worlds which the fancies of man have created 
in philosophical systems, must be scattered to the winds. Be it known how 
vast a difference there is between the Idols of the human mind and the 
Ideas of the divine. The former are nothing more than arbitrary 
abstractions; the latter are the creator's own stamp upon 
creation,impressed and defined in matter by true and exquisite lines. 
(I.cxxiv) 
The "true model of the world" that Bacon hoped to build in human understanding was 
predicated upon a new inductive method, which is the subject of Book II of the Novum 
Organum. 
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The New Organon 
If Bacon's argument for the practice of natural philosophy cogently addresses the 
epistemological anxieties of the period, his new method has little to offer as a remedy. The 
"kind of logic," which he describes at length in the second book of the Novum Organum, 
was meant to replace the stultifying Aristotelian logic that was then in wide use and that 
had been developed to an extreme degree by the Scholastics. Organon, which means 
"instrument," referred to a series of Aristotle's texts (Categories, On Interpretation, Prior 
and Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations) that are related to logic and 
method. Perhaps the most significant difference between Aristotle's organon and Bacon's 
new philosophical method, was that Aristotle inluded a variety of logical strategies while 
Bacon advocated a single logical method (induction) for all types of inquiry. He argues 
that the method he proposes is new, based as it is upon inductive logic. While it is true that 
inductive logic is not the primary logic of ancient philosophies in general, nor of Stoic 
logic in particular, it certainly was not unknown. However, Bacon argues that his 
inductive logic is different from that of the ancients: "While it might be assumed that the 
ancients provided at the outset of their speculations a great store and abundance of 
examples and particulars, digested the same into notebooks under heads and titles, from 
them completed their systems and arts, and afterward, when they understood the matter, 
published them to the world" (1.cxxv), that is not the case, as is evident from their own 
descriptions of their work. Rather, they "flew at once to the most general conclusions, or 
first principles of science" having examined only "a few examples and particulars ( with 
the addition of common notions perhaps of some of the received opinions which have 
been most popular)" {l.cxxv) . Unlike the unfinished induction of his predecessors, 
Bacon's system advocated the gathering of instances and particulars as a foundation from 
which to infer general laws. 
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The exhaustiveness of assembling particulars was not the only difference between 
Bacon's inductive method and that of his predecessors. He was also concerned with 
examining active principles rather than "quiescent" elements of things, i.e., the elements 
of which they are composed. At the beginning of Book II, Bacon makes a distinction 
between the aims of human power and knowledge. The aim of human power is "to 
generate and superinduce a new nature or new natures" on a given body, while the aim of 
human knowledge is to "discover the form, or true specific difference, or nature­
engendering nature, or source of emanation ( for these are terms which come nearest a 
description of a thing)" (I.i). The secondary goal of human power is the transformation of 
concrete bodies and of knowledge, "the discovery in every case of generation and motion, 
of the latent process, carried on from the manifest efficient and the manifest material to 
the form which is engendered and in like manner the discovery of the latent configuration 
of bodies at rest and not in motion" (Li). He privileges knowledge over power, and 
suggests that without knowledge, power is limited. Bacon's inductive method is the means 
by which knowledge is accumulated and secured. 
Bacon's ideas regarding the composition of matter bear little resemblance to those 
of other philosophical schools. Although he grants the appropriateness of Aristotle's four 
causes, for example, he dismisses the system as ineffective in improving the 
understanding of the nature of things or leading to an active science (I. ii) . He is concerned 
with discovering "Forms," but insists these do not correspond to the Platonic theory of 
forms as abstract Ideas, for "in nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies, 
performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law" (I. ii). Thus, he adopts terms 
from other philosophies without sufficiently redefining them. The method of tables he 
derives from these is equally confusing. It consists of a series of tabulations of what he 
calls "simple natures," qualities such as hard, soft, dense, light, porous, nonporous. The 
first table consists of instances in which the given nature is present, while the second table 
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consists of instances which resemble those of the first table, but from which the given 
nature is absent. The third table consists of instances in which the given nature increases 
or diminishes in response to alterations of physical conditions. The instances are combined 
with what Bacon calls "simple motions" and with a set of terms-such as "like," "unlike," 
"possible," "impossible"-which he calls "transcendentals."92 In Bacon's system, the 
transcendentals are used for forming predicates and establishing the essential definitions 
that he seeks. 
The success of Bacon's endeavor was mixed. The natural history, i.e. ,  the 
gathering of instances, he proposed was admired and adopted by many of the natural 
philosophers of his day, particularly in England. If any significant tabulations of instances 
ever occurred, it failed to produce the philosophia primum Bacon hoped for. Lisa Jardine 
argues that Bacon's new logic received two quite different receptions in the early modem 
period. On the one hand, Bacon was seen by members of the British Royal Society, 
including Hooke, Herschel, Mill, and Wilkins, as the founder of the empirical school, 
particularly because of "the centrality to scientific endeavor of carefully tabulated and 
collated descriptions of external qualities of natural phenomena" ("Experientia literata or 
Novum Organum?" 47). Others, such as Gassendi and Mersenne, saw Bacon as a "system 
builder, intent on finding the indemonstrable first principles of things-the hidden 
essential natures of things-by means of a new logic" ( 48). However, they doubted the 
possibility "of getting from our particular experience of natural phenomena to the most 
profound generalities underlying these-the essential natures of which our senses detect 
only the external symptoms" ( 49) and suggest that there is no way to achieve anything 
more than a high degree of confidence, and not the "certainty of scientia" (60). The 
difficulty with the method, from either point of view, is that it begins with a "sceptical 
92 Lisa Jardine notes that Bacon's "transcendentals" are associated with Aristotle's "transcendentals." See 
"Experientia literata or Novum organum?" ( 4 7). 
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suspension of belief in 'doxa' or received opinion" ( 60) and defers the realization of 
general principles. Jardine argues that there are two ways of proceeding from this starting 
point. First is to "pare away all the superstructure of inference based on faulty sense­
perception, received conventions of reasoning, and received beliefs and theories, inference 
that impedes the operation of an otherwise adequate intellectual faculty-and build 
scientia afresh a priori from there" (60). Certainly, this is what Bacon claims he is doing 
in the first book of the Novum Organum. The other alternative, according to Jardine, "is 
the radical sceptical one of giving up the quest for certainty in natural philosophy 
altogether, and being content instead with systematic attempts at providing limited 
possibilities for some kind of action in the form of tentative generalizations about the most 
readily accessible regularities in nature" (60). Jardine argues that Bacon attempts to have 
it both ways, "man of experimental science on the one hand; Aristotelian essentialist on 
the other" (60). 
The discrepancy that Jardine identifies is mitigated by the belief, which Bacon 
shares with the Stoics, that it is possible to penetrate the mysteries of the physical world 
using the rational faculty. In the Preface to the /nstauratio Magno, Bacon claims that 
through his method he has "established forever a true and lawful marriage between the 
empirical and rational faculty, the unkind and ill-starred divorce and separation of which 
has thrown into confusion all the affairs of the human family" (PW 246). Bacon echoes 
the claims of Seneca regarding the penetrability of nature' s  secrets: 
The very one who handles this universe, who established it, who laid the 
foundations of all that is and placed it around himself, and who is the 
greater and better part of his work, has escaped our sight; he has to be 
perceived in thought. Moreover many things related to the highest divinity 
or allotted a neighboring power are obscure. Or perhaps-which may 
surprise you more-they both fill and elude our vision. Either their 
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subtlety is greater than the human eye-sight is able to follow or such a 
great majesty conceals itself in too holy a conclusion. It rules its kingdom 
- that is itself- and grants no admission to any except the mind. 
(Natura/es Quaestiones VII, 30. 3-4) 
Like Seneca, Bacon believed that achieving this knowledge was a slow and methodical 
process. Unlike the Stoics, however, who believed knowledge of nature would lead to 
individual virtue, Bacon followed his humanist values and saw nature's lessons as a 
means for improving the status of humankind. 
The Essays as Method 
For Bacon, who sought to establish a synthetic and comprehensive philosophical 
system, nothing would have been more desireable than to develop a universal logic that 
was transferrable across disciplines. As the passage from the Novum Organum at the 
beginning of this chapter indicates, Bacon believed that his method was such a universal 
logic. The Essays, for which he is perhaps best known in this century, represent just such 
an experiment. Although the style of the Essays seems contrived and awkward to today's 
audiences, they continue to be studied as a forerunner of a form which is now fully 
developed and widely used. Montaigne was the first to use the term essay, which is 
derived from the Latin exagium, the act of weighing, to describe a rather loose discursive 
form, generally personal in nature, in which the author speculated on subjects of interest 
both to individuals and society at large. Montaigne's essays, first published in 1 580, are 
clearly personal and exploratory in nature and were intended to take the place of 
conversations with his closest friend, Etienne de La Boetie (Frame v). The Essays in 
Bacon's first edition, published in 1 597, lack the personal voice that characterizes 
Montaigne 's works, and seem clearly intended for a public audience. They are not meant 
to share his uncertainties, but to off er to his audience the benefit of his meditations on 
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commonly held views on various subjects. This first edition, published in 1597, was 
entitled Essays. Religious Meditations. Places of perswasion and disswasion, and 
included ten essays, Meditationes Sacrae, and Of the Colours of Good and Evil, a 
Fragment. Mediationes Sacrae are typical of Renaissance religious meditations, and The 
Colours of Good and Evil, is Bacon's "improvement" on a set of similar arguments in 
Aristotle's Rhetoric. Bacon continued to work on The Essays throughout his life and 
published two additional editions, one in 1612 and the third in 1625, a year before his 
death. The third and final edition contained a total of fifty-eight essays, including thirty­
eight from previous editions which had been revised and expanded.93 Although Bacon 
considered The Essays to be a tangential and relatively unimportant part of his total body 
of work, they are not unrelated to the rest of his philosophy. 94 Perhaps, most importantly, 
they demonstrate the degree to which Bacon's project is related to the Stoic form of 
Renaissance humanism. 
In a letter dedicating the 1597 edition to his brother Anthony, Bacon explains that 
he is motivated to publish the essays because they were about to be published by others. 
He expresses uncertainty about the propriety of doing so, acknowledging that there 
"mought be as great a vanitie in retiring and withdrawing mens conceites . . . from the 
world as in obtruding them." Nevertheless, Bacon says that he has "played my selfe the 
Inquisitor, and find nothing to my understanding in them contrarie or infectious to the 
state of Religion, or manners, but rather (as I suppose) medicinable ." The form of the 
Essays seems peculiar to modem readers. They do not consist of an argument with 
evidence. Rather, they consist of a series of statements, or sententiae, about a subject. 
93 For a brief but thorough discussion of the publication history, see "A Note on the Text and Annotation" 
in the Penguin edition of The Essays by John Pilcher. For a more comprehensive discussion, see R. W. 
Gibson's Francis Bacon: A Bibliography of his works and Baconiana to the Year 1750. 
94 See RS. Crane, "The Relation of Bacon' s  Essays to His Program for the Advancement of Learning" for 
a discussion of how the Essays are related to the rest of Bacon's philosophical project. 
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Sometimes, Bacon juxtaposes contradictory aphorisms. Other times, he lists a number of 
commonplace assumptions about a subject, and then offers information which challenges 
them all. The experience of reading the Essays is confusing, perplexing. According to 
Stanley Fish, "the demands of the prose have left the reader in a state of ' healthy 
perplexity,' neither content with the notion he had been inclined to accept at the 
beginning of the experience, nor quite ready to put forward a more accurate notion of his 
own" ("Georgics of the Mind" 262). Fish likens the state of mind induced in the reader of 
Bacon's Essays to that of the scientists, "observant, methodical, cautious, skeptical, and 
yet in long range terms, optimistic" (262). The relationship of the aphoristic style of the 
essays to the inductive logic of Bacon's new philosophy, has been demonstrated amply 
by a number of scholars including Crane, Wallace, and Vickers. What has been explored 
less fully, however, is the relationship of the style of the essays to the inductive method. 
The Essays operate in the realm of the contingent; they deal with subjects such as 
truth, dissimulation, envy, love, marriage and the single life, studies, and even gardens, 
about which there is much disagreement and for which there is little solid theoretical 
knowledge available to help us negotiate our differences. This is precisely the realm 
which Renaissance humanists saw as their arena. Moreover, Bacon uses many of the 
same tools that the humanists employed. Certainly, his Essays are not the polished and 
copious rhetoric of the humanists, but they deploy the same types of evidence: 
commonplaces, opinion, and, very frequently, appeals to the authority of the ancients and 
to Biblical authority .95 What is perhaps most convincing in regards to the humanistic bent 
of the Essays is the way Bacon describes the action of various rhetorical strategies in The 
Advancement of Learning: 
95 Fish argues that that Bacon does not, in fact, value sententiae from the ancients or the Bib le any more 
highly than any other evidence and that h is use of such sententiae in the Essays serves to teach new readers 
to value all sources of evidence equally (269-27 1 ). Certainly, it is the case that Bacon sought to develop 
additional sources of authority, but he continued to value the wisdom of the ancients very highly. 
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And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leisure what 
men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and the 
active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry and 
tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of Virtue, 
Duty, and Felicity. (PW 134) 
It is clearly to the active life that Bacon addresses these ruminations. 
In his summary of previous analyses of Bacon's essays, Fish notes that 
commentators have had difficulty reconciling the moralistic goal of the Essays with the 
analytical method. Fish suggests that the difficulty these commentators have is in the 
"assumed equation of ' scientific' and 'objective"' (253) . Rather, he says, the "experience, 
rather than the materials of which it is composed, is what is scientific about the Essays" 
(253). Two things are problematic about this assertion. First, from the perspective of 
modern science, "experience" is not "scientific." The whole point of modem science is 
that the personal is discounted, that the subjectivity of the researcher is, to the greatest 
degree possible, removed from the experiment. Second, Fish' s insistence upon dealing 
with the "experience" of the Essays suggests that their goal is not to establish some kind 
of objective truth, however that might be construed, but to produce a certain kind of 
person. That sort of development of moral character has largely been the province of 
humanists, not scientists. Thus, while Bacon's Essays may, indeed, be related to his new 
philosophy, they are not really "scientific." 
The perplexing nature of Bacon's Essays is not a function of their being 
"scientific," but of their reflecting the Stoic strain of humanism rather than the more 
familiar Augustine/Ciceronian strain. A clue to interpreting the function, purpose, and 
tradition of the Essays lies in the subtitle Religious Meditations. Places of perswasion 
and disswasion. Meditation was a common activity during the Renaissance, and was 
generally not merely a mental discipline, but was practiced in writing. Generally, 
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meditation was a personal and spiritual practice, a means of examining and improving an 
individual's own soul. For Bacon, however, it seems clear that the practice of meditation 
could be applied much more broadly. 
Bacon's Essays seem clearly related to the Stoic practice of meditatio, especially 
to that of Marcus Aurelius, whom Bacon greatly admired. However, to the degree that 
they are highly prescriptive acts related to judgment and persuasion and active rather than 
passive in nature, Bacon' s essays are also humanistic and dialogic in nature. In his 
examination of meditatio, Robert Newman suggests that the process of meditation is not 
merely a logical exercise, particularly as it was practiced by Seneca. The meditatio 
cannot appeal only to the intellect; the whole person must change, and, therefore, the 
emotions, which are more difficult to overcome since they are not dependent on reason, 
must be the primary target of meditation. The constant and rigorous application of 
particular phrases and images helps to work on these emotions; they interiorize the 
meditatio by driving its considerations deep into the soul. As Seneca illustrated, simple 
syllogisms do not have the same force as repeated, hard-hitting phrases, since syllogisms 
entertain the mind, but do not effect one's emotional reaction. ( 1 4  7 5). 
Newman also argues that the use of rhetorical devices is a necessary component of 
meditatio, since its purpose is to persuade. "The powerful images and paradoxes which 
make up the meditatio are necessary to strip away the surface covering of opinion and to 
reveal a thing as it really is" (1 478). 
Bacon's New Philosophy as Humanistic Science 
In describing Bacon's  project, Gaukroger argues that his goal was 
to harness firmly to the yoke of the state a new attitude to knowledge, and 
in the course of attempting to do this, he was led to think through and 
transform this new attitude to knowledge . . . .  The object of this reform 
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was both the practice and the practitioners of natural philosophy. He was 
concerned to reform a tradition of natural philosophy in which the central 
ingredients were areas such as natural history and alchemy: empirical, 
labour-intensive disciplines. (6) 
Such a project is, of course, completely in keeping with the humanistic commitment to 
the vita activa, and Bacon's texts that deal with natural philosophy are all active in their 
focus. Both the Advancement of Learning and its expanded edition De augmentis 
describe contemporary objections to learning, enumerate the obstacles standing in the 
way of its advancement, and propose a reform of education, founded on the study of 
nature, including both theoretical and productive branches. The same can be said for the 
Novum Organum, a description and demonstration of his inductive method, which Bacon 
saw as a the means to laying the groundwork for an "active" science; and even those 
texts in which he deals directly with natural philosophy are primarily examples of his 
inductive method at work. But given Bacon's beliefs about the state of learning in his 
own time, how could it be otherwise? Theoretical knowledge was one goal of the new 
philosopher's activities in the caves and mines of nature. 
Gaukroger describes Bacon's project as a "transformation of philosophy," a 
description with which Bacon would, no doubt, concur. However, Bacon's investigations 
of natural phenomena do not approach the quality of those of his contemporaries such as 
Galileo and Boyle, and quite often he had little respect for their ideas. It is, perhaps, not 
surprising that this is the case since Bacon's education was that of a humanist and his 
professional life was carried out in the law courts, the parliament, and the courts of 
Elizabeth I and James I. Moreover, as has previously been noted, philosophy was not 
generally part of the humanist project, which was more concerned with rhetoric and other 
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linguistic studies. 96 Thus, while Bacon describes a significant and comprehensive reform 
of learning, his writings resemble humanist practical wisdom more than philosophical 
texts. His recommendations for educational reform and his new method provided a new 
focus for study, a structure within which that study could take place, a heuristic for 
carrying it out, and a rationale for doing so. Rather than a transformation of philosophy, 
Bacon's contribution might more accurately be characterized as a rhetorical effort, a 
justification of natural philosophy and a plan for its nourishment and growth. Although 
Bacon ultimately contributed little to the practice of natural philosophy, he did provide a 
view of nature that accommodated both traditional theology and new claims based on the 
work of natural philosophers. Bacon drew on a variety of cultural commonplaces in 
making a case for orderly and rational nature. Bacon's inductive logic owes two principal 
debts to Stoicism. First, the Stoic view of nature as an orderly and creative process, 
helped Bacon make a case for nature as rule-ordered and comprehensible in an age when 
nature was largely regarded as mysterious and susceptible to the will of the Creator. The 
Stoic conflation of god with reason was useful for Bacon in this regard. Second, elements 
of Stoic epistemology served as a rationale for doing away with contemporary 
philosophy and as a foundation for Bacon's new inductive method. His borrowings from 
the Stoics provided Bacon with a means of expanding the humanist project and 
stabilizing the epistemological uncertainty of the Renaissance. 
96 See Kristeller's discussion of humanism's limited emphasis on moral philosophy in Renaissance 
Thought and Its Sources. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
"TO SECOND REASON AND NOT TO OPPRESS IT": 
STOIC INFLUENCE ON BACON'S THEORIES OF RHETORIC AND DISCOURSE 
93Timber 26. 
Yet there hapn'd in my time one noble Speaker who was full of gravity in 
his speaking. His language, where hee could spare or passe by a jest, was 
nobly censorious. No man ever spake more neatly, more presly, more 
weightily, or suffer' d lesse emptinesse, less idleness, in what hee uttered. 
No member of his speech but consisted of the owne graces. His hearers 
could not cough or looke aside from him without losse. Hee commanded 
where hee spoke, and had his Judges angry and pleased at his devotion. 
No man had their affections more in his power. The feare of every man 
that heard him was lest hee should make an end. 
-Ben Jonson 97 
Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic is to the 
understanding,; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked 
into, is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to 
imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will. 
-Francis Bacon98 
98 De aug., PW 535.  
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Twentieth-century narratives of the scientific revolution have failed to 
acknowledged the importance of Bacon' s role as an apologist for the new philosophy. In 
fact, Koyre's derisive sneer at Bacon' s characterisation of himself as a "buccinator" of 
science suggests that Koyre believed the role of one who announced the arrival of the 
new philosophy was a largely insignificant one. But for those who understand the 
generative power of language, to announce something is, in a sense, to make it so. In fact, 
it is Bacon' s recognition of the power of language to obscure humankind' s  perception of 
"the true nature of things" that impels much of his new philosophy. Not only have 
historians of science such as Koyre failed to recognize the significance of this role, so 
have many scholars of rhetoric and discourse, who have considered Bacon to have been 
the progenitor of an anti-rhetorical approach to discourse. Bacon's  reputation as one who 
sought to put an end to humanism is based largely on his expressed aversion to 
Aristotelianism as a stultifying veneration of the past at the expense of the future, his 
claims for the novelty of his new system, and his concern that the humanist emphasis on 
rhetoric came at the expense of better knowledge of things. This understanding of 
Bacon's philosophy is entirely compatible with the common narrative of the scientific 
revolution as the triumph of abstract Platonism over stultified, medieval Aristotelianism 
and with assertions that the move toward modernity encompassed an attempt to find a 
plainer, more transparent discursive style. However, the notion that Bacon' s ideas were 
completely novel and that he owed nothing to the ancients is not justified by a reading of 
his works, which mined the full gamut of ancient texts-mythologies, philosophies, 
histories and sacred texts-for commonplaces to support his arguments.99 Moreover, 
while Bacon may have criticized the copious sty le of his contemporaries, he was well­
trained by humanist tutors in the art of rhetoric and reputed to be one of its finest 
99 See Brian Vickers, "The Myth of Francis Bacon's 'Anti-humanism '," for a deconstruction of the various 
arguments that Bacon was anti-humanist. 
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practitioners in seventeenth-century England. As a humanist trained in rhetoric and as the 
self-proclaimed "buccinator" of the new philosophy, Bacon would certainly have 
recognized that producing and deploying arguments to advance the new philosophy was 
�t least as important as developing a sty le of discourse particularly suited to the new 
epistemological endeavors. 
Bacon's anxiety about language has often been misrepresented as more radical 
than it actually was. While it is true that Bacon was deeply concerned about some of the 
discursive practices of his contemporaries, he was educated in a system that emphasized 
rhetoric and, if we are to believe the accounts of his contemporaries such as Ben Jonson, 
was one of its most adept practitioners. There is no question that among Bacon's most 
significant contributions to modernity was the development of a "plain" style, but the 
antecedents of that style and its relationship to contemporary rhetoric, its relation to his 
epistemology, and its later influence continue to be subject to considerable debate. 
According to many modem histories of discourse, Bacon's plain style de-emphasizes 
aesthetic considerations and attempts to achieve a kind of transparency in representing its 
subject clearly and accurately. While it is certainly the case that much of Bacon's prose, 
when compared to the Ciceronian and Euphuistic styles of his contemporaries, is 
somewhat less ornate, it is a serious misstatement to suggest that he believed in the 
possibility of a "transparent" language in which there was no gap between signifier and 
signified. In fact, Bacon expressed serious doubts regarding the possibility of clear and 
accurate communication. Rather, his style is based on a belief that the gap between words 
(verba) and the things (res) they represent, when combined with certain limitations of 
human nature, society, and intellectual practices, make such communication difficult, if 
not impossible. More to the point, however, the suggestion that Bacon's sole contribution 
to the development of science is the plain style, misrepresents his ideas about language 
and the degree to which discursive practices are imbedded in all human endeavor. 
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Furthermore, such a simplistic view of Bacon's work fails to examine the ways in which 
his theories about and use of language serve as a bridge between humanism and the new 
philosophy that is the forerunner to modem science. Bacon's ideas regarding language 
were formed within the humanist rhetorical tradition and are based upon a rhetorical 
sensitivity to language as human interaction, just as his reorganization of learning was 
founded on ideas from ancient humanist texts and the belief that learning should be 
organized according to human nature. An extensive and elaborate reform of both rhetoric 
and logic was central to Bacon's new instauration of learning, and while he claims that 
his reorganization of learning and his method are "new," it is clear that he follows the 
humanist tradition in that he incorporates aspects of a variety of schools of thought from 
previous centuries. His views on language are related to his division of the sciences and 
are similarly eclectic in their origins. 
Bacon faced, as does anyone who thinks seriously about human language and the 
way it is used, a variety of contradictions that are rooted in the relationship between 
ephemeral words and the things they represent. For Bacon, these inherent inconsistencies 
were exacerbated by the linguistic complexity of his age, which included, on the one 
hand, reverence for recovered ancient Greek and Latin texts and, on the other hand, the 
abandonment of Latin as a common lingua franca, for vernacular languages. The resultant 
hermeneutical uncertainty was complicated by changes occurring on all levels of society, 
and by the wide variety of ideas and practices present in the intellectual milieu. In an age 
so filled with contradictions, it is difficult to situate Bacon within any particular linguistic 
or rhetorical faction. For example, while he objected to what he saw as too great an 
emphasis on rhetoric, he did not object to rhetoric per se. While he objected to 
Aristotelian logic, he called his own method a "kind of logic," ("The Plan of the Work, 
PW 249). There was an anti-Ciceronian element to his rhetoric, but he was capable of 
producing prose as balanced and figured as anything Cicero could have imagined. And 
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his essays employ an innovative structure that is unlike any other existing prose form. 
However, many of these contradictions may be somewhat diminished if Bacon is 
understood within the context of Stoic humanism, which emphasized, as Bouwsma says, 
the "divine, harmonious, and intelligible order of nature" (17). Bacon's aim was not to 
destroy rhetoric, but to situate it within a more comprehensive intellectual edifice that 
was founded upon a clearer understanding between the nature of the mind and the nature 
of things. Stoicism, which was a comprehensive and synthetic philosophy, provides a 
model for just such a plan. Bacon adopts a number of elements of Stoic linguistic 
philosophy, some related to style, but others related to the relationship between words 
and things and between words and the mind. Finally, Stoic skepticism allowed Bacon to 
occupy a middle position between early Renaissance rhetoric, which accepted the 
possibility that language could be a force for positive change and the more radical 
skepticism of those who came after him. 
Bacon's Rhetorical Theories and Practice 
· Bacon's theories about rhetoric100 and its relationship to other arts and sciences 
continue to evoke much debate, 10 1 as do questions about the antecedents for his linguistic 
100 See R. F. Jones, Ancients and Modems : A Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth 
Century England, for an extended discussion of Bacon's "plain style." See also Brian Vickers, Francis 
Bacon and Renaissance Prose 232-261 ,  for a review of Bacon's influence on Renaissance rhetoric. See 
James Zappen, "Francis Bacon and the Historiography of Scientific Rhetoric" for a thorough but concise 
review of literature on Bacon and scientific discourse. See also Robert Adolph, The Rise of Modem Prose 
Style 26-77, for a discussion of Bacon's contribution to modem scientific prose. See the first chapter of 
Robert Stillman's The New Philosophy and Universal Languages in Seventeenth-Century England: Bacon, 
Hobbes, and Wilkins for a discussion of Bacon's views on the gap between res and verba. For a contrasting 
view, see Timothy Reiss The Discourse of Modernism. 
1 0 1  In Francis Bacon and the Art of Discourse, Lisa Jardine argues that Bacon "subordinates rhetoric to 
dialectic and characterizes rhetoric as something overlaid upon discourse composed according to dialectical 
rules" ( 1 4). By contrast, Brian Vickers argues in "Bacon and Rhetoric," that " logic and rhetoric constituted 
a joint training in thinking, arguing, and expressing arguments in persuasive form" (209). The notion that 
Bacon's influence was largely on the development of science is also questioned. In Francis Bacon and 
Renaissance Prose, Vickers argues that Bacon's "dominance on seventeenth century thought" is not a result 
of his scientific program, but of "the terms in which it was formulated and the imaginative eloquence with 
which these were transmitted (232). The most comprehensive study of Bacon's linguistic philosophy is 
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philosophy . 1 02 Assessments of the influence of Bacon's rhetoric on subsequent discursive 
practices are almost as varied and discordant as those of his antecedents. Richard Foster 
Jones has described Bacon's contribution to the intellectual life of the seventeenth 
century as a rejection of ancient learning and the ornate language of the humanists, and a 
turn to nature as a source of truth. He characterizes Bacon's views on language as an 
attempt to develop a "clear, accurate, plain style" that resisted "interposing . . . any 
possible obstruction between observation and description" ("Science and English Prose 
Style" 77). Jones argues that Bacon's ideas influenced seventeenth century "scientists" to 
claim that ancient philosophy "was merely verbal, with no counterpart in reality," and "to 
consider a reformation in language and style as essential as one in science, to formulate 
their linguistic and stylistic ideals, and to try to make them operative" (Ancients and 
Moderns 49). Jones also argues that Bacon proposed a utilitarian science, perhaps 
because he had been "deeply impressed with the wretched condition of the human race, 
and cherished the hope that out of the marriage of mind and things there might spring ' a  
line and race of inventions that may in some degree subdue and overcome the necessities 
and miseries of humanity"' (60). While Jones's reductionist view of Bacon's rhetoric is 
consistent with the modernist �arrative of the scientific revolution, his perception 
regarding Bacon's utilitarianism contradicts the notion that it amounted to a rejection of 
humanism, which valued highly the individual's contribution to society. More recent 
scholars have come to question the reductionist nature of this view of the origins of 
found in Karl Wallace's  Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric. 
102 In Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose, Vickers suggests that Bacon is influenced by Plato .. John 
Briggs, in Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, has also suggested that Bacon's view of rhetoric was 
in the Platonic tradition, which subjected rhetoric not to dialectic but to ethics. A rather different view 
suggests that Bacon follows, more or less, in the Aristotelian tradition, viewing rhetoric as equal to 
dialectic, as a much fuller art which includes all the canons from invention to delivery. In "Attic Prose: 
Lipsius, Montaigne, Bacon," Morris Croll suggests that Bacon relied heavily upon Aristotle ("Attic 
Prose"). James Stephens, in "Bacon's New English Rhetoric and the Debt to Aristotle" argues that Bacon 
returns to Aristotle's view of rhetoric in order to "take a step forward by going back to the source," and 
suggests that Bacon attacks the Ciceronians and Senecans in much the same way that Aristotle faults the 
Sophists for "fostering a 'delicate and polished' kind of learning" (248). 
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modem science and have called into question such representations of the discursive 
practices of natural philosophers which do not consider the complexity of the cultural 
context within which the scientific revolution took place. 
In The Material Word, Morris Kroll challenges the notion that seventeenth­
century natural philosophers were able to achieve a degree of transparency in language. 
He disagrees with Jones' s notion 
that the scientific world view produced an ideology that treated language 
as transparent or referential-as an instrument, that is, to an unmediated 
cognitive and experimental grasp of objects in the world. When 
neoclassical authors talk about the 'plain style,' they do not advertise what 
Jones and later scholars in his tradition associate with 'scientific' 
neutrality or self-evidence. ( 4) 
Kroll argues that Jones's thesis is a product of a modernist "narrative of progress" and 
that it provides him with "scientific" ground from which to survey the "marshy territory 
of rhetoric" (5). Ultimately, Kroll contends that, while such descriptions of the 
relationship between science and language have some merit, Jones' s insistence on the 
transparency of scientific language "fails to recognize that the rhetoric of the materials 
that supplies its evidence constitutes a substantive claim in itself' (2). He argues that 
early modem philosophers, rather than rejecting the rhetorical practices of the humanists, 
advocated an "ideology of contingency" that constituted "a defense of the rhetorical or 
symbolic nature of human culture" ( 1 86). In other words, despite the professions of their 
authors to the contrary, the texts of the scientific revolution are themselves rhetorical in 
nature and are part of the rhetorical context of the Renaissance and early modem periods. 
K.roll's argument and others like it risk being as reductionist as Jones's theory. 
Robert Stillman has argued that both these readings of early modem natural philosophy, 
which he calls the "anti-rhetorical" stance of Jones and the "ideological" stance of Kroll, 
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fail to address the issue of textual contradictions. These contradictions must be accounted 
for because they are symptomatic of an age "in which the opposition between the literal 
and figural underlies so many polarities of discourse (the divide between truth and 
falsehood, reason and imagination, philosophical discourse and rhetoric)" ("Assessing the 
Revolution" 1 05). It is necessary to take seriously early-modem concerns regarding 
language. There is no question that Bacon, like many of his peers, was greatly concerned 
about the degree to which human language could be trusted as a reliable means of 
representing truth and an acceptable means of communication. 103 But, as Stillman points 
out, even the most radical new philosophers of the early modem period continued to 
produce texts, and many of those texts deployed the rhetorical strategies that were taught 
in the humanist educational system in which they studied. The notion that Bacon was 
anti-rhetorical and anti-humanistic is an extreme representation of his views and one that 
does not take into consideration either his humanist values or the rhetorical strategies by 
which he justifies his turn to natural philosophy. This debate is not the kind of 
disputatiousness for its own sake that Bacon deplored among the scholastic philosophers 
of his day; uncertainty about his view of rhetoric and philosophy is justifiable. Bacon 
produced no handbooks, either of rhetoric or dialectic, though he discusses both logic and 
and rhetoric in The Advancement of Learning and De augmentis scientiarum, and he calls 
the art of the "interpretation of Nature," which he introduced in Novum organum, a "kind 
of logic" (PW 275). For Bacon, both logic and rhetoric, as practiced during the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance, were significant obstacles to learning. According to Bacon's 
narrative regarding the emphasis on rhetoric during the Renaissance, the humanist 
fascination with ancient texts and rhetoric was a result of the Protestant reformation when 
103 Debates about the reliabil ity of language continued for some time. During the early modern period the 
anti-language attitudes of natural philosophers became so extreme that Jonathan Swift satirized them in 
Gulliver's Travels . He described a group of roving philosophers who so mistrusted language that they 
traveled from place to p lace leading heavily-burdened asses and "conversed" solely by displaying the 
"things" that they carried. 
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Martin Luther, "being no ways aided by the opinions of his own time was forced to 
awake all antiquity, and to call former times to his succors to make a party against the 
present time, so that the ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long 
time slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved" ( Adv. , PW 54). 104 From 
this grew "a delight in their manner of style and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of 
writing" which by Bacon's time had led men to "study words and not matter" ( Adv. , PW 
54). Even more serious, in Bacon's view, was the contentious learning of Scholastic 
deductive logic in which genuine inquiry had degenerated into unproductive 
disputatiousness, "like so many substances in nature which are solid do putrefy and 
corrupt into worms, so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrefy and 
dissolve into a number of subtile, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them) 
vermiculate questions" (Adv. , PW 55). Bacon's complaint regarding dialectic is 
essentially the same as for rhetoric-that it does not focus on things but takes itself as its 
subject matter. The result of this inappropriate focus is that dialectic "brings forth indeed 
cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance 
or profit" (Adv. , PW 55). 
Stillman has described how the many uncertainties of the period-religious and 
political, as well as linguistic-opened up a gap between res and verba (between words 
and things) that traditional humanists, who had too much invested in "the persuasive 
power of the word," were unable to address (New Philosophy 30). He argues that Bacon 
was uniquely effective in exploiting that breach in order to advance the claims of a new, 
culturally superior form of knowledge: 
Into the breach between words and things opened by repeated challenges 
to the humanist rhetorical tradition, Bacon inserted the new logic of 
104 This narrative does not, of course, correspond with the nineteenth- and twentieth-century narrative of 
humanism in which Italian humanists, beginning with Petrarch, were responsible for reviving the interest in 
ancient texts . 
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. natural philosophy-a logic aimed an illuminating things not words . . . .  
Armed with a new organon, Bacon sought to transfer the status of cultural 
preeminence from oratory, poetry, and disputatious philosophy to natural 
philosophy. (3 0) . 
This "transfer of cultural preeminence," more accurately describes Bacon's contribution 
than Jones' s suggestion that he sought to destroy rhetoric and humanism or Kroll' s 
argument that the rejection of rhetoric was merely a pose. William Bouwsma's notion of 
Stoic humanism as one of two foci of Renassaince humanism provides a framework 
within which to understand Bacon's justification for this transfer of cultural preeminence. 
Because it offered a model for a synthetic intellectual framework, Stoicism provides the 
means by which Bacon was able, not to do away with rhetoric and logic, but to resituate 
them within a larger, integrated structure. Stoicism, as the hellenistic synthesis of hellenic 
philosophies is a more likely antecedent for Bacon's reformulation of these arts, 
reflecting the eclectic character that has been previously noted. While both his rhetorical 
and linguistic theories also reflect elements of Stoic linguistic philosophy, it is his style 
that most clearly demonstrates the unmistakable influence of the Stoics. 
Renaissance Rhetoric and Style 
Modernist histories of rhetoric have suggested that by the end of the Renaissance, 
the art of rhetoric - which in Aristotle 's day comprised the five canons of invention, 
arrangement, memory, style, and delivery - had declined to the point that it comprised 
merely the canon of style. Peter Ramus, who authored widely used textbooks on both 
dialectic and rhetoric and who was among the most influential opponents of rhetoric, was 
largely responsible for removing from the art of rhetoric any significant epistemological 
function, essentially reducing it to an art of style. 105 Ramus was primarily concerned with 
i os The definitive work on Ramus is Walter Ong's Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue. Ong' s work 
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sorting out the intellectual tradition he had inherited, and his most significant contribution 
is his Dialectic or system of logic that is, in Ong' s estimation, "of little interest to a 
serious logician" (7). It had the advantage, however, of reducing dialectic to a simple 
schematic device that could be used by virtually anyone, even the thousands of 
schoolboys to whom it was taught. It is clear that Ramus saw himself as a great 
educational reformer whose goal was to root out errors that he believed had persisted 
virtually since the time of Aristotle. 106 Despite these lofty claims, Ramus's contribution 
was more pedagogical than philosophical, and consisted in reducing and standardizing 
the various arts that were part of the curriculum so that there was little or no redundancy 
among them (Conley 128) . In parceling out the intellectual functions of rhetoric and 
dialectic, Ramus, who believed that invention and arrangement were part of judgment, 
assigned those rhetorical canons to dialectic, leaving to rhetoric the ornamental aspects of 
style and delivery. He defined dialectic as "the art of speaking decisively on matters in 
doubt" (Conley 129) and felt it should apply only strict syllogistic reasoning. Dialectic 
yields, not probable, but certain conclusions: 
For Ramus, the aim of dialectic is the truth, ratio . . . .  Ramus' 
commitment is to certain truth arrived at (as in Plato and Boethius) by 
dialectical invention and set out according to the "natural method," 
arranging ideas in descending order of generality. Rhetoric is simply the 
vehicle for the transmission of this truth to an audience unprepared to 
acceptit. (Conley 1 30) 
on Ramus may have exerted more influence on the h istory of Renaissance rhetoric than the works of 
Ramus exerted on the practice of Renaissance rhetoric. I have relied also on Conley's succinct analysis of 
Ramus's ·work and influence (Rhetoric in the European Tradition 127- 133). The claims regarding Ramus's 
influence are based largely upon the great number of editions of his textbooks on rhetoric and dialectic. 
106 One of his earliest works was Aristotelica animadversiones (Remarks on Aristotle), often translated 
Against Aristotle), which was essentially a diatribe against Aristotle's philosophy and its influence in the 
Renaissance. 
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For Ramus, rhetoric was merely a necessary evil, designed to "serve no other purpose but 
to lead the vexatious and mulish auditor" (qtd. in Conley 130) . Nevertheless, Ramus's 
Rhetorica was very popular, most likely because of its schematic nature, which made it 
easy to understand and relatively simple to use. What is perhaps most important about 
Ramus' realignment of rhetoric and dialectic was that it promised a kind of 
epistemological certainty that traditional rhetoric could not. At the same time, it 
diminished the possibility of negotiating differences in contingent situations since, 
according to Ramus' schema, such situations did not exist. While Ramus, who seems to 
have been genuinely anti-humanistic, may have dismissed rhetoric as "mere" style, many 
of his contemporaries viewed it quite differently. 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of rhetoric in the public life of the 
Renaissance. 1 07 Not only was rhetorical training necessary for personal advancement at 
court, it was a critical component in the emerging forms of government as well. The 
successful courtier was expected to have a ready wit, to demonstrate sprezzeratura, a 
mixture of cleverness and grace, in both written and oral discourse; 1 08 the successful 
public servant required a degree of oratorical competence to engage in public debates 
about civic matters. However, centuries-old arguments about the province and ethics of 
rhetoric continued much the same as they had in the past and were intensified by the 
replacement of the lingua franca Latin with vernacular languages and the emergence of 
new forms of government. For example, on the continent, outside of the new nation states 
1 07 There is a significant body of literature on Renaissance rhetoric. For an overview, see Thomas Conley, 
Rhetoric in the European Tradition. For an anthology of pertinent issues, see James Murphy, Renaissance 
Eloquence. Wayne Rebhorn has examined contrasting views of rhetoric during the Renaissance in 
Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric. For rhetorical practice in England, see W. S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric 
in England: 1 500 to 1 700. See also, Peter Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric. For the relationship between 
rhetoric and dialectic, see Peter Mack, Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of 
Rhetoric and Dialectic. 
1 08 For a discussion of the role of rhetoric in the creation of the Renaissance courtier, see Stephen 
Greenblatt' s Renaissance Self-Fashioning. See also George Kennedy 's discussion of sprezzeratura in 
Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times . 
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of Italy, absolute monarchies continued to rule, while in England, the Parliament 
persisted in its efforts to wrest power incrementally from the crown. Thus, while rhetoric 
was a primary focus of Renaissance humanism, there is no question that as the cultural 
anxieties of the period multiplied, it came under the same kinds of scrutiny as did most 
other aspects of the culture. 
One way of viewing Renaissance rhetoric is as the evolution of style, particularly 
to the degree that it was associated with the humanist shift in emphasis from logic to 
textual analysis . The earliest focus for Renaissance rhetoric, a response to the recovery of 
ancient texts, was on an imitation of ancient eloquence in Latin, which remained the 
lingua franca throughout Europe well after the fall of the Roman empire. 109 The 
protohumanist Petrarch, who was perhaps better known in his own time for his 
annotations of classical authors than for the sonnets which form the basis of his modem 
reputation, lamented the deterioration of Latin style that had occurred during the Middle 
Ages and consciously imitated both Augustine and Seneca in both his prose and poetry. 
As the age progressed and more of Cicero's works were recovered and disseminated, his 
balanced periodic style, which was rich in tropes and figures, became the standard for 
eloquence. By the second half of the fifteenth century, some writers imitated Ciceronian 
style so slavishly that they refused to use any word form that could not be found in the 
works of Cicero. 1 10 The resulting backlash against Ciceronian eloquence has 
subsequently been named the anti-Ciceronian movement, and Bacon has often been 
considered a part of that movement. The emphasis on eloquence was not, however, 
109 For a brief discussion of the eloquence in the Renaissance, see Elaine Fantharn's  entry on "Eloquence" 
and Jean Dietz Moss's entry on "Rhetoric in Renaissance Language and Literature" in The Encyclopedia of 
Rhetoric. See also the chapters on Renaissance rhetoric in Thomas Conley's Rhetoric in the European 
Tradition. 
1 10 Erasmus, the great Dutch preacher, rhetorician, and author of handbooks on the arts of letter writing and 
preaching, composed a dialogue, Ciceronianus, critical of such slavish devotion to stylistic imitation. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the debates between the Ciceronians and anti-Ciceronians, see "Part I: History 
of the Controversies" in Izora Scott's English language edition of Ciceronian us. 
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confined to the use of Latin, but was extended to the vulgar languages as they began to be 
used for more sophisticated intellectual activities. In England, this concern with style in 
vernacular rhetoric is evident in the works of Henry Peacham (The Garden of Eloquence, 
1577) and George Puttenham (The Arte of English Poesie, 1589). The ornamental English 
style reached its zenith in the works of John Lyly (Euphues, Anatomy of a Wit, 1578, and 
Euphues and his England, 1580). For many, the euphuistic style came to represent the 
worst stylistic excesses. The plain style of the early modem period has largely been seen 
as a rejection of euphuistic excess. 1 1 1  The perception that Renaissance rhetoric is 
primarily concerned with "mere" style, however, belies the complexity of the rhetorical 
landscape of the Renaissance in general, and, in particular, the breadth of meaning 
associated with the concept of style. 
Eloquence, Prudence, and Practical Knowledge 
Histories of rhetoric that have portrayed Renaissance style as mere ornamentation 
have helped to obscure the nature of the early humanists' beliefs about the possibility of 
language to represent reality and to effect change in human affairs. For the humanists, 
style was not mere decoration, but was related to the belief in the possibility of language 
to represent shades of meaning, as well as to be a subtle marker of character. The 
textbook De copia, by Erasmus, the widely known Dutch preacher and rhetorical theory, 
demonstrates the ways in which a single phrase may be transmuted to convey more or 
less subtle shades of meaning. Eloquence, i.e., facility with style, was seen as a marker of 
character. In her discussion of Renaissance humanism, Hanna Gray explores the 
centrality of eloquence in both educational practice and in civic humanism. Gray seeks to 
account for the shift from the scholastics' concern with logic and metaphysics to an 
1 1 1  Bouwsma would likely argue that the history of  Renaissance rhetoric is not a move from Ciceronian 
rhetoric to plain style since the Senecan or Stoic influence existed throughout the Renaissance. See The 
Two Faces of Renaissance Humanism. 
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emphasis on the methods of rhetoric in terms of a shift in values and changing notions 
about the ends of knowledge and debate. For the Renaissance humanist, the goal of 
education was to equip the individual to lead a good life, and "the function of knowledge 
was not merely to demonstrate the truth of given precepts, but also to impel people 
toward their acceptance and application" (500). The common bond among humanists, 
according to Gray, is their interest in eloquence, which "endowed the precept with life, 
immediacy and persuasive effect, and which stimulated a man's will as well as informing 
his reason" ( 500- 1 ). Their understanding of eloquence was grounded in the traditions of 
classical rhetoric which provided "a body of precepts for the effective communication of 
ideas and, equally important, with a set of principles which asserted the central role of 
rhetorical skill and achievement in human affairs" (498) . For the Renaissance humanists, 
true eloquence, as opposed to sophistry, arose from "a harmonious union between 
wisdom and style; its aim was to guide men toward virtue and worthwhile goals, not to 
mislead them for vicious or trivial purposes" ( 498). In contrasting rhetoric to logic, ethics 
to metaphysics, literature to natural philosophy, and education to epistemology, the 
humanists were "contrasting a general and practical culture to the professional and 
academic activities and attitudes" of scholasticism (50 1 ). These humanist activities were 
grounded in assumptions about the relative importance of the vita activa as opposed to 
the vita contempliva, "the conviction that knowledge should serve practical ends, that 
human learning ought to have utility for human life, that education should instruct both 
the will and the intellect, and that in persuasion and eloquent discussion lie the effective 
means of conveying truth" (505). In an age as fraught with uncertainty as the 
Renaissance, the art of rhetoric was perhaps more essential than that of logic and 
metaphysics since, from ancient times, the function of rhetoric was "to argue over matters 
which presented alternative possibilities, problems about which different points of view 
could be maintained, questions open to debate because they could be judged only in 
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terms of probable truth and were not susceptible to scientific demonstrations of 
irrefutable validity" (505). 
Within the liberal arts tradition, eloquence was not merely facility with language, 
but an indicator of character as well. Janet Atwill summarizes the relationship between a 
liberal arts education and humanism in terms of the inculcation of values: 
Historically, the aim of a liberal arts education, in the most general terms, 
has been to inculcate a set of cultural values through texts and traditions 
believed to exemplify those values. In other words, the purpose of such an 
education has been to pass on "culture" - to transmit the values, 
practices, and institutions a culture believes to be its fabric and 
framework. The product of such an education would be the individual, a 
kind of normative subject, whose values and expectations conformed to 
those of the exemplars and traditions protected by the liberal arts. ( 1 )  
Central to humanism is the study of rhetoric, particularly rhetoric in the Roman tradition 
of Cicero and Quintilian, in which the ideal practice is the 'good man speaking well' ( vir 
bonus dicendi peritus) . 1 12 This belief in eloquence as a marker of character was a crucial 
element of Renaissance humanism, as the centrality of rhetoric in the curriculum 
suggests. 
Bacon and Stoic Style 
Bacon was considered an extraordinary orator in an age in which virtually all 
members of the upper and middle classes had some rhetorical training. 1 1 3 However, his 
1 12 The critical intersection between virtue and eloquence had been a commonplace s ince Cicero. See 
Atwill 's discussion in Rhetoric Reclaimed, 29-46. Recently, scholars have suggested that the "vir bonus," 
which comes from Quintilian, is based on the Stoic concept of the wise man or sage. See Arthur Walzer, 
"Quintilian's 'Vir Bonus' and the Stoic Wise Man." 
1 13 In his essay "Grammatica Movet'', Lawrence Green argues that even those who did not receive 
university training in rhetoric and its h istory were introduced to the elements of rhetorical style through 
their training in grammar. The Latin grammar books that were prominent throughout the era included 
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rhetorical practice was not of a piece with the ornate, euphuistic rhetoric of some of his 
contemporaries. As the excerpt from Ben Jonson's Timber at the beginning of this 
chapter suggests, Bacon's rhetoric was not valued merely for its aesthetic aspects, but for 
its "gravity," its neatness, and its lack of idleness and emptiness. Jonson, who himself 
greatly admired the style of the Stoics, 1 14 emphasized, too, the conciseness of his speech, 
which apparently was so tightly argued that his auditors could not "cough or looke aside 
from him without loss" (26). It is clear that Bacon's concern with language and discourse 
was not limited to his public oratorical performances, but is central to his philosophical 
project as well. He recognized that internal communication of the new philosophy among 
its practitioners was as critical to its advancement as was the external communication of 
these findings to a larger audience. He also believed that communication among the 
initiates was qualitatively different from communication with external audiences. While 
it was not uncommon for rhetorical theorists to make distinctions among various 
audiences and purposes, Bacon broadened his discursive theory to include uses of 
language that were not, in his view, primarily persuasive. 
There is no question that Bacon's most direct indebtedness to the Stoics is 
stylistic. 1 15 During the early part of this century, Morris Croll produced several studies 
arguing that several seventeenth-century writers-particularly Montaigne, Lipsius, and 
extensive examples of the rhetorical tropes and figures. See also Peter Mack's chapter on "Rhetoric in the 
Grammar School" in Elizabethan Rhetoric. 
1 14 See Robert C. Evans, Jonson, Lipsius and the Politics of Renaissance Stoicism, for an analysis of 
Jonson's appreciation of Stoic style and philosophy; see also Robert Adolph, The Rise of Modem Prose 
Style, who notes that "Jonson's famous praise of Bacon was adapted from a passage in Seneca the Elder 
{1 65)." 
1 15 The secondary literature on Baconian style is extensive and the debate is not without heat. See Croll, 
'" Attic Prose' in the Seventeenth Century," "Attic Prose: Lipsius, Montaigne, Bacon," and "The Baroque 
Style in Prose", as well as the anthology Style, Rhythm, and Essays. George Williamson seconded Croll 's 
argumenet in The Senecan Amble and "Senecan Style in the Seventeenth Century." Brian Vickers rejects 
the argument in Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose; as does Robert Adolf in The Rise of Modem Prose 
Style. The heat of the argument is not related to the question of Stoic influence on the style of Bacon and 
the others, but to the characterization of them as anti-Ciceronian. See also Stanley Fish, "Georgics of the 
Mind: The Experience of Bacon's Essays"; and A. C. Howell, "Res et Verba: Words and Things." 
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Bacon-imitate the style of the Stoics Tacitus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Croll places 
these writers within the anti-Ciceronian movement, and delineates the distinctions 
between the "oratorical" style, "invented" by the Sophist Gorgias and elaborated by 
Isocrates, and the plainer "essay" style of the Stoic writers. The oratorical style was 
"distinguished by the use of schemata verborum, or 'schemes,' as we might call them, 
which are chiefly similarities or repetitions of sound used as purely sensuous devices to 
give pleasure or aid the attention" ('" Attic Prose' in the Seventeenth Century" 54). The 
essay style lacks these figures, relying instead uponfigurae sententiae, "the figures of wit 
or thought" ( 54 ). The Stoics, in particular, valued. the figure antithesis. During the 
Renaissance and early modem periods, the Ciceronian movement reached its zenith in the 
euphuistic style of John Lyly. Ciceronian style was further characterized by long, 
balanced sentences, the phrases and sentences of which were fully connected to one 
another, in contrast to the shorter, disconnected sentences of the essay style. 
The Stoics followed Aristotle in being concerned with the rhetorical qualities of 
clarity, brevity, and appropriateness. Croll argues that the Stoics devalued clarity, i .e., 
"the exposition of objective reality, as in the statement of the facts and laws of natural 
science" (85) because the kind of "truth" they wanted to expose was 
moral and inward . . .  a reality not visible to the eye, but veiled from 
common observation; hidden in a shrine toward which one might win his 
way, through a jostling, noisy mob of illusory appearances, by a series of 
partial initiations. This kind of reality can never be quite portrayed, of 
course, because ultimate knowledge of the mystery of truth is never 
attained. But it is at least possible to depict the effort of the athletic and 
disciplined mind in its progress toward the unattainable goal. And this 
effort of the mind was the characteristic theme of the Stoics, and the object 
of their rhetorical art. Though by the rigor of their theory they were bound 
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to a cold passionless objectivity, they really aimed at a highly imaginative 
portrayal of their relations with truth; and even those who professed to 
strive for clearness, and in fact did so, could not resist the temptation to 
convey the ardor of their souls in brevities, suppression, and contortions of 
style which are in fact inconsistent with a primary devotion to the virtue of 
perspicuity. (85-86) 
Bacon expressed similar concerns about the virtue of clarity, or seeming clarity. The truth 
that Bacon wished to expose was not moral and inward, but the truth of ''things" or 
nature, which he felt was obscured by language. When knowledge was delivered in the 
form of continuous discourse (what he called Methods) i.e., in the way "best to be 
believed," he claimed that there resulted "a kind of contract of error between the deliverer 
and the receiver" because the deliverer does not reveal the way in which the knowledge 
was acquired, nor does the receiver find it necessary to inquire (De aug., PW 530). He 
preferred the cryptic, aphoristic style of the Stoics because it forced the auditor to try to 
assemble or add to the "broken" or incomplete knowledge that existed in his time. 
Brevity, according to Croll, is the virtue the Stoics most admired as a quality 
"almost necessarily involved in the attempt to portray exactly the immediate motions of 
the mind" (87). He suggests that throughout history, 
those which have aimed at the expression of individual experience have 
tended to break up the long musical periods of public discourse into short, 
incisive members, connected with each other by only the slightest of 
ligatures, each one carrying a stronger emphasis, conveying a sharper 
meaning than it would have if it were more strictly subordinated to the 
general effect of the whole period. Such a sty le is a protest against easy 
knowledge and the complacent acceptance of appearances. ("Attic Prose" 
87) 
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This affection for brevity is evidenced in the Stoic affection for sententiae, an affection 
which Bacon shared. He found a number of virtues associated with sententiae, or 
aphorisms: 
[B]ut that other delivery by aphorisms has many excellent virtues whereto 
the methodical delivery does not attain. First it tries the writer, whether he 
be light and superficial in his knowledge, or solid. For aphorisms, not to be 
ridiculous, must be made out of the pith and heart of sciences. For 
illustrations and excursion are cut off; variety of examples is cut off; 
deduction and connexion are cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off; so 
there is nothing left to make the aphorisms of but some good quantity of 
observation. And therefore a man will not be equal to the writing in 
aphorisms, nor indeed will he think of doing so, unless he feel that he is 
amply and solidly furnished for the work. (De aug., PW 53 1) 
The virtue of appropriateness is, according to Croll, the most puzzling of the Stoic 
virtues of style. Appropriateness, for the Stoics, had two aspects, appropriateness as to 
thing and person. Appropriateness to thing was simply defined, although that definition 
perhaps opens up whole avenues of disagreement. Lipsius, writing about Stoic style in 
the late sixteenth century, suggests that appropriateness to thing meant that "everything is 
said for the sake of the argument" and that "the vesture of sentence and phrase exactly 
fits the body of the thing described" (qtd. in Croll, "Attic Prose" 88). Appropriateness to 
person was related to appropriateness to audience as well as to the speaker. Here Croll 
contrasts Stoic rhetoric to Aristotelian rhetoric that places primary emphasis upon the 
appropriateness of discourse to the audience. For the Stoics, however, primary 
importance was placed on the "exact interpretation in one's expression of the mode of 
one's thought" (89). This, again, is related to the goal of style as the presentation of the 
action of the mind of the speaker. 
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The secrets of nature are made known only to attentive and collected 
minds, prepared by a long preliminary training in habits of exclusion and 
rejection; and even to them but partially, and in moments of rare 
illumination. A style appropriate to the mind of the speaker, therefore, is 
one that portrays the process of acquiring the truth rather than the secure 
possession of it, and expresses ideas not only with clearness and brevity, 
but also with the ardor in which they were first conceived. (89) 
Thus, Croll argues, Stoic rhetoric must be characterized not by the sensuous schemes of 
oratory, but the "figures of wit," chief of which were antithesis, "as a means of 
expressing striking and unforeseen relations between the objects of thought" (90) and 
points (argutiae). These two figures are the primary means employed in condensation of 
argumentation in sententiae and aphorism (89-90). 
Colish notes that Stoic literary style is based on the notion that language is a 
natural sign. For the Stoics, a work must be mimetic and must conform to nature and to 
truth, lest it "distort the natural function of language" (1 : 58). The same holds true for 
rhetoric, according to Colish: 
In the realm of rhetoric the Stoics elaborate five basic canons of style: 
purity of language; clarity and distinctness; conciseness, even tending 
toward paratactic constructions; the avoidance of inaccuracy, 
colloquialism, barbarism, and solecism; and appropriateness of style. 
Appropriateness of style means its appropriateness to the subject matter, in 
the light of which the speaker should select his figures and should decide 
whether to employ high, middle, or low style. (1 :59) 
Coli sh argues that in Stoic literary theory, there is no need to consider the ethos of the 
audience in selecting style because the speaker addresses the audience's logos which is 
the same for all. She recognizes the irony that the Roman Stoics, who were not 
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particularly interested in speculating about physical correlatives to logic and ethics 
created "the most eloquent literary expression to a theory of style in which the logos of 
physics and the logos of ethics are so integrally related with the logos of language" (I :60). 
Certainly, it seems to be the case that Bacon's concept of language attempted a similarly 
comprehensive, integrated system, although the impetus for Bacon was to create a 
wholistic system that could complement the deficiencies of language itself. 
Bacon's preference for sententiae and aphorisms is related to the Stoic preference 
for brevity. Perhaps the greatest correspondence between Stoic linguistic philosophy and 
Bacon's is the sense of the important connection between the cognitive process and its 
expression: 
But knowledge that is to be delivered to others as a thread to be spun on 
ought to be insinuated (if it were possible) in the same method wherein it 
was originally invented. And this indeed is possible in knowledge gained 
by induction; but in this same anticipated and premature knowledge (which 
is in use) a man cannot easily say how he came to knowledge which he has 
obtained. Yet certainly it is possible for a man in a greater or less degree to 
revisit his own knowledge and trace over again both the footsteps of his 
cognition and consent; and by that means to transplant it into another mind 
just as it grew in his own. (De aug. PW 530). 
Bacon's  description of language which reflects the process through which knowledge 
was obtained is remarkably similar to Seneca' s advice in response to Lucullus' s criticism 
of a philosopher' s  style: 
Suppose, now, that your statement is true-that he pours forth rather than 
places his words; let me however, tell you at the start that this trait of 
which you speak has a peculiar charm, and that it is a grace appropriate to 
a smoothly-gliding style. For I maintain, it matters a great deal whether it 
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tumbles forth or flows along . . . .  Fabianus seems to me to have not so 
much an "efflux" as a "flow" of words; so copious is it, without confusion, 
and yet not without speed. This is indeed what his style declares and 
announces-that he has not spent a long time in working the matter over 
and twisting it into shape . . . .  the man was building up character rather 
than words, and was writing those words for the mind rather than for the 
ear . . . .  But certainly whenever I heard him lecture such did his work seem 
to me-not solid but full, the kind which would inspire young men of 
promise and rouse their ambition to become like him, without making 
them hopeless of surpassing him . . . . (Epistles III, C. 8, 12) 
For Seneca, the artfully crafted language of the Ciceronians diminished the direct impact 
of the speaker upon the audience. In this passage, Seneca is concerned that the speaker's 
character is able to be imitated his auditors, whereas Bacon is concerned that the 
speaker's knowledge-making process be what is imitated. 
The Stoic emphasis on language as process is based, to a degree on their own 
perceived understanding of the gap between verba and res and the belief that things 
matter more than words, particularly in philosophical matters : 
One should not, however, bestow very much attention upon mere words. 
Let this be the kernel of my idea; let us say what we feel, and feel what we 
say; let speech harmonize with life . . . . .  Are you concerned about words? 
Rejoice this instant if you can cope with things. (Seneca Epistles II, 
LXXV.4,8) 
Style as Method in Bacon 's Works 
Despite the apparently great differences between Bacon's plain style and the 
copious rhetoric of the Renaissance humanists, they share certain fundamental 
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assumptions about the importance of style. Both believed that style was more than mere 
ornamentation. The fact that Bacon advocates a plain style for natural philosophy does 
not mean that style is unimportant. As Jeanne Fahnestock points out in her examination 
of Rhetorical Figures in Science, a plain style is a style nonetheless. Bacon's taxonomy 
of styles suggests, in fact, that Bacon related style to different kinds of mental effort just 
as he based his division of the sciences upon the faculties. In addition to a belief in the 
importance of sty le, Bacon also seems to share with the Renaissance humanists the 
assumption that reading is a prudent or deliberative act. 
Bacon's new method, which purports to be a kind of inductive logic, is itself 
based on the rhetorical trope antithesis. Fahnestock argues that the rhetorical tropes act as 
organizing principles for ways of thinking. She calls them "epitomes of durable lines of 
argument" ( 40). Antithesis is one of the most fruitful of these tropes because setting one 
thing against the other in effect forces the auditor to make choices between them. 
Bacon's method, which he describes as "a process of exclusion and rejection" relies 
heavily on antithesis. He applies his method by compiling tables in which a given 
characteristic, such as heat or cold, is either present or absent. Fahnestock argues that 
Bacon's method is derived from rhetorical practice: 
[F] or all his gesturing about departing from the methods of the ancients, 
[it] is still topical and, given the relation between the figures and the 
topics, it is essentially figural as well. In particular, Bacon demonstrates 
how existing or acceptable pairs of contraries, fitted into a syntactic frame, 
can invite the invention of new arguments and direct the search for new 
sources of evidence. Thus, it is possible to say that Bacon's empirical 
method of inquiry is in a sense figure-driven, and that given his 
epistemological commitment to the aphorism, he was predisposed to 
package both his arguments and his observations in epitomes such as the 
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antithesis. Far from turning his back on the rhetorical tradition, he in fact 
tapped its conceptual resources epitomized in the figures. ( 65) 
Bacon would perhaps argue that the fact that his empirical method is figure-driven 
merely demonstrates the universality of his method. It is more likely, that it demonstrates 
the degree to which he was immersed in the rhetorical and textual practices of the 
humanists. However, there is no question that Bacon did resituate rhetoric within a larger 
and more complex framework, and one that draws heavily on Stoic linguistic philosophy. 
Linguistic Theory 
Bacon addresses matters of language in Book VI of De augmentis, in which he 
discusses the "Art of Transmission . . .  or of producing and expressing to others those 
things which have been invented, judged, and laid up in the memory" (PW 52 1 ). The 
general Art of Transmission includes "all the arts which relate to words or discourse," but 
he argues that "reason [is] the soul of discourse, yet in the handling of them reason and 
discourse should be kept separate" (52 1) .  He includes three divisions of the Art of 
Transmission: first, the Organ of Discourse, or Grammar, which he subdivides according 
to speech and writing and which is of two sorts, literary and philosophical; second, the 
Method of Discourse, or the Wisdom of Transmission, is divided into the "different kinds 
of methods [with] their advantages and disadvantages"; and third, "the Illustration of 
Discourse, which is the Art of Rhetoric" (52 1) .  This division differs from the traditional 
humanist curriculum in a number of ways. First, the humanist liberal arts tradition 
included grammar, rhetoric, and poetics, the last of which Bacon elevates to a much 
higher level according to his distribution of learning according to the faculties. Second, 
Bacon allots judgment to logic, or to his philosophical method, rather than to rhetoric. 
Finally, Bacon resituates rhetoric as a subordinate part of philosophy rather than valuing 
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it as an art equivalent to and sometimes more useful than philosophy as did the 
humanists. 
Grammar, or the Organ of Discourse 
Bacon begins his discussion of the Arts of Transmission with grammar, which he 
divides into two parts relating to speech and writing following Aristotle's dictum that 
"words are the image of thought and letters are the image of words" (521) .  However, he 
digresses with a discussion of what he calls the "Organ of Transmission" that, he says, 
"has other children besides Words and Letters" (521). These other children are 
hieroglyphics and pictographs, as well as human sign language. Bacon calls these "real 
characters, not nominal; characters, I mean, which represent neither letters nor words, 
but things and notions" (521-22). He calls these characters "Notes of Things" and says 
they are of two types: "ex congrua where the note has some congruity with the notion, 
the other ad placitum, where it is adopted and agreed upon at pleasure" (522) . Bacon's 
recognition of a difference between characters that are "real, not nominal" and letters, as 
well as his differentiation of characters as congruent and conventional seems to be related 
to the distinction he makes between literary and philosophical grammar. Literary 
grammar is for the purpose of learning everyday languages more quickly and speaking 
them more purely and correctly (523). Philosophical grammar, however, ought to inquire 
regarding "the analogy between words and things, or reason" (523). 
This notion that some aspects or types of language are more congruent with things 
than others is also reflected in Bacon's notion of an uncontaminated, prelapsarian 
language in which words and things were perfectly congruent. This prelapsarian language 
was made possible by "knowledge of nature, by the light whereof man discerned of every 
living creature, and imposed names according to their propriety" (Filum labyrinthi, PW 
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209). 1 16 Bacon's view of a pure prelapsarian language is, of course, consistent with 
Christian theology, but it also conforms with Stoic view that language is a natural sign: 
"Language is sound; it is material and corporeal; and it has a direct and natural 
correlation with the physical realities which it signifies" (Colish 1 :56). Consequently, the 
Stoics spurned neologisms as linguistically less authentic than older words. 
Bacon also follows the Stoics in several technical aspects of linguistic philosophy, 
which made distinctions among words, speech, and internal language. Although the 
Stoics are said to have made significant contributions to the traditional grammar that was 
transmitted from the Hellenistic period to the Middle Ages and Renaissance, there are no 
extant grammatical texts from the period. Blank and Atherton argue that Stoic 
grammatical theory must be derived from the various parts of dialectic. Grammatical 
theory regarding parts of speech, for example, are related to the subsection of dialectic 
concerned with "voice" while syntax was concerned with a different part of dialectic 
(314). Diogenes Laertius says that the Stoics distinguish between utterance and speech 
and between ·saying and voicing: 
Utterance and speech are different, because vocal sound is also an 
utterance but only articulated sound is speech. And speech is different 
from language, because language is always significant, but speech can 
lack significance, e.g. blituri, whereas language is not so at all. 
Furthermore, saying is different from voicing. For utterances are voiced 
but it is states of affairs which are said-they, after all, are actually 
sayables. (Diogenes Laertius 7. 57) 
According to Diogenes Laertius, "Impression leads the way; then thought, which is able 
to speak, expresses in discourse what it experiences as a result of the impression" (Long 
1 1 6 See Stillman's discussion of Bacon' s  views of an Adamic language in New Phi losophy and Universal 
Language 98ff. 
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HP Vol. 1 33D). Discourse is made possible by that class of incorporeals, the sayables 
(lekta). Stoic linguistic philosophy is the first to recognize and elaborate upon the 
difference between linguistic and grammatical meaning, a difference which is based in 
the Stoic dichotomy between form and force. The Stoics made a distinction between the 
material aspects of language-which included both the thing to which a word referred 
and the word itself, or utterance-and its meaning, i.e., the idea the word denoted. A 
word must be associated with what the Stoics called a "movement of thought," which 
they called a lekta, or sayable. Seneca describes the difference between words and lekta 
in this way: 
There are [ the Stoic says] bodily substances: for instance, this is a man, 
and this is a horse. These are accompanied by movements of thought 
which can make enunciations about bodies. These movements have a 
property peculiar to themselves, which is separate from bodies. For 
example, I see Cato walking: sense-perception has revealed this, and my 
mind has believed it. What I see is a body, and it is to a body that I have 
directed my eyes and mind. Then I say, "Cato is walking." What I now 
utter (he says) is not a body, but a certain enunciation about a body, which 
some call a proposition, others a thing enunciated, and others a thing said. 
(Letters 1 1 7 . 1 3) 
According to Sextus Empiricus, Stoics place the issue of truth within the sphere of what 
he calls "the signification." 
The Stoics defended the . . .  opinion . . .  that three things are linked 
together, "the signification", "the signifier", and "the name-bearer". The 
signifier is an utterance, for instance "Dion"; the signification is the actual 
state of affairs revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it 
subsists in accordance with our thoughts . . .  ; the name-bearer is the 
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external object, for instance Dion himself. Of these, two are bodies-the 
utterance and the name-bearer; but one is incorporeal-the state of affairs 
signified and sayable, which is true or false. (Against the Professors 8 . 1 1 -
12) 
It is on this theory that Stoic linguistic philosophy, which can be subdivided into 
grammar, dialectic (logic), and rhetoric, is based. Bacon's description of grammar and his 
anxiety about the gap between word and thing suggest that he shared a similar 
understanding of language. 
Methods of Discourse 
Though the early Stoics were concerned with speaking well, their rhetorical 
theory, at least until the late imperial period, seems relat_ively undeveloped. Diogenes 
Laertius says that for the Stoics, rhetoric is "the science of speaking well in regard to 
continuous discourses" (7.41 [ HP 3 1  A]). Plutarch also suggests that Stoic rhetoric, at 
least according to Chrysippus, was concerned with "continuous discourse and its 
arrangement," and says that the speaker should be concerned not with appropriate speech 
but with delivery as well. However, he points out that Chrysippus later eschewed the use 
of many rhetorical figures and tropes. (HP 3 1H [On Stoic self-contradictions 1 047 A-B]). 
The second part of Bacon's Art of Transmission, which he calls "Methods of 
Discourse," offers a unique typology of genres. Aristotle, for example, sorted rhetoric 
according to its purpose--epideictic, forensic, or deliberative-and also according to 
levels of style-high, midlde, and low-which should be fitted to the occasion. Bacon 
classifies his types of discourse according to their auditors. The first pair, "Magistral" and 
"Initiative" discourse, are both related to learning: magistral aims to teach crowds of 
learners; Initiative attempts to spur the adept to seek deeper knowledge. 
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The magistral method teaches; the initiative intimates. The magistral 
requires that which is told should be believed; the initiative that it should 
be examined. The one transmits knowledge to the crowd of learners; the 
other to sons, as it were, of science. The end of the one is the use of 
knowledges, as they now are; of the other the continuation and further 
progression of them. (De aug. , PW 530). 
A second pair, which Bacon says are related to Magistral and Initiative but "in reality 
almost contrary" are exoteric and acroamatic. These are intended to "separate the vulgar 
among the auditors from the select" (531). While he does not describe exoteric discourse 
except to say that it is the more open of the two, the intention of acroamatic discourse is 
"by obscurity of delivery to exclude the vulgar . . .  from the secrets of knowledge, and to 
admit those only who have received the interpretation of the enigmas through the hands 
of teachers, or have wits of such sharpness and discernment as can pierce the veil" (531). 
It is likely that Bacon is referring here to hermetical texts, as well as some ancient texts. 
A third pair is "methods" and "aphorisms". Aphorisms are the short, pithy 
constructions that are often associated with Bacon's writing. Ideally, they are the 
distillation of intense and prolonged observation (induction). The value of aphorisms is 
that they "represent only portions and, as it were fragment of knowledge, [ and] invite 
others to contribute and add something in their turn" (531 ). In contrast, methods are 
continuous discourse, that is, compositions that include assertions with proof to back 
them up. Methods "many times carry a shot of I know not what excellent art, which if 
they were taken to pieces, separated, and stripped, would shrink to little or nothing . . . 
they [are] fit to win consent or belief, but of little use to give directions for practice" 
(531 ). Bacon suggests that these discursive methods ought only be used to "remove 
strong preoccupation's and prejudgments" (531-2). To summarize, then, magistral 
discourse and methods are used to obtain adherence or belief; initiative discourse and 
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aphorisms are used among "experts" to provide a structure for continuing investigation of 
natural history. Bacon uses both these discursive modes in his Great Instauration as a 
means of realizing his goals of commencing "a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and 
all human knowledge" (PW241). It is primarily because of these latter forms of 
discourse, which contrast so sharply with the copious rhetoric of his age, that Bacon is 
considered to be the father of modem discursive practices. 
Bacon's distinction between aphorisms and continuous discourse is one he shares 
with Stoic rhetorical theory. According to Plutarch, Chrysippus was opposed to the 
elaborate style that was focused on figures of speech: 
He defines rhetoric as an expertise concerned with the order of continuous 
speech and its arrangement. Furthermore, in book I he has even written the 
following: "I think one should cultivate not just a frank and unaffected 
order but also, apart from the speech, the appropriate kinds of delivery in 
relation to the fitting tones of voice, facial expressions and gestures." Yet 
after being so ambitious about speech here, he says again in the same 
book, when discussing hiatus, that we should not only ignore hiatus and 
stick to what is better, but we should also ignore various kinds of unclarity, 
ellipses and - in heaven's name - solecisms, of which numerous others 
would be ashamed. (On Stoic self-contradictions 1047A-B) 
The Stoic who is, perhaps, best known for his use of the aphorisms, or sententiae, is 
Tacitus, the Roman historian whom Bacon greatly admired. 1 17 Patrick Sinclair, in his 
examination of the use of sententiae in the works of Tacitus and other Roman Stoics, 
examines how Seneca demonstrates the value of aphorisms ( or precepts or sententiae) in 
an educational project. Seneca sets up a relationship between a philosopher/praeceptor 
who "attempts to elucidate the the occurrences of daily life and history in conformity 
1 17 In "Attic Prose: Lips ius, Montaigne, Bacon," Croll identifies Bacon' s  style as Tacitean. 
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with general Stoic doctrine" (9 1 ), and a philosophical novice who needs instruction in the 
obligations of Stoic sapientia: 
Seneca' s preceptor-student relationship in fact sets up a model that can 
illluminate important aspects of [the preceptor's] use of sententiae to 
communicate his policies on particular issues and events, to instruct 
Roman citizens about the broader vision behind those policies, and to 
define the relation of the individual and the social orders to his 
government and to political life in general. For [the] sententiae do in fact 
comprise a political 'De rerum natura' in [the] narrative. (9 1 )  
This relationship between preceptor and student precisely mirrors Bacon's use of 
aphorisms as the ideal form for philosophical communication, since they are the distilled 
essence of wisdom. 
Rhetoric 
Although Bacon found the humanist emphasis on texts and rhetoric to be one of 
the most serious deficiencies of learning, he did not dismiss rhetoric out of hand as 
Ramus did. While he recognized the propensity for speech to mislead, he also saw the 
need for an art of persuasion. Bacon ranked eloquence inferior to wisdom, but called it a 
"science both excellent in itself, and excellently laboured" ( Adv., PW 534-35). Following 
his division of learning according to the "faculties of the rational soul," he allied rhetoric 
with the imagination: "Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic is to the 
understanding,; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked into, is no other 
than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to imagination, in order to excite the 
appetite and will" (535). Rhetoric acts with logic and moral philosophy to strengthen 
reason: "For the end of logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to 
entrap it; the end likewise of moral philosophy is to procure the affections to fight on the 
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side of reason, not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is to till the imagination with 
observations and images, to second reason and not to oppress it" (535). Bacon's division 
of the faculties is like that of other Renaissance Stoics. According to A. H. T. Levi, the 
scholastic model of faculty psychology was based on Augustine's introduction of the 
concept of voluntas or will. "The _scholastics made the voluntas, together with the 
intellectus and the memoria, into 'faculties' of the soul, really distinct from the soul and 
from one another. Acts were specified by their objects, and faculties were specified by 
their acts. The acts of the intellectus were specified by the true, and those of the voluntas 
by the good" (93). The problem for the scholastics was how to account for acts that were 
both cognitive and volitive, e.g., an act of faith, or rational choice. Cognitive acts, 
because they refer to a standard of truth, could not be free; acts of the will, however, may 
be made without reference to the "truth." According to Levi, Lipsius's generation 
imported into the scholastic model of faculty psychology the Stoic doctrine that "the 
passions were based on or constituted false judgements [sic], and that the 'ratio' of the 
Stoics, necessarily right, because divine, had become in the scholastics subject to error" 
(94). This version of faculty psychology is compatible with Bacon's description of the 
way rhetoric works· as an assistant to reason to strengthen the will: 
Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic is to the 
understanding; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked 
into, is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to the 
imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will. For we see that the 
government of reason is assailed and disordered in three ways; either by 
the illaqueation of sophisms, which pertains to Logic; or by juggleries of 
words, which pertain to Rhetoric; or by the violence of the Passions, which 
pertains to Ethics. For as in negotiations with others men are usually 
wrought either by cunning or by importunity, or by vehemency; so 
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likewise in this negotiation within ourselves, we are either undermined by 
fallacies of arguments, or solicited and importuned by assiduity of 
impressions and observations, or agitated and transported by violence of 
passions. And yet the nature of men is not so unfortunately built, as that 
those arts and faculties should have power to disturb reason, and now 
power to strengthen or establish it; on the contrary they are of much more 
use that way. For the end of logic is to secure a form of reason, and not to 
entrap it; the end likewise of moral philosophy is to procure the affections 
to fight on the side of reason, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is to 
fill the imagination with observations and images, to second reason and 
not to oppress it. (De aug. , PW 535) 
There are no Stoic rhetorical treatises extant, but Diogenes Laertius describes the 
differences between rhetoric and dialectic: 
[T]he logical part is divided into two sciences, rhetoric and dialectic . . . .  
rhetoric since it deals with the art of speaking well in regard to continuous 
discourses; and dialectic, since it is the science of correct discussion in 
regard to discourses conducted by question and answer, so they also define 
it as the art of what is true and false and neither. (7.41-4) 
According to Sextus Empiricus, Zeno of Citium described the difference between rhetoric 
and dialectic in terms of brevity and copiousness: 
When Zeno of Citium was asked how dialectic differs from rhetoric, he 
clenched his fist and spread it out again, and said, "like this" -
characterizing compactness and brevity as the hallmark of dialectic by the 
clenching, and hinting at the breadth of rhetorical ability through the 
outspread and extension of his fingers. (HP 31  F) 
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There are echos of both these notions of rhetoric in Bacon's Arts of Transmission, 
particularly in the notion that brevity is related to epistemology, while continuous 
discourse is related to persuasion. 
James Stephens argues that Bacon follows Aristotle in describing rhetoric as a 
moral art and classifying it according to audience. However, Bacon corrects Aristotle in 
several significant areas, including the role of imagination and the inconsistency of 
Aristotelian logic. Perhaps most significantly, Stephens argues, Bacon "seeks to correct 
Aristotle's error in reducing style, the only function which rhetoric serves exclusively, to 
a 'minor' and ' vulgar' accessory. The only way to reform rhetoric is to grant the 
importance _of style and then re-work it as a philosophical ornament which transcends 
mere ornament" (Francis Bacon and the Style of Science 249). Stephens identifies three 
doctrines that distinguish Bacon's approach to rhetoric from that of Aristotle : the 
psychology of discovery, which considers the relationship between audience and the 
content of scientific communication; his theory regarding the relationship between style 
and scientific method, which examines how human emotions are exploited "in the 
interest of reason;" and the doctrine of "literate experience," which explores the special 
relationship between rhetoric and philosophy (Francis Bacon and the Style of Science 
56). Stephens has not, however, examined the importance of Stoicism as an influence on 
Bacon's "corrections" of Aristotle, a topic which remains relatively unexplored. 
Williamson and Croll, who have certainly catalogued the stylistic similarities between 
Bacon's prose and that of Stoic authors Seneca and Tacitus, have not gone much farther 
to demonstrate a connection between philosophy and rhetoric, either in Stoic or Baconian 
thought. Vickers and Robert Adolph have, in fact, rejected Croll's and Williamson's 
thesis regarding Bacon's imitation of Senecan or Tacitean prose sty le. In Francis Bacon 
and Renaissance Prose, Vickers argues essentially that Bacon borrows from many 
different styles and deploys his borrowings according to his own purposes. Thus, it is 
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inappropriate to limit him merely to Stoic style. Adolph argues that what appears to be 
Stoic in Bacon's style is a rather a reflection of Bacon's own utilitarian philosophy (47-
48). 
There are valid reasons to reject arguments that Bacon was a neo-Stoic. Not the 
least of these is Bacon's overt criticism of certain elements of Stoic philosophy, criticism 
that may be related to his perpetual efforts to curry favor with James 1. 1 1 8 Moreover, 
although Bacon seems always willing to mine the works of classical authors for wise 
sayings and pithy aphorisms, he is seldom so eager to give them credit as his intellectual 
antecedents, preferring instead to cast his project as a wholly new creation. Nevertheless, 
Stoicism is arguably the source of several important aspects of Bacon's linguistic 
philosophy and rhetorical practice. And, while it would be inaccurate to suggest that 
Bacon's philosophy precisely mirrors Stoicism, it is clear that this ancient philosophy 
provides a model for the sort of synthetic, comprehensive philosophical system that he 
hoped to create. Rather than rejecting rhetoric as the Jonesian thesis suggests, Bacon's 
reform of education preserves both rhetoric and "a kind of logic" within an expanded 
educational scheme. That reorganization is based on values that are compatible with the 
Stoic strain of humanism, which attempted to negotiate a path between the creation story 
and the Hellenistic principle of the immanent rationality of the university. Ideas from 
Stoic philosophy regarding the relationship between nature and the human mind are 
certainly a basis for Bacon's theories regarding education, rhetoric, and philosophy and 
1 1 8 See J. H. M. Salmon, "Stoicism and Roman Example: Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England." 
Salmon examines the ways in which a group of rebellious Elizabethan and early Stuart courtiers, including 
Sidney and Essex, attempted to use Stoic philosophy to justify shifting authority from the monarch to the 
aristocracy. It is possible that Bacon's objections to certain aspects of Stoicism reflect his desire to avoid 
any hint of anti-monarchialism. His complaints about the Stoics focused primarily on their moral 
philosophy, particularly on their preoccupation with death. However, Bacon continued to admire much 
about the Stoics, especially Tacitus. See Edwin Benjamin's discussion of this admiration in "Bacon and 
Tacitus." 
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provide a means for uniting these arts within a comprehensive epistemological 
framework. 
Style as Process in the lnstauratio Magno 
Although Bacon ostensibly intended his Jnstauratio magno as a philosophical 
text, it is clearly a rhetorical text. He addresses multiple audiences and his goals are 
complex. Among the ends Bacon articulated for the Jnstauratio magno, three are of 
primary importance: first, to acquaint humankind with the obstacles that stand in the way 
of true knowledge of the world; second, to lay out a plan for achieving a more perfect 
understanding; and third, to develop an "active science" in which human power is 
supported upon human knowledge of nature. Thus, Bacon's project was to move from an 
active life in which subjective concerns obscured true vision and understanding, through 
a contemplative phase in which better understanding is gained, to a new and more 
powerful active life supported upon true and objective knowledge of the world. As his 
introduction to that great work, the Novum organum purports to be anything but a piece 
of mere rhetoric, but not even the most well-disposed auditor would make such an 
intellectual leap except under the influence of powerful persuasion. However, Bacon is 
true to his representation of rhetoric as the "appl[ication] of reason to the imagination for 
a better moving of the will." Bacon's persuasive action in the Jnstauratio magno and 
Novum organum is a stylistic representation of the intellectual journey he hopes that his 
auditors will take. It moves from a more copious style resembling humanist rhetoric to 
his own plain sty le, from methods, or continuous discourse to aphorisms, and from 
magistral to initiative discourse, from action and subjectivity to contemplation and 
objectivity. 
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Bacon opens the Preface to the lnsauratio magno in a rhetorical style similar to 
that of his humanist counterparts. He not only uses copious language, such as doubling, 
and figures of sound that are more often seen in the oratorical style, he also uses extended 
metaphors, similes, and analogy. He compares his work to the establishment of a new 
edifice for learning. This new edifice will replace the crumbling, decaying temple of 
learning whose foundation rests not on the natural world but on the flawed wisdom of the 
ancients. Charles Whitney has explored at length how this metaphor "suggest[ s] the 
restoratio nor re-edification of King Solomon's Temple of Jerusalem [to invoke] the 
Christian process of spiritual edification toward salvation" (23). But the word 
"instauration" has a double meaning, and signifies also a new beginning. Bacon never 
clearly articulates which meaning he intends and, according to Whitney, he does so 
advisedly : 
As a lover of allegory and secret codes, Bacon never explained what he 
meant by instauration, or why he continued to use this word so 
exclusively . . . .  the word's doubleness of meaning (restoration/new 
beginning) embraces many of the paradoxes of change with which Bacon 
is deeply concerned. (23) 
And surely this is the case. But it is also typical of Bacon's rhetoric to leave issues of this 
sort unresolved so that the audience is forced to continue to ponder the paradox and, if 
Bacon is successful, to seek a resolution for the mystery . Even as Bacon sets forth this 
paradox, he offers a means of pursuing its resolution. If the reader adopts his method, i.e., 
if the reader moves from the copious rhetoric of the humanists to a simple inductive 
practice as it is demonstrated in this text, the answer may ultimately become cleat. The 
Preface of the Jnstauratio magno begins with as copious a metaphor as any humanist 
rhetorician ever articulated, an emblem of learning as "Scylla, who had the head and face 
of a virgin, but her womb was hung round with barking mnosters, from which she could 
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not be delivered" (PW 243). This use of simile is in striking contrast to Bacon's 
discursive style at the end of the Preface when he insists that "all this depends on keeping 
the eye steadily fixed on the facts of nature and so receiving her images simply as they 
are" (253). 
The movement from familiar literary style to Baconian plain style is echoed in the 
movement from familiar methods of continuous discourse to cryptic aphoristic discourse 
that characterizes the publication as a whole. The Preface takes the form of an argument 
with assertions, and while Bacon may give this style of argumentation his own flavor, it 
certainly is one that would have been familiar to his audience. As he progresses to the 
body of the Novum Organum, he abandons this discursive form and begins to set forth 
his argument in ahporisms. In doing so, he hopes to move his audience from their old 
rhetorical habits to his new method. A similar rhetorical movement is discernible 
between the two books of the Novum organum. There is a clear difference between the 
language and arguments of these two books. They are both presented in aphorisms, but 
the first book is clearly directed at those who have yet to be persuaded to embrace the 
inductive study of nature. In fact, Bacon is quite clear that his purpose in this first book is 
to prepare the minds of his audience for his new method. Book One is arguably what 
Bacon called magistral discourse, i.e., discourse that "transmits knowledge to the crowd 
of learners," that teaches," and that "requires that which is told should be believed." 
Book Two is initiative discourse that "intimates the new work that the convicted hearer 
should now begin. 1 19 
In attempting to establish his new philsophy, Bacon is struggling against both 
scholastic dialectic and humanist rhetoric. It is the hide-bound forms of the scholastics 
that, in his view, constrict the current state of human knowledge, that keep it, like Scylla, 
1 19 In fact, even Book Two retains some elements of continuous discourse. Only some of the more obscure 
texts are genuinely aphoristic. 
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from bearing fruit. But he is equally contemptuous of the subjectivity of the humanists 
whose rhetoric, he believes, obscure humanity's vision of nature, the deserving object of 
its attention. He subverts both these discourses to his own ends. Eloquence is consumed 
by plain style, syllogistic reasoning by aphoristic induction, and the gaze is turned from 
the subject of the self and language, to the object of nature. 
Bacon's Rhetoric as a Balance Between Prudence and Skepticism 
Ramus' s realignment of rhetoric and dialectic was probably less influential than 
many twentieth-century histories of rhetoric have suggested, but there is little doubt that 
the art of rhetoric became increasingly less influential during the period. In Rhetoric, 
Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance, Victoria Kahn traces a trajectory of 
decline, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, in the confidence regarding 
rhetoric's potential to move others to right action. Key to understanding the trajectory of 
Renaissance rhetoric, Kahn argues, is the contradiction inherent in the humanist attempt 
to reconcile the ideological and epistemological inconsistencies among Christianity, 
Ciceronian prudential rhetoric, and the practice of arguing both sides of a question (in 
untramque partem) that was a legacy of medieval Academic skepticism. 1 20 Quattrocento 
humanists 
are united by their faith in the compatibility of Christianity, prudential 
rhetoric and Academic skepticism and they believe that the Academic 
skeptic's way of arguing in utramque partem can be used to support their 
ethic of decorum. Contradiction for these authors is not a logical scandal, 
but a sign of rhetorical possibility. Skepticism is conceived of not as a 
threatening relativism, but as an occasion for action. (27) 
120 Aguing in utramque partem was not limited to the skeptics, but is as old as the art of rhetoric itself and 
was the principal instructional strategy of the Sophists of ancient Greece. 
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These humanists saw the capability of arguing on either side of a question as liberating, . 
as evidence for the possibility of change. The impossibility of theoretical knowledge of 
God provides for the possibility of free will and also determines that practical certainty 
was the only degree of certainty available to human beings. Practical certainty resulted 
from social and linguistic custom and convention, consensus omnium, so that the arts of 
politics, philology, and rhetoric were seen to be "analogous and inseparable" (27). 
As the Renaissance progressed, humanists such as Erasmus, Montaigne, and 
Hobbes, became increasingly less certain about the efficacy of rhetoric. Kahn argues that 
"at the same time that their texts reveal an awareness of the ideal alliance of rhetoric and 
prudence, their rhetorical strategies prove to be symptomatic of an increasing anxiety of 
skepticism about the power of rhetoric to persuade to right action" (27). These later 
humanists become more concerned with examining the possibility of persuasion itself, 
than with attempting to persuade their readers to right action: 
By emphasizing the problematic nature of interpretation, they force us to 
reflect on the relationship between interpretive and ethical practice, the 
practice of reading and practical reason. Thus, while they instruct us in the 
complexities of the humanist rhetorical and pragmatic conception of 
literature, they also allow us to perceive the shifting status of prudential 
rhetoric in the Renaissance and its eventual decline. (28) 
According to Kahn' s narrative of the trajectory of rhetoric, by the middle of the 
seventeenth century when Hobbes was writing, rhetoric was a virtual "outcast from the 
commonwealth" (28). Unlike the Quattrocento humanists, whose religious beliefs and 
stable society allowed them to reconcile the inconsistencies between prudence and 
skepticism, Hobbes lived in an age in which epistemological certainty had been 
undermined on all fronts: religious, political, and social . Thus he attempted "to invent a 
new language of certainty, a sovereign logic that will effectively exclude all further 
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rhetoric in utramque partem" ( 1 54). He sought to distinguish between "a rhetoric of 
probability, opinion, and experience on the one hand, and a logic of universal truths on 
the other; between a prudential and a scientific method; or between a rhetoric in 
utramque partem and a logic of non contradiction" (1 55). For Hobbes, the end of rhetoric 
was victory, the end of logic, truth ( 1 55). Ultimately, he sought to substitute for the 
practical wisdom of his humanist predecessors "scientific" fact as a basis for certain 
truths upon which human beings may determine their actions. 
The Academic skepticism that Kahn attributes to the earlier humanists is a 
function of Stoic humanism. According to A.H.T. Levi, in order to reconcile the conflict 
between will and desire in scholasticism, Renaissance Stoics adopted this rather mild 
form of skepticism that gradually evolved into the more extreme form that Kahn 
identifies. While skepticism and Stoicism were quite separate philosophies in the ancient 
world, Renaissance Stoicism and skepticism were not incompatible. Levi argues that both 
doctrines were transmitted within defective traditions and that the terms had been altered 
by scholasticism. According to Levi, "Freedom from passion, the Stoic ethical ideal of 
'apatheia' meant either making the sage exempt from false judgment of passion, making 
the wise man omniscient, which was absurd, or positing in the sage recourse to the 
suspension of judgment . . .  which was skeptical" (94). Bacon employs this milder form 
of skepticism as a middle ground between humanism and natural philosophy. Bacon has 
often been criticized because his new philosophy is, in a sense, a method without content. 
The same kind of skepticism by which Renaissance Stoics were able to account for the 
sage' s  incomplete knowledge allowed Bacon to defer the realization of his intellectual 
project. At the same time, because the promise of his project had not yet yielded the kind 
of certain knowledge that the study of nature would eventually provide, rhetoric remained 
an essential art for the philosopher who continued, at times, to operate within the realm of 
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contingent knowledge. Bacon's less radical skepticism allowed him to create a middle 
path between his new philosophy and the rhetorical orientation of his fellow humanists. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Sage In the House of Solomon 
The Stoics said that wisdom is scientific knowledge of the divine and the 
hwnan, and that philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility. Virtue 
singly and at its highest is utility, and virtues, at their most generic, are 
triple - the physical one, the ethical one, and the logical one. 
-Aetius 1 2 1  
Frances of Verulam reasoned thus with himself, and judged it to be for the 
interest of the present and future generations that they should be made 
aquainted with his thoughts. -Francis Bacon 1 22 
[ A ]mongst the excellent acts of that king, one above all hath the 
preeminence. It was the erection and institution of an Order or Society 
which we call "Salomon's House"; the noblest foundation (as we think) 
that ever was upon the earth; and the lanthorn of this kingdom. It is 
dedicated to the study of the Works and Creatures of God . . . .  [T]his 
Order or Society is sometimes called Salomon's House and sometimes the 
College of the Six Days Works; whereby I am satisfied that our excellent 
king had learned from the Hebrews that God created the world and all that 
therein is within six days; and therefor he instituted that House for the 
finding out of the true nature of all things (whereby God might have the 
Preface 2 (HP A26) 
1 22 The Great Jnstauration, Proemium (PW 241)  
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more glory in the workmanship of them, and men the more fruit in the use 
of them) did give it that second name. 
-Francis Bacon123 
Critical to both the practical wisdom of Renaissance humanism and the materialist 
philosophy of Stoicism is the concept of the sage, or wise individual. For the humanists, 
the sage was the vir bonus dicendi peritus, the good man speaking well, whose eloquence 
is a reflection of his virtue. The Stoic sage, on the other hand, is the individual who is 
completely dedicated to the study of nature and who has submitted completely to the 
rational will of the universe . For the humanist, the vir bonus is an essential concept 
because, after all, the entire impulse of the humanist project is the inculcation of values, 
and the vir bonus constitutes an exemplar to be imitated. For the Stoics, the concept of 
the sage is even more important because, unlike philosophies and religions that posit an 
ideal to which one must aspire, the individual exists in a universe that is the working out 
of reason. Virtue consists, not in realizing some abstract ideal, but in perceiving and 
conforming to the logos of Nature. Thus, much of the extant literature of Stoicism, such 
as Seneca's epistles, or meditations like those of Marcus Aurelius, comprises lessons on 
proper behavior examples of strategies by which the sage gains wisdom. When these two 
systems, humanism and Stoicism, are combined, there are subtle changes in both the 
character and goal of the sage, who is now required to gain both practical and theoretical 
knowledge and to put that knowledge to work for the benefit of society. Francis Bacon's 
New Atlantis demonstrates the role of the sage in a humanistic society. Bacon's sage is 
both wise and productive, learning from nature and distributing her bounty to his fellow 
citizens. He unites the contemplative life of the Stoic sage with the active life of the 
123 The New Atlantis (PW 72 1 ) 
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humanist vir bonus engaged in service to the commonwealth. In Bacon's society, art 
performs a normative function to perfect reason within the individual. I argue that this is 
related to the conflation of techne and logos in the Stoic concept of nature. 
The New Atlantis 
Bacon's fragmentary text, The New 1-tlantis, 124 clearly offers an alternative to 
Thomas More 's humanist vision of Utopia. Though composed about one hundred years 
apart, the similarities between the two texts are striking. Both narratives take place on 
remote islands previously unknown to European explorers, and the stories are related by 
sailors who, having become lost at sea, discover the islands when blown off course by 
life-threatening storms. Both societies, though unknown to Christian Europe, have 
through some miraculous event become aware of and been converted to Christianity, and 
both have benefitted from social reforms made by a wise and enlightened king. However, 
the differences are equally striking. In More's Utopia, the problems that plague European 
society are ameliorated by a closely ordered communal society in which power and 
wealth are strictly controlled and evenly distributed. In Bacon's Bensalem, however, the 
well-ordered society is a result of prosperity that is itself the result of natural philosophy 
and technology; it is a society ruled by wise men whose study of natural philosophers 
124 As with most of Bacon' s texts, the New Atlantis has been extensively examined and written about over 
the years. See Judah Bierman, "The New Atlantis Bacon's Utopia of Science" and "Science and Society in 
the New Atlantis and other Renaissance Utopias"; Jerry Weinberger, "Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: 
An Introduction to the Reading of the New Atlantis. " "On the Miracles in Bacon's  New Atlantis " "Francis 
Bacon and the Unity of Knowledge: Reason and Revelation";See Elizabeth McCutcheon, "Bacon and the 
Cherubim: An Iconographic Reading of the New Atlantis, " for a close reading of the imagery of the 
cherubim in the New Atlantis and of several of the emblems in the original texts . See the extended 
discussion of the New Atlantis in Timothy Reiss's Discourse of Modernism. See also Denise Albanese, 
"The New Atlantis and the Uses of Utopia," and New Science, New World for a discussion of the New 
Atlantis as colonialist literature. In this same vein, see also Claire Jowett, "'Books Will Speak Plain ' :  
Colonialism, Jewishness, and Politics in Bacon's  New Atlantis. " See also Kate Aughterson, "The 'Waking 
Vision' Reference in The New Atlantis" and "' Strange Things So Probably Told' : Colonialism, Jewishness, 
and Politics in Bacon's New Atlantis." For a critique of such readings, see Catherine Gimelli Martin, "The 
Ahistoricism of the New Historicism: Knowledge as Power versus Power as Knowledge." Also see 
Bronwen Price's recent anthology, Francis Bacon 's New Atlantis: New Interdisciplinary Essays. 
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allows them to reap the benefits of God's  creation for themselves and their fellow 
citizens. More's  text is a somewhat pessimistic view of humankind, which suggests that 
the baser elements of our nature may only be suppressed through the most vigorous 
control. Bacon' s  New Atlantis is a much more optimistic text that hints at the relative 
perfectability of human nature through art and science. 
The New Atlantis was most likely written sometime in 1624 and was published 
posthumously in 1 627 by Rawley along with the Sylva sylvarum. 1 25 According to 
Spedding, "the story of .Solomon's  house is nothing more than the vision of the practical 
results which [Bacon] anticipated from the study of natural history diligently and 
systematically carried on through successive generations" (Editor' s Preface to The New 
Atlantis, PW 7 10). Rawley called it a fragment, and it clearly seems to be incomplete. 
However, Spedding suggests that its brevity is a reflection of the unfinished state of 
Bacon's project: 
Of the state of Solomon's House he has told us all that he was as yet 
qualified to tell. His own attempts to "interpret nature" suggested the 
apparatus which was necessary for success; he had but to furnish 
Solomon's House with the instruments and preparations which he had 
himself felt the want of. The difficulties which had baffled his single 
efforts to provide that apparatus for himself suggested the constitution and 
regulations of a society formed to overcome them; he had but to furnish 
Solomon' s  house with the helps in head and hand which he had himself 
wished for. His own intellectual aspirations suggested the result; he had 
but to set down as known all that he himself most longed to know. Buthere 
125 Sylva sylvarum is one of Bacon' s  fragmentary philosophical texts. It consists of a large number of 
aphorisms, which Rawley called a "heap of Particulars." Rawley divided them into "centuries," but there is 
no other apparent organizational scheme as in the &says. See Hutton 49-50. 
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he was obliged to stop. He could not describe the process of a perfect 
philosophical investigation; because it must of course have proceeded by 
the method of the Novum Organum which was not yet expounded. Nor 
could he give a particular example of the result of a such investigation, in 
. the shape of a Form or an Axiom; for that presupposed the completion not 
only of the Novum Organum but (at least in some subject) of the Natural 
History also . . . .  Here therefore he stopped. (PW 710) 
Spedding' s confidence in Bacon's  intellectual integrity is impossible to confirm. 126 Many 
of Bacon's  philosophical texts are unfinished, while the aphoristic sty le of others makes 
them seem incomplete. It was, after all, a tenet of Bacon's  philosophy that "scientific" 
communication should be incomplete, a goad to spur the auditor to further 
investigation. 127 Whether it is complete or not, however, The New Atlantis offers an 
intriguing glimpse of a society led by wise men whose knowledge is secured by natural 
philosophy, "not an ideal world released from the natural to which ours is subject, but of 
our world as it might be made if we did our duty by it" (Spedding PW 7 10) .  
The Wise Men of  Bensalem 
For the Renaissance humanist, the issue of character was of utmost importance. 
The ideal humanist was the vir bonus dicendi peritus, the "good man speaking well," 
whose eloquence arose from "a harmonious union between wisdom and style" and whose 
"aim was to guide men toward virtue and worthwhile goals, not to mislead them for 
vicious or trivial purposes" (Gray 498). Central to the appeal of The New Atlantis is the 
character of the Bensalemites. They possess, in Spedding's words, "sober piety," "serious 
126 Spedding follows Rawley's explanation for the fragmentary nature of this text. For an alternative 
explanation, see J. C. Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing, 1516-1 700, 
1 05-37. 
127 See Bacon' s discussion of"broken knowledge" in Book VI, Ch. 2 of De augmentis. 
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cheerfulness," "tender and gracious courtesy." "open-handed hospitality," "fidelity in 
public and chastity in private life," "grave and graceful manners," "order, decency and 
earnest industry" (7 1 1  ). In addition, the inhabitants of Bensalem were, for the most part, 
Christians, having encountered a mysterious chest containing the books of the Bible. 
They were equally well acquainted with the histories and mythologies of other lands, 
including those of the far east and the Americas. This knowledge was gained both from 
their own travels to other lands and from travelers whom they had received throughout 
history. 
The narrator of The New Atlantis meets a number of individuals whose actions 
demonstrate the character of the larger society of Bensalem. The first meeting between 
the ship's company and a citizen of Bensalem takes place after they seek refuge in their 
harbor following a storm. The crew saw on the shore of the city "divers of the people, 
with bastons in their hands, as it were forbidding us to land; yet without any cries or 
fierceness but only as warning us by signs that they made" (456). When the Bensalemites 
deliver to the ship a scroll, which offers them sanctuary for sixteen days, as well as 
asking after their needs for food, water, medical treatment, or repairs to their ship, it is 
evident that theirs is a hierarchically-ordered, Christian society, acquainted with the 
world outside its borders, clearly cautious, but not apparently xenophobic. The ship's 
company, who are put at ease by this encounter, inform the Bensalemites of the status of 
their ship and health and are later invited into a place called the "Stranger's House" 
where they are "accommodated of things both for our whole and for our sick" ( 459). The 
sailors' dealings with the island's inhabitants are characterized by the utmost civility, and 
when they meet the governor of the Stranger's House, they admire his "gracious and 
parent-like" treatment of them (716) .  Their treatment in the Stranger's House so 
impresses them that they said that "we were come into a land of angels, which did appear 
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to us daily and present us with comforts, which we thought not of, much less expected"' 
(7 1 6). 
It is not merely the generosity of spirit that impresses the narrator; he also admires 
their physical well-being and the abundance and quality of their material culture. It is 
clear from the beginning that Bensalem' s society is a wealthy one with material goods of 
quality at least equal to that of Europe. The narrator describes the city as "well built," and 
the parchment on which the greeting is written is superior to the European equivalent­
"somewhat yellower than our parchment, and shining like the leaves of writing tables, but 
otherwise soft and flexible" (7 13). The officer who meets them is wearing a gown of "an 
excellent azure color, far more glossy than ours" and persons whom they subsequently 
meet are dressed even more finely (7 13). The streets through which the ship's company 
pass are all "fair" and the Stranger 's House is well-constructed, commodious, and 
includes an infirmary for their sick. The food is healthful and of the highest quality : 
Soon after our dinner was served in, which was right good viands; both for 
bread and meat; better than any collegiate diet than I have known in 
Europe. We also had drink of three sorts, all wholesome and good; wine of 
the grape; a drink of grain, such as is with us our ale, but more clear; and a 
kind of cider made of a fruit of that country; a wonderful pleasing and 
refreshing drink. Besides, there were brought into us a great store of those 
scarlet oranges for our sick; which (they said) were an assured remedy for 
sickness at sea. ( 46 1 )  
The narrator is also impressed by the knowledge of the healing arts the Bensalemites 
demonstrate. During their first encounter, the official who greets them explains that their 
hesitancy in granting them entrance to the city is on the advice of their Conservator of 
Health in case the illness of their sailors was contagious. The notary who boards the ship 
carries with him a fruit "like an orange . . .  which cast a most excellent odor" which he 
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seemed to use "for a preservative against infection" ( 459). Once they arrive at the house, 
their sick are supplied with a box of pills to hasten their recovery ( 46 1 ). 
Bensalem is clearly a wealthy society. The Governor of the Stranger's House tells 
them that there are sufficient funds to care for the entire ship's company for at least 
sixteen days and to compensate them in silver or gold for any of their own stores that are 
used. However, it soon becomes clear that the real currency of this society is knowledge. 
Every twelve years a group of Bensalemites would travel to other lands, to discover 
"knowledge of the affairs and state of those countries to which they were designed, and 
especially of the sciences, arts, manufactures, and inventions of all patterns in every kind . 
. . . But thus you see we maintain a trade, not for gold, silver, or jewels; nor for silks, nor 
for spices; nor any other commodity of matter; but only for God's first creature, which 
was Light; to have light (I say) of the growth of all parts of the world" (722). The 
propagation of that knowledge was the task of the fellows of Salomon's House. 
The House of Salomon 
According to the history of Bensalem, which is related by the governor of the 
House of Strangers, the wisest of the Bensalemites was a King Solamona, who had 
reigned about nineteen-hundred years previously, and whom the Bensalemites considered 
"a divine instrument, though a mortal man" (PW 720). Solamona "had a ' large heart', 
inscrutable_ for good, and was wholly bent to make his kingdom and people happy" (72 1 ) .  
This king was the primary author of the laws of the land and, having realiz�d the se�f­
sufficiency of his kingdom, had instituted hospitality laws to protect Bensalem against 
opportunistic visitors. However, he "preserved all points of humanity" regarding the good 
treatment of strangers, allowing those who desired to do so to remain and learn from 
them. 
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The source of Salomona' s wisdom was the lost works of King Solomon, "that 
Natural History which he wrote, of all plants, from the 'cedar of Libanus' to the 'moss 
that groweth out of the wall' ,  and of all 'things that have life and motion"' (72 1 ). 
Salomona, feeling an affinity with Solomon, instituted an "Order or Society," which he 
called "Salomon's House" that is "dedicated to the study of the Works and Creatures of 
God" (72 1 ). Salomon's House is also called The College of the Six Days Work, which 
the governor intuits is because "our excellent king had learned from the Hebrews that 
God had created the world and all that therein is in six days; and therefore he instituting 
that House for the finding out of the true nature of all things (whereby God might have 
the more glory in the workmanship of them, and men the more fruit in the use of them) 
did give it that second name" (72 1). It is clear that the Fathers of the order are held in the 
greatest esteem by the Bensalemites, as evidenced by the quality of his conveyance and 
garments better than those even of the governor of the city, and the respect accorded him. 
During his procession into the city, the narrator says that "the street was wonderfully 
kept; so that there was never any army had their men stand in better battle-array, than the 
people stood. The windows likewise were not crowded, but every one stood in them as if 
they had been placed" (726). The fellows of the House of Salomon are the equivalent of 
the Renaissance ideal of the vir bonus dicendi peritus, but it is not merely speaking well 
that sets them apart. 
The New Atlantis as a Synthesis of Humanism and Stoicism 
In the New Atlantis, Bacon depicts a society in which many of the conflicts that 
led to the anxieties of Renaissance Europe have been reconciled. In earlier works, he 
made linkages among a number of concepts that are at the heart of the conflicts among 
church, humanism, and natural philosophy, conflicts that seem to present no problem for 
the inhabitants of Bensalem. These concepts-God, nature, reason, knowledge, and 
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power-do not trouble the inhabitants of the New Atlantis as they did Renaissance 
Europeans. The inhabitants of Bensalem have internalized a set of beliefs that authorize 
the study of natural philosophy as the basis for a well-ordered society. However, the 
fellows of the House of Salomon are inculcated with more than a set of values that enable 
their study of nature and manipulation of the knowledge gained for the betterment of their 
society.' they have also internalized arts and methods. 
The centerpiece of Bacon's new philosophy was a methodology by which human 
beings could reap the benefits of Nature. Bacon's new method functions as an art, or 
techne, in the same way as rhetoric and dialectic. Technai, however, are culturally 
problematic because they do not encompass particular cultural, moral, or ethical value 
systems. Plato's complaints against rhetoric in the Socratic dialogues are emblematic of 
the objections to a techne. In Rhetoric Reclaimed, Janet Atwill connects the conflicts in 
the humanist/liberal arts epistemological tradition to the older techne tradition. Technai, 
or arts, occupied the realm of productive knowledge as distinct from theoretical or 
practical knowledge. For example, Plato's epistemological scheme distinguished only 
between true and sham arts, and classified philosophical method, or dialectic as a true art 
with rhetoric as a sham art. Aristotle replaced this two-fold classification with one that 
included three categories of knowledge : theoretical, practical, and productive. Theoretical 
knowledge included mathematics and moral and natural philosophy; practical knowledge 
included ethics and politics; productive knowledge included medicine, the art of warfare, 
and rhetoric. According to Aristotle's epistemological typology, the productive arts, or 
technai, were not bound by values or knowledge in the same way that the theoretical and 
productive arts were. · 
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Atwill identifies three characteristics of a techne: 128 
( I )  A techne is never a static, normative body of knowledge. A techne is 
described as a dynamis (or power) and a set of transferrable strategies. A 
techne neither represents reality nor encompasses a set of deductive 
postulates. 
(2) A techne resists identification with a normative subject. . . .  As such, 
there are no well-defined boundaries between the subject and knowledge. 
Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make techne conform to 
either Plato' s  equation of knowledge and virtue or Quintilian's vir bonus 
(3) Techne marks a domain of human intervention and invention. What is 
at stake in a techne is neither subjectivity nor virtue . . . .  [T]echne is 
defined against the forces of necessity, spontaneity, experience, chance, 
compulsion, and force; it is often associated with the transgression of an 
existing boundary . . . .  In contrast to philosophical knowledge, a techne is 
defined by its relation to situation and time. A techne is knowledge as 
production, not product, intervention and articulation, rather than 
representation. (7) 
In subsequent centuries, most productive arts came to be identified as "crafts," while 
rhetoric as productive knowledge came to be identified with the handbook tradition, 
(Atwill 5-6) .  
In the Stoic period, the concept of techne was transformed as a result of its role in 
the Stoic conceptualization of nature. The Stoics defined nature as a combination of 
reason and matter. Zeno called nature "a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to 
128 Atwill's examination of the concept of techne is limited to the period between the seventh through 
fourth centuries BCE. Understanding of the concept varied over this time period, but Atwill contends that 
these characteristics remained relatively constant. 
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the work of generation" and Diogenes Laertius said that the Stoic view of nature was as 
an "artistically working fire going on its way to create." Diogenes Laertius also calls 
nature "a force moving of itself, producing and preserving in being its offspring in 
accordance with seminal principles. "129 In these definitions, the Stoics use the terms 
techne and logos in referring to the active principle in the universe, a principle that is 
equivalent to God. According to Gerard Watson, "The picture that emerges from this 
combination of techne and logos is of a natural power working in a unified fashion 
through the control of details . . .  to produce in time one perfect co-ordinated structure" 
( 1 ). Because humans, as rational beings, share in the logos of the universe, the concept of 
techne is key to Stoic epistemology and is the basis of their "realization of the importance 
of the particular, even in the midst of a system where universal unity seems at first to be 
the overriding consideration" ( 1  ). 1 30 
Techne, for the Stoics, was no longer an inferior form of making 
knowledge. According to Watson, a techne is an activity, unified by a plan 
or structure, the knowledge of which is gradually acquired through 
experience. In time this knowledge becomes a part of the artist himself, 
and constitutes the constant norm which imposes itself on the contingent 
which is its field. In imposing itself it relies on the immediate 
apprehension of the individual concrete reality. The production of the 
particular depends on the artist's skill and at each point he must choose 
what will best suit the realization of his concept. This implies an aesthetic 
129 The citation from Zeno comes from Cicero's De natura deorum II 57. The quotations from Diogenes 
Laertius are from VII 1 56 and VII 148,  respectively. All three are cited in Gerard Watson, The Stoic Theory 
of Knowledge, 1 .  
1 30 Stillman has described the political implications of technai for Bacon: "Politics is a conservative 
business, inherently resistant to change, Bacon understands, since ' a  change even for the better is 
distrusted, because it unsettles what is established' (4.89) . . . .  By contrast, the arts are dynamic and 
progressive; they depend upon change and the 'noise of new works and further advances' (4.89-90). 
Natural philosophy is liable to be perceived as politically suspect by reason of the very dynamism intrinsic 
to its operation" (New Philosophy and Universal Language 8 1  ) . 
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judgment based on intuition, involving selection and limitation. It involves 
a keen awareness of the particular and its conditions, and since it is 
production, it cannot ignore details. (3) 
It is easy to see how the Stoic conflation of techne and logos transforms the concept of 
techne. First, while techne may not have been a static, normative body of knowledge, it 
acted, to the extent that it was internalized by the sage, as a "constant norm." The second 
characteristic of techne in the previous centuries no longer applies; techne is now clearly 
identified with a normative subject. In the Stoic model, as in previous philosophical 
systems, technai operate in the field of the contingent, but what is contingent in Stoicism 
is not nature, but the individual's knowledge of nature. Thus, according to Watson, the 
usefulness of techne is that it allows for assembling particulars and testing them against 
one another, which allows the individual to act "artistically" and function as a rational 
being (7). 
Watson's description of the work of the Stoic sage might well be a description of 
Bacon's project. The inductive method is founded upon an extensive and careful 
assembly of as many particulars as possible. From these particulars, by means of 
exclusion and inclusion, according to the "Prerogative Instances" that he delineates in the 
Novum organum, the "sons of science" eventually will be able to draw general principles 
in order to assemble a true picture of the world: 
It must be remembered that in this Organum of mine I am handling logic, 
not philosophy. But since my logic aims to teach and instruct the 
understanding, not that it may with slender tendrils of the mind snatch at 
and lay hold of abstract notions (as the common logic does), but that it 
may in very truth dissect nature, and discover the virtues and actions of 
bodies, with their laws as determined in matter, so that this sciences flows 
not merely from the nature of the mind, but also from the nature of things; 
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no wonder that it is everywhere sprinkled and illustrated with speculations 
and experiments in nature, as examples of the art I teach. (NO I. Iii) 
Bacon clearly draws a distinction here between art and philosophy, as do the Stoics. 
Similarly, the virtue of the art is clearly secured by the virtue of nature, and it is the 
conjunction of the nature of the mind with the nature of things that secures the legitimacy 
of the art. Bacon echoes the Stoic concept of art as "knowledge [that] becomes a part of 
the artist himself and constitutes the constant norm which imposes itself on the 
contingent which is its field" when he argues that the purpose of arts is to achieve the 
"furthest end of knowledge . . . .  to give a true account of their gift of reason " 
(Advancement, PW 60) . 
For the Stoics, whose philosophical aim was to live in accordance with nature, 
techne was directed toward the perfection of the individual's rationality. However, for 
Bacon the civic humanist, that the pursuit of knowledge is not merely an intellectual 
pursuit, but required an active component as well: 
But this is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if 
contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and 
united together than they have been; a conjunction like unto that of the 
two highest planets, Saturn the planet of rest and contemplation, and 
Jupiter the planet of civil society and action. Howbeit, I do not mean when 
I speak of use and action, that end before-mentioned of the applying of 
knowledge to lucre and profession . . . .  Neither is my meaning, as was 
spoken of Socrates, to call philosophy down from heaven to converse 
upon the earth; that is, to leave natural philosophy aside and to apply 
knowledge only to manners and policy. But as both heaven and earth do 
conspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man, so the end ought to 
be, from both philosophies, to separate and reject vain speculations and 
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whatsoever is empty and void, and to preserve and augment whatsoever is 
solid and fruitful; that knowledge may not be as a courtesan, for pleasure 
and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master's  
use; but as a spouse for generation, fruit, and comfort. (60) 
Productive knowledge was an inseparable part of Bacon's  project. Following 
Democritus, who said that "the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and in 
caves," Bacon divides natural philosophy into "the mine and the furnace, and [makes] 
some to be pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer" 
(Advancement, PW 92) . He identified two branches of natural philosophy: the Inquisition 
of Causes ( also called Speculative and Natural Science) and the Production of Effects 
(also called Operative or Natural Philosophy) (92). These two branches were inextricably 
linked via a "double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent; ascending from 
experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of 
new experiments" (92-93). Bacon divided the Inquisition of Causes into Physic and 
Metaphysic, both of which were based upon a comprehensive natural history. Bacon 
represents this theoretical branch of natural philosophy as a wholly integrated discipline: 
"For knowledges are as pyramids of which history is the basis: so of Natural Philosophy 
the basis is Natural History: the stage next the basis is Physics: and the stage next the 
vertical point is Metaphysics" (Advancement, PW 92) . As for the vertical point of the 
pyramid, which he calls the Summary Law of Nature or Philosophia Prima, Bacon is 
unsure whether that degree of knowledge is attainable by human beings. Physic "should 
handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and a moving" while Metaphysic 
"should handle that which supposeth in nature further a reason, understanding, and 
platform" (94). In Aristotelian terms, Physic is concerned with material and efficient 
causes, while Metaphysic is concerned with formal and final causes (94). Natural history 
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was concerned with gathering particulars, Physic with comparing those instances using 
inductive logic, and Metaphysic with deriving universal principles from them. 
For Bacon, techne was also intimately related to technology. Bacon was 
fascinated with improvements in all kinds of mechanical arts. His interest in the ideas of 
the French ceramicist and potter Bernard Palissy has already been noted. In the Preface to 
the Great Instauration, he contrasts the creativity and progressiveness of the mechanical 
arts with the stultification of the intellectual arts: 
Observe also, that if sciences of this kind had any life in them, that could 
never have come to pass which has been the case now for many ages -
that they stand almost at a stay without receiving any augmentation worthy 
of the human race . . . In the mechanical arts we do not find it so; they, on 
the contrary, as having in them some breath of life, are continually 
growing and becoming more perfect. As originally invented, they are 
commonly rude, clumsy, and shapeless; afterwards they acquire new 
powers and more commodious arrangements and constructions; in so far 
that man shall sooner leave the study and pursuit of them and turn to 
something else, than they arrive at the ultimate perfection of which they 
are capable. (PW 244) 
In Book One of Novum Organum, Bacon addresses the connection between intellectual 
arts and mechanical arts and the subservience of both to Nature, saying that "Human 
knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known, the effect 
cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed" (NO I . iii, PW 259). For 
Bacon, knowledge without corresponding technological production was problematic not 
only because it produced no fruit, but also because he saw technology as furthering the 
advancement of knowledge itself. He compared the status of knowledge in his day to the 
fable of the monstrous Scylla, 
1 82 
who had the head and face of a virgin, but her womb was hung round with 
barking monsters, from which she could not be delivered. For in like 
manner the sciences to which we are accustomed have certain propositions 
which are specious and flattering; but as soon as they we come to the 
particulars, which are the parts of generation, when they should produce 
fruit and works, then arise contentions and barking disputations, which are 
the end of the matter and all the issue they can yield. (Inst. magno, 
Author's  Preface, PW 243) 
This stultification of the intellectual arts is contrasted with technological innovation, 
which serves as the metaphor for progress. In contrast, the invention of the compass is 
instrumental in furthering discovery, "but as in former ages, when men sailed only by 
observation of the starts, they could indeed coast along the shores of the old continent or 
cross a few small and mediterranean seas; but before the ocean could be traversed and the 
new world discovered, the use of the mariner's needle, as a more faithful and certain 
guide, had to be found out" (246). 
The concept of art or techne was also a critical aspect of Bacon' s  attempt to 
resolve conflicts between natural philosophy and religion. As has been discussed earlier, 
Bacon' s  view of nature is that it is the expression of God' s power, as compared to divine 
revelation, which is the expression of God's will. He also suggests that to engage in the 
work of natural philosophy is a holy act: 
But these three [natural history, physic, and metaphysic] be the three 
stages of knowledge; and are to them that are depraved no better than the 
giants' hills [Pelion, Ossa, and Olympus piled on one another], . . .  but to 
those who refer all things to the glory of God, they are as the three 
acclamations, Sancte, sancte, sancte; holy in the description or dilatation of 
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his works, holy in the connection or concatenation of them, and holy in the 
union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. (Advancement, PW 95) 
For Bacon, the practice of natural philosophy and, indeed, of all the intellectual 
arts, is intended to realize the individual's own potential, to derive benefits to 
enhance the status of humankind, and to glorify God. 
The Sage 
For the Stoics, the ultimate product of techne is the Sage, or wise man, who 
according to R. J. Hankinson, never errs in making choices: "Secure in their 
understanding of the providential structure of the world, which is identical with fate, 
which in turn is identical with the will of Zeus, Sages order their lives in accordance with 
it, assimilating their will to the will of Zeus, living in accordance with nature, and so 
achieving the smooth flow of life, the eurhoia bioa so devoutly to be wished" (59). The 
Stoic relationship between techne and character can be summarized in this way . Techne 
is the means of securing knowledge about nature to which the Sage conforms. 
The Stoic Sage per se was not an ideal model for Bacon's new philosopher. Not 
only was Bacon careful not to ally himself too closely with the more fractious English 
neo-Stoics, but he rej ected the more fatalistic elements of Stoic philosophy. While he 
approved, for example, the Stoic control of the passions, he rejected the extremes to 
which they might go to achieve that control. In a letter to the Earl of Rutland, he said, 
"The Stoics were of the opinion that there was no way to attain this even temper of the 
mind but to be senseless, and so they sold their goods to ransom themselves from their 
evils" ( qtd. in Salmon 2 12). The Stoic's emphasis on preparation for death and their 
pessimism directly contradict Bacon's program for advancement of the human condition. 
Regardless of his objection to these aspects of Stoic ethical philosophy, the concept of the 
wise individual is integral to Bacon's project. 
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The concept of the good or wise man was familiar to Renaissance humanists as it 
had come down through the liberal arts tradition. It is clear, too, that the notion of the 
wise individual is important to Bacon. In Book One of The Advancement of Learning, he 
offers many historical examples of wise men who have contributed to the received store 
of knowledge of his age. For example, Adam, before the fall, represents the perfect 
knowledge of nature to which Bacon aspires. Abel, the contemplative shepherd is 
superior to Cain, the tiller of the soil. Moses, the lawgiver, had all the learning of the 
Egyptians. (PW 6 1 -2). All the examples of wise men that Bacon assembles have in 
common a tendency toward contemplation and study. While he recognizes that God was 
in the beginning obliged to "employ persons altogether unlearned otherwise than by 
inspiration" in subsequent ages "he did send his divine truth into the world waited on 
with other learnings as with servants or handmaids" (63). Thus, just as humanist 
education was intended to create a particular kind of subject, Bacon's  project for the 
reform of learning relied on the intellectual arts to produce a certain kind of educated 
individual. In his essay "Of Studies," he explores the ways that particular disciplines 
· impart particular characteristics : 
Histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics subtle; natural 
philosophy deep; moral grave; logic and rhetoric able to contend. Abeunt 
studia in mores. [The studies pass into the manners. ] Nay there is no stond 
or impediment in the wit but may be wrought out by fit studies; like as the 
disease of the body have appropriate exercises . . . .  So if a man's wit be 
wandering, let him study the mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit 
be called away never so little, he must begin again. If his wit be not apt to 
distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoolmen; for they are 
cymini sectores [splitters of hairs] . If he be not apt to beat over matters, 
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and to call up one thing to prove another, let him study the lawyers' cases. 
So every defect of the mind may have a special receipt. (PW 798). 
For Bacon, however, education not only should improve the mind, but should lead to 
action as well. The "true" end of knowledge is "for the benefit and use of life," and it 
must be "perfected and governed in charity" to avoid the consequences experienced by 
angels who "lust[ ed] for power" and men who "lust[ ed] for knowledge"(Preface to the 
Great Instauration, PW 24 7). Bacon saw his new instauration "not as an opinion to be 
held, but as a work to be done" and as the "foundation, not of any sect of doctrine, but of 
human utility and power" (247). 
From Techne to Technology 
The Fellows of the House of Salomon in the New Atlantis, are examples of the 
kind of sage who embodies not only the appropriate values, but the necessary arts as well, 
so that they are capable of producing theoretical, practical, and productive knowledge. 
Their work is both philosophical and mechanical, theoretical and experimental. They 
produce both knowledge and goods for their society. In a meeting with the narrator, the 
Father of the House of Salomon offers to impart "the greatest jewel I have . . . the true 
state of Salomon's house," including "the end of our foundation. Secondly the 
preparations and instruments we have for our work. Thirdly the several employments and 
functions whereto our fellows are assigned. And fourthly, the ordinances and rites which 
we observe" (727). According to the Father, "The End of our Foundation is the 
knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of 
Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible" (727). 1 3 1 The Father of the House 
of Salomon describes the many and varied activities of the institution, as well as their 
1 3 1 See Richard Serjeantson, "Natural Knowledge in the New Atlantis, " for a discussion of the quality of 
Bacon's natural knowedge. 
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various facilities, which include mines, both artificial and natural; towers; lakes, pools, 
streams, and cataracts, as well as artificial wells and fountains; great and spacious houses 
for the study of meteorological phenomena; Chambers of Health; orchards and gardens, 
parks and enclosures; brew houses, bake-houses, and kitchens; dispensatories, or shops of 
medicines; furnaces; perspective-houses, sound-houses; engine-houses; a mathematical 
house; and houses of deceit of the senses. Within these various laboratories, the Fathers 
and Sons of the House of Solomon are engaged in all manner of arts and sciences, 
including mining, ceramics, climatology, engineering, botany and the propagation of 
species of flora and fauna, medicine, the culinary arts, and optics (72 7-731 ). It is clear 
that the activities of the House of Salomon represent technai or arts. For example, the 
Father of the House describes the propagation of fruits: 
And we make (by art) in the same orchards and gardens, trees and flower 
to come earlier or later than their seasons; and to come up and bear more 
speedily than by their natural course they do. We make them also by art 
greater much than their nature; and their fruit greater and sweeter and of 
differing taste, smell, colour and figure, from their nature. And many of 
them we so order, as they become of medicinal use. (728) 
And again, regarding experimentation in animal husbandry, he says, "Neither do we do 
this by chance, but we know beforehand what manner and commixture what kind of 
those creatures will arise" (728). The Father also demonstrates the relationship between 
art and technology: 
We have also divers mechanical arts, which you have not; and stuffs made 
by them; as papers, linen, silks, tissues; dainty works of feathers of 
wonderful lustre; excellent dyes, and many others; and shops likewise, as 
well for such as are not brought into vulgar use amongst us as for those 
that are. For you must know that of the things before recited, many of them 
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are grown into use throughout the kingdom; but yet if they did flow from 
our invention, we have them also for patterns and principals. (729) 
The interrelationship between art and character in Bacon's philosophy is 
emblematized in the description of the occupations of the fellows of the House of 
Salomon. They have a variety of tasks, but what is important to recognize is that their 
titles are related to the arts they perform and the benefits they produce. Twelve of them, 
called "Merchants of Light," travel to foreign lands and bring back "books, and abstracts, 
and patterns of experiments" (73 1 ). "Depradators" collect experiments from books; 
"Mystery-men" collect experiments of mechanical arts and liberal sciences; "Pioners or 
Miners" try new experiments of their own design; "Compilers" assemble and transmit the 
data from the work of the others; "Benefactors or Dowry-men" examine the experiments 
of the others to draw out "things of use and practice for man's life and knowledge as well 
for works as for plain demonstrations of causes, means of natural divinations, and the 
easy and clear discovery of the virtues and parts of bodies" (732) ; "Lamps" direct new 
experiments "of a higher light, more penetrating into nature than the former" after 
meetings and consultations of the whole membership; "Inoculators" execute the 
experiments directed by the Lamps; and the Interpreters of Nature: "raise the former 
discoveries by experiments into greater observations, axioms, and aphorisms" (73 1 -32). 
The ordinances and rites include the veneration both of products of their art and of 
their greatest minds. In long galleries, they display "patterns and samples of all manner of 
the more rare and excellent inventions" (732). They also erect statuary to their own 
greatest minds and to those from other lands, such as the inventor of ships, the inventors 
of music, letters, and printing; and Christopher Columbus for discovering the West 
Indies. (732). They have "certain hymns and services which we say daily, of laud and 
thanks to God for his marvellous works; and forms of prayers, imploring his aid and 
blessing for the illumination of our labours, and the turning of them into good and holy 
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uses" (732). And finally, they travel to foreign lands to make known both the 
fundamental natural philosophy and "new profitable inventions" (732). 
The degree to which the values and methods of the House of Salomon are 
inculcated into its Fellows is illustrated by a story regarding the Bensalemites' conversion 
to Christianity. The inhabitants of Bensalem, although their civilization had no contact 
with European civilization, were Christians as the result of a separate divine revelation 
involving the discovery of an ark containing both canonical and non-canonical books of 
the Bible. The Governor of the Stranger's House explains how, about twenty years after 
the ascension of Christ, the arrival of this ark was marked by a "a great pillar of light" 
rising from the sea, topped by "a large cross of light more bright and resplendent than the 
body of the pillar" ( 464 ). Among those who went out to examine this phenomenon was 
"one of the wise men of the society of Salomon's House" who "attentively and devoutly 
viewed and contemplated" the pillar and cross, and then made the following prayer: 
Lord God of heaven and earth, thou has vouchsafed of thy graces to those 
of our order, to know the works of creation, and the secrets of them; and to 
discern (as far as appertaineth to the generations of men) between divine 
miracles, works of nature, works of art, and impostures and illusions of all 
sorts. I do here acknowledge and testify before this people, that the thing 
which we now see before our eyes is thy Finger and a true Miracle; and 
forasmuch as we learn in our books that thou never workest miracles but 
to a divine and excellent end (for the laws of nature are thine own laws, 
and thou exceedest them not but upon great cause), we most humbly 
beseech thee to prosper this great sign, and to give us the interpretation 
and use of it in mercy; which thou dost in some part secretly promise by 
sending it to us. ( 464) 
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This prayer, which echoes Bacon's Confession of Faith, asserts that nature is God's 
creation and that he does not interfere with its laws. The response of this "wise man of 
the House of Salomon," after "attentive" and "devout" viewing and "contemplation" of 
the phenomenon, is to offer an eloquent prayer for wisdom to interpret and use this 
revelation. In relating this story, the governor calls the House of Salomon the "eye" of the 
society, but it is, in fact, much more. The fellows do not merely observe, although 
observation is their initial response to phenomena, either natural or unnatural. Their 
observation is followed by interpretation and then by use. Observation and interpretation 
are governed by reason and method; use is governed by art. The Fellow of the House of 
Salomon, because his character has been honed by the observation of nature and the 
application of method, is able to discern the truth of the divine revelation. Techne is an 
essential concept in Stoicism as it is for humanism, and it is through techne that Bacon is 
able to resolve the conflict between humanism, natural philosophy, and Christian 
theology. 
The Rhetorical Value of the House of Salomon 
Given their belief in the possibility of language to achieve practical certainty and 
to move individuals to right action, the production and consumption of literary texts were 
acts of great importance for early Renaissance humanists. Quattrocento humanist rhetoric 
was situated within the context of civic humanism and allied to the virtue of prudence, or 
practical wisdom. Because the marker of the individual's achievement of humanist values 
was eloquence, the art of rhetoric was critical to the humanist project. As it was practiced 
during the quattrocento, however, rhetoric was a "truncated version of classical rhetoric" 
because it did not extend to legislative and legal settings (Kahn 38). Rather, it was 
primarily epideictic rhetoric - the rhetoric of praise or blame. Unlike other scholars who 
stress the limitations on rhetoric and view quattrocento rhetoric as a precursor to a purely 
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aesthetic form of the art, Kahn suggests that the conflation of rhetoric and poetics 
"enlarges the sphere of literature, since the written text now takes on the functions of 
deliberative and judicial rhetoric" (3 8). Thus, the production of the work of literature, or 
any work of art, was a deliberative or prudential act, as was consumption of that work 
through the act of reading: 
[P]rudence or practical reason that is deliberation about action in a social 
or political context is also at work in the artist 's production of a work of 
art. Prudence is, in this sense, the precondition of artistic decorum, just as 
it is of ethical decorum. As a result, the work of art is seen less as an 
object than as reflecting a certain process or activity or judgment. (39) 
Consequently, "knowledge of the literary text can only be practical, since the interpretive 
practice of reading requires the same acts of discrimination, the same judgments of 
decorum, as does the author 's practice of writing" (39). For the humanists, then, literary 
texts - and these included primarily poetry and drama, dialogues, and texts such as 
Philip Sydney 's "Defense of Poesy" - were considered appropriate rhetorical activities 
that could lead individuals to right action in the realm of human affairs. 1 32 Bacon's New 
Atlantis follows in this tradition and is intended to lead both the king and fellow citizens 
to the right action of embracing natural philosophy. 
Civic humanism during the Renaissance was nowhere more fully developed than 
in England of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and texts such as Thomas Elyot' s 
Boke Named the Gouvernour and Thomas More's Utopia, were critical elements in the 
transmission of humanist values. Although they are generically very different-The Boke 
Named the Gouvernour is an advice book to rulers while Utopia is a detailed description 
of the life and habits of the citizens of a fictional island-both texts are concerned with 
1 32 This understanding of reading as a deliberative and/or prudential act helps to elucidate the power of the 
"book of nature" metaphor that was prominent in the discourse of early modem natural philosophers. 
19 1 
the proper way to organize and govern society. Such texts, as Kahn has suggested, 
perform an essentially rhetorical function, in that the act of reading was seen as a 
deliberative and prudential act. 1 33 More's Utopia, for example, acted as a critique of 
various social ills, and offered as a solution a highly-structured communal society whose 
laws and customs were founded upon Christian and humanist values. Like his fellow 
humanists, Bacon was interested in improving society, and his New Atlantis, which is 
clearly a response to More's Utopia, offers the very different view of how to accomplish 
that goal. Both More's Utopia and Bensalem of Bacon's New Atlantis are island societies, 
discovered by sailors lost at sea. More imagines a communal society in which power is 
diffused because its leaders are drawn from the general population and serve for limited 
terms. In Bacon's ideal society, the leaders are philosophers who are dedicated to the 
"proficiency and advancement" of knowledge as a means of improving their society . 1 34 
The social institutions in Utopia are based on humanist ethical principles; in The New 
Atlantis, ethical principles are derived from natural philosophy, and the preeminent social 
institution is a philosophical society. In Bensalem, nature is not only the source of 
material benefits, but serves a normative function as the source of knowledge from which 
serves as a basis for an ethical system. Bacon's blending of Stoic concepts with 
humanistic values. 
The century between the publication of these two texts comprised a critical time 
in the declining trajectory of rhetoric as an architectonic epistemological art. As Kahn 
133  While More's Utopia was not the first text to present the image of an ideal soceity, it has come to 
represent all such literature. See Paul Salzman, "Narrative Contexts for New Atlantis" for a discussion of 
the series of narratives touched off by Bacon's response to More. See also Elizabeth Dickinson Blodgett, 
"'The New Atlantis' and Campanella's 'Civitas Solis"' and Timothy J. Reiss, "Structure and Mind in Two 
Seventeenth-Century Utopias: Campanella and Bacon" for examinations of Bacon's work to another 
contemporary piece of Utopian literature. See also Denise Albanese, "The New Atlantis and the Uses of 
Utopia." 
1 34 The leaders of Bacon's Bensalem are more reminiscent of the philosopher-kings of Plato's Republic. 
An essential difference between More's Utopia and The New Atlantis is that More assumes that society's 
resources are limited and guards against discord by leveling class and monetary distinctions; Bacon 
suggests that the new philosophy will reduce discord because it creates and abundance of materials goods. 
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and Stillman have suggested, by the early part of the seventeenth century there is 
considerably less confidence in the power of language to produce the right action that is 
required to make a good society than More would have felt. Because the integrity of 
humanist rhetoric was secured by the concept of the vir bonus, one might assume that 
with the decline of rhetoric the importance of the vir bonus within society might also 
have declined. However, the part played by such individuals within these two narratives 
suggests that such is not the case. If anything, the wise individual is even more important 
in Bacon's New Atlantis than in More's Utopia. Moreover, Bacon's act of producing the 
text of the New Atlantis suggests that he did not consider the persuasive power of texts to 
have been completely lost. 1 35 What is clear, however, in Bacon's new society is that 
eloquence persists, but rhetoric has lost its epistemological primacy to a variety of other 
arts. 
Solomon as Rhetorical Trope 
Of all the wise men in history, Bacon most admired Solomon of whom he said: 
[I]n the person of Salomon the king, we see the gift or endowment of 
wisdom and learning, both in Salomon's petition and in God's assent 
thereto, preferred before any other terrene or temporal felicity. By virtue 
of which grant or donative of God, Salomon became enabled not only to 
write those excellent parables or aphorisms concerning divine and moral 
philosophy, but also to compile a natural history of all verdure, from the 
cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon the wall, ( which is but a 
rudiment between putrefaction and an herb), and also of all things that 
1 35 See Sarah Hutton, "Persuasion to Science: Baconian Rhetoric and the New Atlantis." Hutton argues that 
Bacon follows Sydney in believing that poetic, or imaginative texts, have greater persuasive power than 
histories. She also discusses Bacon's ideas regarding the impact of figurative language and metaphor. 
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breathe and move. Nay, the same Salomon the king, although he excelled 
in the glory of treasure and magnificent buildings, of shipping and 
navigation, of service and attendance, of fame and renown and the like, 
yet he maketh no claim to any of these glories, but only to the glory of the 
inquisition of truth. (Advancement, PW 246-7). 
It is not difficult to identify what Bacon admired about Solomon. The use of aphoristic 
reasoning, the emphasis on natural history, and the comprehensive nature of Solomon's 
interests -divine, moral, and natural philosophy-are all things that Bacon himself 
attempted. However, Bacon also exploited the Solomonic ideal of the wise king in his 
attempt to persuade James I to help establish the kind of institution he proposed in the 
various texts of the lnstauratio Magna. 
In the opening pages of The Advancement of Learning, Bacon praises James's  
eloquence and wisdom. 1 36 He compares James to Solomon, praising him for his God­
given ability "to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, and nevertheless to touch 
and apprehend the least" (PW 42). Bacon's purpose for the Advancement of Learning was 
to provide for James a description of the excellency of learning and knowledge, a 
description of the current status of knowledge, and his prescription for its advancement. 
He hoped that his work would "excite [James's] . . .  to visit the excellent treasures of 
[his] mind, and thence to extract particulars for this purpose agreeable to [his] 
magnanimity and wisdom" (PW 43). Bacon repeats this comparison in the Epistle 
Dedicatory to the Great Instauration . "you who resemble Solomon iD: so many things -
in the gravity of your judgment, in the peacefulness of your reign, in the largeness of your 
heart, to the noble variety of books you have composed" (PW 242). 
1 36 See Sharon Achinstein, "How to Be a Progressive Without Looking Like One: History and Knowledge 
in Bacon's New Atlantis." Achinstein argues that Bacon's project is, in fact, intended to enhance the power 
of the monarch. See also David Colclough's "Ethics and Politics in the New Atlantis," and Simon 
Wortham, "Censorship and the Institution of Knowledge in Bacon's New Atlantis." 
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This flattery of James is not mere sycophancy, however, but is intended to urge 
James to support Bacon's educational reforms and Great Instauration in substantial 
material ways. In the Epistle Dedicatory, Bacon asks that James follow Solomon's 
example in 
taking order for the collecting and perfecting of a Natural and 
Experimental History true and severe (unencumbered with literature and 
book-learning), such as philosophy may be built upon - such, in fact, as I 
shall in its proper place describe; that so at length, after the lapse of so 
many ages, philosophy and the sciences may no longer float in air, but rest 
on the solid foundation of experience of every kind, and the same well 
examined and weighed. I have provided the machine, but the rest must be 
gathered from nature. (PW 242). 
Bacon was not asking merely for James's encouragement; in fact, he hoped that James 
would provide resources to endow institutions in which the research for this natural and 
experimental history would occur. In the Advancement of Learning, Bacon identifies 
three "objects" involved in learning: places, books, and persons (PW 75). Regarding 
books, he was concerned with the institution of libraries for assembling the works of 
ancient authors and with commissioning the production of new and more accurate 
translations of these authors (75). 
There are four items to be considered regarding the places of learning: 
"foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with franchises and 
privileges, institutions and ordinances for government; all tending to quietness and 
privateness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles" (PW 76). Bacon was concerned 
that the colleges and universities of Europe were primarily places for professional 
education and argued that institutions dedicated to the arts and sciences were needed. He 
argued for institutions that were devoted to philosophical pursuits as a way of building up 
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knowledge to form a better foundation for philosophical education. He also sought to 
reform faculty compensation, arguing that the most competent teachers must be 
adequately compensated. Bacon also sought to encourage "men to sell their books and 
build furnaces" (PW 77). He wanted to build on the growing trend of experimental 
philosophy and sought means of providing the instruments for that work. Finally, he was 
concerned with the governance of educational institutions, particularly regarding 
curriculum and communication between and among institutions (PW 77-79). Bacon 
demonstrates the kind of institution he hopes James will establish in The New Atlantis. 
In establishing Solomon as the model for King Salomona and Solomon's learning 
as model for the intellectual activity undertaken there, Bacon manages to reconcile 
Christian tradition with the new practice of natural philosophy. Moreover, although the 
kind of natural philosophy he describes bears significant similarities with Stoic 
philosophy, he places it neatly within a Christian context. In addition, in describing a 
natural philosophy that is both theoretical and practical, he reconciles the conflict 
between the vita contemplativa and vita activa. The Fathers of the House of Salomon 
represent the kind of practice and institutions that will bring Bacon's Great Instauration 
to fruition. 
The apothegm that appears at the beginning of Bacon's Great Instauration is an 
almost perfect emblem of the role the wise individual ought to play in society. The wise 
individual reasons, i.e., applies method to observation in order to form generalized 
judgments. However, j udgment , or making knowledge, is not sufficient in Bacon's 
conceptualization. The wise individual is also required to communicate that knowledge 
for the "interest of present and future generations." This combination of reason, 
judgment, and utility is the essence of Bacon's attempt to reconcile the contemplative life 
of medieval scholasticism with the active life of Renaissance humanism. However, the 
basic conflict between the active and contemplative life was rooted in epistemological 
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inconsistencies, the conflict between scholastic dialectic and humanist rhetoric, between 
received theology and the contradictory discoveries of natural philosophers. Stoic 
philosophy provided a means to mediate these conflict. 
By the the time Francis Bacon was writing during the late Renaissance, a variety 
of epistemological activities were jostling against one another. Christian theology was 
secured by the revealed word of God, while scholasticism privileged the art of dialectic, 
which relied on the philosophical universals of syllogistic reasoning. Humanists, on the 
other hand, valued ancient texts and privileged the art of rhetoric for its utility in the 
contingent realm of human government. Renaissance humanism was concerned with the 
production of a normative subject, the vir bonus peritus dicendi (the good man speaking 
well). However, the values to which the Renaissance humanist conformed were not 
logically derived from nature, but from various texts and cultural institutions. In large 
part, recovered ancient texts led to the focus natural philosophy, which in turn challenged 
long-held ideas about the place of human beings in the natural world. Resulting 
technological advances not only changed the physical culture, but enlarged the known 
world. Stoic philosophy provided a way to reconcile many of these conflicts. Stoic 
naturalism provided a way to reconcile the conflicts between traditional Christianity and 
natural philosophy. The concept of the Sage, the wise individual, was also useful. While 
Renaissance humanism was concerned with the production of a normative subject, the vir 
bonus dicendi peritus (the good man speaking well), the values to which the Renaissance 
humanist conformed were not logically derived from nature. Stoic philosophically 
provided a foundation for objectively applying inductive logic to the study of God's 
natural creation in order to garner benefits for humankind. However, Bacon lived in a 
humanist age, in which virtue was allied with character. Thus, throughout the Great 
Instauration, Bacon illustrates the humanist values with human exemplars. and situates 
his new philosophy within humanist educational and religious institutions. In sum, 
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Bacon's new philosophy embeds significant aspects of Stoicism - its belief in Nature as 
normative and certain epistemological beliefs - within a Christian and humanist matrix. 
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CONCLUSION 
For man is but the servant and interpreter of nature; what he does and what 
he knows is only what he has observed of nature's order in fact or in 
thought; beyond this he knows nothing and can do nothing. For the chain 
of causes cannot by any force be loosed or broken, nor can nature be 
commanded except by being obeyed. And so these twin objects, human 
Knowledge and human Power, do really meet in one. 
Bacon at last, a mighty Man arose, 
Whom a wise King and Nature chose, 
Lord Chancellor of both their Laws, 
And boldly undertook the injured pupil's caus . . . .  
Like some old Giants more Gigantic Ghost, 
To terrify the Learned Rout, 
With the plain Magique of true Reasons Light, 
He chac' d out of our flight, 
Nor suffer'd Living Men to be misled, 
By the vain shadows of the Dead; 
-Francis Bacon 1 37  
To graves from which it rose the conquer'd Phantome fled; 
He broke that Monstrous God which stood . . . .  
131/nst. magno, Plan of the Work, PW 253. 
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The Orchard's open now, and free, 
Bacon has broke that Scare-crow Dietie; 
Come, enter all that will, 
Behold the ripen' d fruit come gather now your Fill; 
Yet still, methinks, we fain would be 
Catching at the Forbidden Tree, 
We would be like the Deitie 
When Truth and Falshood, Good and Evil, we 
Without the Sences aid within ourselves would see; 
For ' tis God only who can find, 
All Nature in his Mind . . . . .  
From Words, which are but the Pictures of the Thought, 
(Though we our Thoughts from them perversely drew) 
To Things, the Minds right Object, he it brought, 
Like foolish Birds, to painted Grapes we flew; 
He sought and gather'd for our use the True; 
And when on heaps the chosen Bunches lay, 
He prest them wisely the Mechanic way, 
Till all their juyce did in one Vessel joyn, 
Ferment into a nourishment Divine, 
The thirsty Souls refreshing Wine . . . . .  
Bacon, like Moses, let us forth at last, 
The barren Wilderness he past, 
Did on the very Border stand, 
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Of the blest promis'd Land, 
And from the Mountain Top of his Exalted Wit, 
Saw it himself, and shew' d us it. 
-Abraham Cowley 1 3 8  
The Renaissance was an age during which almost all foundations of cultural 
certainty were undercut. The Protestant Reformation questioned the authority of Catholic 
Church. New forms of government, new types of economic activity, and a resultant social 
mobility upended the stable, hierarchical social order. Discoveries of new lands, new 
technological inventions, and new ways of seeing the natural world led to new ways of 
understanding the relationship between human beings and the world. The humanist' s  
recovery of a variety of ancient texts injected a host of new ideas that challenged both the 
stultified logic of the scholastics and the contingent art of humanist rhetoric. The 
abandonment of Latin, the lingua franca, for the common vernacular languagues 
constituted an almost Babel-like confounding of the epistemological status quo. It was a 
time of intense cultural anxiety, but also a time of tremendous opportunity for new 
intellectual projects. It is, perhaps, no surprise that modern science would have its 
beginning during this period. Given the tremendous variety of ideas jostling against one 
another, it is appropriate to examine the ways in which the "new" natural philosophy 
achieved the kind of epistemological supremacy it now holds. Francis Bacon has long 
been recognized as one of the fathers of the scientific revolution, although it is clear that 
138 Ode to the Royal Society, ll. 37-40, 43-50, 58-78, 93-98 Publ. in Spratt History of the Royal Society. 
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his contribution is not consistent with that of many others such as Galileo's experiments 
view of the heliocentric universe or Robert Boyle's experiments with air pressure. 
Historians of science such as Alexandre Koyre have suggested that the idea that Bacon 
was a scientist is a joke. Others have suggested that his contribution was merely as the 
father of a plain style of discourse more suitable to scientific communication than the 
ornate sty le of Renaissance rhetoric. 
To assign Francis Bacon to the scrap heap of the scientific revolution or to limit 
his contribution to the invention of the plain style is to ignore the real impact of his 
philosophical works during the years subsequent to his death. While Bacon's rather 
peculiar philosophical method was never successfully implemented, even, so far as we 
know, by Bacon himself, his emphasis on the compilation of an exhaustive natural 
history as a foundation for practical, experimental science was taken seriously by a 
number of his near-contemporaries. Nevertheless, Bacon's contribution to the 
development of modern science was important. His role was that of an apologist for 
natural philosophy who used his considerable rhetorical skills to make a case for the 
acceptance of ideas and practices that were radically at odds with those of his 
contemporaries. Bacon's contributions to the changes that have been called the scientific 
revolution are both epistemological and institutional. First, he made the case for a view of 
nature as a rational and orderly creation the workings of which could be understood and 
manipulated by human beings. Second, he argued that natural philosophy was the 
appropriate foundation for all intellectual endeavors. Finally, he made the case for the 
establishment of institutions to support the work of natural philosophers. As an apologist 
for the new philosophy, Bacon drew from ancient philosophies, particularly Stoicism, 
using both the rhetorical skills and the cultural values of his humanist context. 
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The Stoic Humanism of Bacon's New Philosophy 
The philosophy of the Stoics, a synthesis of a variety of ancient philosophies, was 
a comprehensive system based upon the notion that the whole of the universe is the 
embodiment of reason. As such, it is ultimately perceptible by human beings who share 
in its rationality. For the Stoics, the ultimate good was to study nature and to conform to 
its rationality. They believed that physics, the study of nature, was the most important 
branch of philosophy and should form the basis for their logic and moral philosophies. It 
was a philosophy that valued the inward life of contemplation and meditation. 
Renaissance humanism privileged rhetoric as an architectonic art in a world of shifting 
values and valued the active life of service to one's community. Bacon's new "active 
science" combined both Stoicism' s emphasis on natural philosophy with the humanist 
desire to better the human condition. 
The passage from the Plan of the Work from Bacon's Instauratio magno is 
emblematic of his blending of Stoicism and humanism. His representation of humankind 
as the "servant and interpreter of nature" is derived from the Stoic notion of submission 
to the rationality of nature, but is also compatible with the Christian notion of submission 
to the will of God. Human knowledge is limited to what can be observed in nature using 
the rational faculty that defines human nature. The "chain of causes" to which Bacon 
· refers is more consonant with the Stoic notion of cause and effect than with the 
Aristotelian concept of the four causes. Bacon is not willing, however, to accept the 
fatalism that is part of Stoic philosphy. His humanistic sense of service to society is too 
strong. He intends not merely to study nature, but to reap its benefits for his fellow 
beings, recognizing, however, that nature cannot "be commanded except by being 
obeyed." Thus, in Bacon's philosophy, "human Kno'wledge and human Power, do really 
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meet in one." The humanistic impulse toward bettering society transforms Stoic 
knowledge of nature into power over the natural world. 
Natural History 
The most successful element of Bacon's program for human learning is the notion 
that a thorough gathering of particulars was necessary before deriving general principles. 
Bacon draws from Stoic epistemology. In the division of the disciplines in Bacon's  
Advancement of Learning, Bacon organizes the "parts of human learning" according to 
the psychological faculties of memory, reason, and imagination. He allots history to the 
memory, philosophy to reason, and poesy to the imagination (PW 79). Each major 
division of studies, i.e., natural, civil, ecclesiastical, or literary, is subdivided into 
according to these parts. In all cases, history is the foundation upon which the other parts 
are founded. The notion that a comprehensive natural history is a necessary beginning for 
natural philosophy is Bacon's  most tangible contribution to the practice of early modern 
natural philosophy. Among the early examples of texts which followed Bacon's 
description of a natural history was Joshua Childrey's  Britannica Baconia: Or, the 
Natural! Rarities of England, Scotland, and Wales in 1 661 . In 1662, John Graunt and 
William Petty published Natural and Political Observations . . .  Made Upon the Bills of 
Mortality, and in 1665 London 's Dreadful Visitation, a collection of the Bills of Mortality 
for the year 1664. Among the most articulate and effective adherents to Bacon's belief in 
the need for a comprehensive natural history were John Wilkins, founder of the Royal 
Society, and Robert Hooke. 
In addition to being the leading light in the founding of the Royal Society, John 
Wilkins is best known for his attempts to establish a universal language, which he 
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describes in his Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language, 
published in 1 668. Wilkins follows Bacon's pattern of gathering the largest possible 
particular instances from which to infer generalities. Wilki11:s makes a distinction between 
being and knowing as they are related to the development of a metaphysics: "The 
particulars are .first in the order of Being, yet Generals are first in the order of Knowing. 
Now the proper end and design of Metaphysic should be to enumerate and explain those 
more general terms, which by reason of their Universality and Comprehensiveness, are 
above all those heads of things styled Predicaments, or else common to several of them . .  
. .  " (24). Wilkins' attempt to develop a universal language are not merely an attempt to 
develop a simplified language, but are part of the kind of a comprehensive program that 
had implications not merely for institutionalized science, but for society as a whole. 
Robert Hooke was first employed by the fellows of the Royal Society in 1 662 as 
Curator of Experiments, but was not elected a fellow until 1 665. In 1 677, he became one 
of the Secretaries of the Society. He was a professor of Geometry at Gresham College, 
Oxford, and is perhaps best known as author of Micrographia, in which he documented 
the results of his examination of bodies, great and small, terrestrial and astronomical, 
using a magnifying lens. He was also author of a text on natural philosophy : A General 
Scheme, or Idea of the Present State o/Natural Philosophy. The extended subtitle of this 
text indicates that the remediation of its defects should include experimentation as well as 
"collecting observations" in order to compile "a natural history as the solid basis for the 
superstructure of true philosophy" (Posthumous Works). Hooke's Natural Philosophy 
closely follows Bacon's plan in its early stages. While Bacon calls his method as the 
Novum Organum, Hooke sets out to develop a "True Method of Building a Solid 
Philosophy or of a Philosophical Algebra" (7). He divides the project into three parts: 
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1 st, An Examination of the Constitution and Powers of the Soul, or an 
Attempt of Disclosing the Soul to it self, being an Endeavour of 
Discovering the Perfections and Imperfections of Humane Nature, and 
finding out ways and means for the attaining of the one, and the helping of 
the other; 
2ndly, A Method of making use of, or employing these Means and 
Assistances of Humane Nature for collecting the Phenomena of Nature, 
and for compiling of a Philosophical History, consisting of an exact 
description of all forms of Natural and Artificial Operations, or a Method 
of making Experiments and Observations for the Prosecution and 
Examination of any Philosophical Inquiry. 
3rdly, A Method of describing, registering, and ranging these 
Particulars so collected, as that they may become the most adapted 
Materials for the raising of Axioms and the Perfecting of Natural 
Philosophy. (7-8) 
Hooke's natural philosophy both adheres to and extends Bacon's work in significant 
ways. His defects of the soul are effectively a recounting of Bacon's Idols of the M ind, 
but he is much more specific regarding the "perfections." His experimental methods go 
far beyond Bacon's tables for induction. Clearly, however, he is a true _disciple of Francis 
Bacon and adopts his belief in a normative natural philosophy. 
The Father of the Royal Society 
What is perhaps Bacon's most important contribution to the development of 
modern science is the notion that the state should establish and support an institution to 
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support the advancement of natural philosophy. The House of Salomon in the New 
Atlantis is an example of a collegial philosophical institution that he describes in the 
Advancement of Learning, which served as a model for the institution of the British 
Royal Society. Bacon died in 1 626 and the Royal Society was not established until 1 662, 
so that he was not directly involved in the establishment the institution. However, the 
notion that an experimental society ought to be an officially recognized and supported 
part of national culture is clearly consistent with Bacon's plan. The establishment of the 
Royal Society and its early history led to a number of conflicts, but the question of 
whether a society to explore natural philosophy ought even to exist was no longer an 
issue. 1 39 
At the beginning of the second book of The Advancement of Learning, Bacon 
suggests that James I should be concerned, not only with leaving behind heirs to the 
throne, but to "be conversant not only in the transitory parts of good government, but in 
those acts which also are in their nature permanent and perpetual" (PW 15). The most 
appropriate of these acts, in Bacon's view, is to "[endow] the world with sound and 
fruitful knowledge" (76). The works related to learning had three foci: "the places of 
learning, the books of learning, and the persons of the learned" (75). Like water, which is 
wasted unless it is "collected into some receptacle where it may by union and comfort 
and sustain itself' (75) the 
excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from divine inspiration 
or spring from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to oblivion if it 
139 See Michael Hunter, Establishing the New Science: The Experience of the Early Royal Society for an 
extensive examination of the founding of the Royal Society and its relationship to the wider po lity of 
seventeenth-century England. See also Shaeffer and Shap in, Leviathan and the Air Pump for an extensive 
examination of one of the controversies that formed the context of these cultural negotiations. 
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were not preserved in books, traditions, conferences, and places appointed, 
as universities, colleges, and schools, for the receipt and comforting of the 
same. (75-76). 
The House of Salomon in the New Atlantis represents the kind of intellectual institution 
Bacon describes in Advancement of Learning. Its fellows, who are among the society's 
most revered and wealthy members, engaged in both theoretical and applied studies, and 
gathered knowledge, theories, and inventions from all parts of the intellectual globe. It is 
also, according to Joseph Glanvill, the model for the British Royal Society : "Salomon's 
House in the NEW ATLANTIS was a Prophetick Scheam of the ROYAL SOCIETY" 
(65). 
The notion of an intellectual fraternity engaged in the study of natural philosophy 
was, like many of his ideas, not original to Bacon. 140 The earliest of these societies was 
the Italian Academie Lincei (the Academy of the Lynx), founded in 1 603 by the 
nobleman Francesco Cesi, whose most famous member was Galileo Galilei. The 
Accademie Fran�ais, founded by Cardinal Richelieu, also predated the Royal Society, but 
pursued a theoretical rather than experimental approach. According to its first historian 
Thomas Sprat, the small group of individuals who formed the core of the Royal Society 
first began meeting "some space after the end of the Civil Wars" (53) in John Wilkins 
lodgings at Wadham College, Oxford, where they continued intermittently until about 
1658 .  The group reconstituted itself in 1660 and was incorporated by Charles II as the 
Royal Society in 1 662. 
140 See Martha Ornstein, The Role of Scientific Socieities in the Seventeenth Century, for a history of these 
acadamies and societies. 
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The significance of Francis Bacon to the Royal Society is apparent in the 
frontispiece of Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal Society, in which Bacon is pictured 
along with Charles II and Lord Brouncker, who was president of the Royal Society. 
Bacon's influence is also celebrated in Abraham's Cowley's ode "To the Royal Society," 
which is reproduced at the beginning of Thomas Sprat's history. Cowley not only adopts 
Bacon's metaphor of knowledge as a sweet liquid which must be gathered and preserved, 
but also argues that previous generations had limited philosophy to the study of discourse 
when its true province should be the study of nature. Bacon, "like Moses" had led 
humankind from the captivity of ancient philosophy, but never entered the promised land. 
Exploration of that land was left to the Fellows of the Royal Society. Bacon's influence is 
also apparent in Sprat's history of philosophy in the goals of the Royal Society as they 
are articulated by Sprat in his history. 
Their purpose is, in short, to make faithful Records of all the Works of 
Nature, or Art, which can come within their reach; that so the present Age, 
and posterity, may be able to put a mark on the Errors which have been 
strengthened by long prescriptions, to restore the Truths, that have lain 
neglected; to push on those, which are already known, to more various 
uses: and to make the way more passable, to what remains unreveal'd. 
This is the compass of their Design. And to accomplish this, they have 
indeavor'd, to separate the knowledge of Nature, from the colours of 
Rhetorick, the devices of Fancy, or the delightful deceit of Fables. (6 1-63) 
They recommended similar reforms to the curriculum and advocated the remedy the error 
that "Seats of Knowledge have been for the most part heretofore, not Laboratories as they 
ought to be, but onely Scholes, where some have taught, and all the rest subscrib'd" (68). 
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They also invited scholars from various professions and from different parts of Europe. 
Finally, what distinguished the Royal Society most particularly was its emphasis on 
experimental philosophy and the method by which they carried it out. According to Sprat, 
two things governed their experiments. First, they prescribed no particular "art of 
Experimenting" but kept themselves free to adapt their methods to "different 
circumstances, that occur to them in their operations; and the several alterations of the 
Bodies on which they work" (89). Further, they determined to "regard the least, and the 
plainest of things, and those that may appear at first the most inconsiderable" (90), 
reasoning that their predecessors had erred in collecting only extraordinary examples of 
the qualities of matter. Like Bacon, they believed a true and accurate natural history was 
an essential foundation upon which to build further knowledge. 
* * * 
In Leviathan and the Air Pump, Shaff er and Shapin examine a controversy 
between the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle, one of the early 
members of the Royal Society and author of a series of experiments utilizing his 
invention, the air pump, to investigate a variety of questions about that most ubiquitous 
material, the answers to which ·we now take for granted. A consequence of the 
controversy that that is of greatest interest to Shaffer and Shapin is that Hobbes, who was 
a member of the Royal Society and was known in his day as an accomplished natural 
philosopher, is now remembered almost exclusively for his political writings. Hobbes had 
been, in fact, "virtually written out of the history of science" by the end of the eighteenth 
century (8). Shaffer and Shapin conclude that Hobbes' s disappearance from the history of 
2 10  
science is not necessarily a result of his ideas being inherently wrong, but reflects a 
fundamental difference in what counts as scientific knowledge : "which propositions were 
to be counted as meaningful and which absurd, which problems were soluble and which 
not, how various grades of certainty were to be distributed among intellectual items, 
where the boundaries of authentic knowledge were to be drawn" (332). They argue that 
the Hobbes-Boyle controversy represents a conflict; it is not merely a scientific debate, 
but a serious disagreement about how and where science ought to be performed. It 
illustrates their contention that "there is a conditional relationship between between the 
nature of the polity occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity" 
(332) .  The disappearance of Hobbes from the history of science suggests that the 
experimental form of philosophy championed by Bacon had clearly triumphed. 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, there is no question that the polity 
occupied by scientific intellectuals was a precarious space, indeed. Early modem natural 
philosophers, in many cases, practiced at their own risk within a larger polity which was, 
itself, plagued by uncertainties. The so-called scientific revolution was only possible 
because a place was opened within that wider polity for it to occur. By skillfully blending 
the Stoic attitude of normative nature with the Christian concept of nature as a second 
divine text within the context of civic humanism, Francis Bacon helped to authorize the 
pursuit of experimental natural philosophy. Though his scientific method per se was 
never practiced, his contributions as an apologist for the development of early modem 
science are beyond question. " 
2 1 1 
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